Order 15731 - Bell Atlantic: Division Initiated Investigation

REPORT AND ORDER

The Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers ("Division") initiated this docket to fully investigate the circumstances surrounding a Bell Atlantic - Rhode Island ("Bell Atlantic") March 31, 1998 telephone service interruption.  [1 The Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission, during an open meeting conducted on April 1, 1998, also called for an investigation of the March 31 outage. The Commission requested that the Division provide it with a copy of its findings.]

The basis for the investigation rests on two quality of service and public safety related issues; specifically, (1) that the service interruption lasted over 40 minutes and that over 90,000 Bell Atlantic access lines were impacted, and (2) that Bell Atlantic failed to immediately notify the Division of the service interruption, or public safety officials in the area(s) affected by the service interruption. The Division's jurisdiction over these issues is derived from the legislative mandate contained in Rhode Island General Laws ("R.I.G.L."), Section 39-4-13. This section requires the Division to protect ratepayers from "unreasonable", "insufficient" and "inadequate" telephone service; and when a lack of telephone service endangers public health.

Bell Atlantic was duly noticed pursuant to R.I.G.L. Section 39-4-15 of the instant investigation on June 1, 1998. In that same notice, Bell Atlantic was directed to appear before the Division on June 25, 1998 for "a formal hearing and investigation" (See Hearing Officer Exh. 1).

The following individuals entered appearances at the June 25, 1998 hearing:

For Bell Atlantic:                                   Jeffrey J. Binder, Esq.

For the Division's Advocacy Section:    Elizabeth Kelleher, Esq.

Bell Atlantic proffered two witnesses at the June 25 hearing to explain the circumstances surrounding the March 31 service interruption and its failure to notify regulatory and public safety officials. The Division's Advocacy Section proffered three witnesses in response.

Mr. Michael Fraine, Bell Atlantic's Director of Network Operations, introduced himself as the individual responsible "... for operations for the network services side of the business in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont and Rhode Island" (Tr. 10). Mr. Fraine related that he is in charge of the day-to-day provisioning and maintenance of the Providence switch and the other switches in Rhode Island.

Mr. Fraine testified that the service interruption that took place on March 31 occurred at 11:00 p.m., while Bell Atlantic technicians were performing work associated with a "growth job" (Tr. 12). He related that the growth work was being done to provide additional trunk capacity to meet the increased demand coming from competitive local exchange carriers (Id.). Mr. Fraine characterized the work as "routine" (Id.).

Mr. Fraine related that the growth work in issue involved adding "peripheral equipment" to the central office switch (Tr. 18). This equipment is used to connect the central office switch to lines and trunks (Tr. 13). Mr. Fraine explained that when a customer takes their phone off the hook, it is sensed by peripheral equipment which in turn sends a message to a message switch, which in turn sends a message to the central processing unit, which in turn sends instructions back to the message switch to set up a connection (Tr. 14-15).

Mr. Fraine also explained that Bell Atlantic uses DMS-100 switches, manufactured by Northern Telecom. He testified that these switches utilize two central processing units, two sets of memory, and two message switches (Tr. 15). According to the witness the DMS-100 switch is designed to run with one of the central processing units and its associated memory active, while the other central processing unit, with its associated memory, is in a "standby mode" (Tr. 16). Mr. Fraine testified that this "duplex mode," which also includes the message switches, allows the switch to keep functioning even when individual components fail (Tr. 16-17).

Mr. Fraine related that in order to add peripheral equipment it was necessary for Bell Atlantic "to grow the message switches to consolidate and add additional circuit packs" (Tr. 18). He explained that the DMS-100 switch has two message switches, called "message switch 0" and "message switch 1." Mr. Fraine testified that these message switches reside on a bay that is two feet wide by seven feet tall. Each message switch has its own separate shelf. He related that each shelf has its own power feed in furtherance of providing redundant protection (Tr. 20-21). Mr. Fraine related that the circuit packs or "control cards" come in two basic sizes, 64 ports and 128 ports, and are used to energize the switch and facilitate the message communications between the central processing unit and the message switch (Tr. 20-21). The witness explained that in order to expand a message switch additional control cards (ports) must be added. He testified that this is what Bell Atlantic was doing on the evening of March 31, 1998.

Mr. Fraine testified that on the evening of March 31, Bell Atlantic was completing the work of installing sixteen new control cards into the front and back of both message switches (Tr. 22). He explained that eight new cards were installed into the front and back of message switch 0 on March 29, and that on March 31 similar new cards were being installed into message switch 1 (Tr. 25).

Mr. Fraine did note that on March 29 the technicians experienced an unplanned "two minute initialization" or "warm restart" when message switch 1 was removed from service (Tr. 25). He explained that Bell Atlantic personnel subsequently performed a planned "cold restart" to "clean up" the switch (Tr. 84). He related that the switch was tested thereafter and found to be working properly (Tr. 84). Mr. Fraine stated that even though the switch was working properly after the cold restart on March 30, Bell Atlantic elected to have additional technical staff present when the growth job continued on March 31.

The witness explained that on March 31 message switch 1 was placed out of service, thereby changing the DSM-100 switch operation mode from "duplex" to "simplex." This procedure was a necessary step in the process of augmenting the message switch's control cards (ports). He related that after the cards were inserted the technicians observed that the indicator light for message switch 0 displayed that it was also out of service (Tr. 24). Mr. Fraine testified that upon detecting that both message switches were out of service, the technicians immediately took steps to bring message switch 1 back on line.

Mr. Fraine testified that when message switch 1 was repowered it first initialized or reconfigured itself, as expected (Tr. 32-33). However, after completing its initialization it "went into another initialization" (Tr. 34). He related that after the second initialization it began to initialize again. Upon seeing that message switch 1 was "not coming up," Mr. Fraine related that the technicians decided to power down message switch 1 and remove the eight control cards that were installed minutes before. He testified that after the cards were removed message switch 1 was repowered, and ultimately recovered over the "outage time" in issue (Tr. 34).

Mr. Fraine testified that during the two weeks following the service interruption, Bell Atlantic sent the control cards from the two message switches to Northern Telecom in Raleigh, North Carolina (Tr. 35-36). Mr. Fraine related that in Raleigh the cards were stress tested in the vendor's lab. He testified that the lab technicians "didn't find anything wrong with the packs" (Tr. 36). Mr. Fraine also explained that while the Raleigh lab was doing its tests on the control cards, Bell Atlantic technicians were contemporaneously testing the message switches and their links in Providence (Id.). He testified that in the end all of the associated packs and switch components tested free of defects (Tr. 36-40).

Mr. Fraine also explained that following the outage Bell Atlantic conducted an investigation to determine whether the technicians installing the control cards on March 31 acted properly. According to the witness, it was determined that the technicians "were following the procedure as laid out by the vendor" (Tr. 39). Mr. Fraine related that "the vendor reviewed it as well and concurred with that" (Id.).

In the final analysis, Mr. Fraine testified that Northern Telecom and Bell Atlantic experts have agreed that the outage resulted from "a marginal hardware component" (Tr. 40-41). Mr. Fraine described a marginal hardware component as follows:

... There are occasions, I had not seen within a DMS switch before, but we had occasions where sometimes the action taken is to reseat a pack. The connection that's made, it could have some sort of -- I mean, you have pins that connect, you could have insulating -- an insulator or dirt, something like that. It's very rare to have something come to this point in terms of an outage; but you might have a piece of equipment that goes out of service, you diagnose it and it's indicating a particular pack, you take the pack out, you put a new pack in, diagnose it, all tests pass, take that pack, put the old pack in, diagnose it, all tests pass. That does -- it does happen on occasion that you don't find a particular component that you can say, 'That's the one.' You don't like it; but it does happen in computer technology.

Q. And that was the case here?

A. Yes. (Tr. 41-42).

Mr. Fraine next discussed Bell Atlantic's failure to notify the E-911 Uniform Emergency Telephone System Division ("E-911 Division") of the outage. Regarding this breach of procedure, Mr. Fraine testified as follows:

We messed up. We messed up in our notification procedure in the Network Operations Center. That's where the responsibility lies for the notification ... The responsibility for notification lies in the Network Operations Center. The people in the switch location aren't there 24 hours a day, aren't necessarily there 24 hours a day. So you have to rely on an organization that's consistently there to take care of the notification. (Tr. 42-43).

Mr. Fraine explained that the Network Operations Center ("NOC") is in Manchester, NH and serves both a "facility" function and a "switch" function (Tr. 43). He related that the NOC is responsible for notifying the E-911 Division or local police in the New England states in the context of both functions. Mr. Fraine described a fiber break as an example of an outage necessitating a "facility" function notification to the E-911 Division. A "switch" function notification is required when a "planned" outage is contemplated (Tr. 43-44). Mr. Fraine characterized the outage in issue as an "unplanned ... switch" outage (Tr. 44-45).

Mr. Fraine testified that the NOC personnel in Manchester had not experienced a switch outage "of any magnitude that would require us to make that notification" prior to March 31, 1998 (Tr. 45). He opined that "the techs are out of practice" (Tr. 45). Mr. Fraine also related that a cell phone conversation between a manager in Providence and NOC personnel resulted in confusion relative to the matter of whether proper notification was actually made (Tr. 45-46).

Mr. Fraine next discussed the specific notification procedures that the NOC should have followed on March 31. He referred to Bell Atlantic's "Significant Network Failure Notification Procedure" as the procedure that should have been followed. He explained that for a Rhode Island outage, the NOC is required to first contact the E-911 Division. He also noted that the Rhode Island E-911 Division telephone number is provided on the procedure document. He further explained that in addition to the E-911 Division, the NOC is required to contact the following persons:

In addition to that [E-911 Division], people further down the list are contacted, myself, the manager who works for me who manages the switch technicians in the Network Operations Center, my boss is on the list, the organization that manages outages for the company is contacted, and then various other organizations including public relations in the associated state so they can take care of notification of organizations such as the Division in Rhode Island ...(Tr. 48-49).

Mr. Fraine also emphasized the importance of the NOC's duty to immediately contact the E-911 Division. He acknowledged that the E-911 Division must be contacted so that the E-911 Division can subsequently contact local police in the outage area. He related the following:

Typically what might happen, the 911 Bureau might contact the local police and have them stationed in cruisers in neighborhoods so if I'm having a heart attack my wife can run out and get help (Tr. 50).

During the cross-examination phase of Mr. Fraine's testimony the following additional information was recorded:

- That the outage was actually 46 minutes long and that 99,090 access lines were affected (Tr. 76);

- That Bell Atlantic's policy is to notify the E-911 Division only when a certain threshold of affected customers is reached. Mr. Fraine testified that he could not remember the threshold, but estimated it at between 300 and 500 customers (Tr. 92-93);

- That prior to the March 31 outage, Bell Atlantic had not conducted any E-911 Division notification drills in preparation for unplanned switch-related failures. Since the March 31 failure Bell Atlantic has implemented and conducted "false alarm" outage drills (Tr. 115-117);

- That since the March 31 outage, Bell Atlantic has increased its training for NOC personnel for the purpose of emphasizing notification protocols (Tr. 117) and;

- That no Bell Atlantic personnel were reprimanded or disciplined over the March 31 notification failure (Tr. 118).

The Division's Advocacy Section called Ms. Marion Donnelly, the E-911 Division's Public Education and Information Coordinator as a witness. Ms. Donnelly represented that she is also currently the E-911 Division's Acting Director of Operations.

Ms. Donnelly prefaced her statement by emphasizing that she has worked closely with Bell Atlantic:

... to make sure that we were all in sync so that we understood if we had a problem who we called and if they had a problem how important it was that they notify us as soon as possible so that we can react in a proper manner (Tr. 55).

Ms. Donnelly explained that prior to the March 31 outage, Bell Atlantic personnel would contact the E-911 Division each time a "planned" outage was to take place. She related that they would follow up in writing and provide as many details as possible. She noted that these contacts usually were made "a week or two ahead of time" (Tr. 55). Ms. Donnelly related that this information was then circulated to E-911 Division supervisory staff. She testified that it was common for the E-911 Division and Bell Atlantic staffs to establish a "bridge call" during these planned outages in order to maximize the flow of timely information (Tr. 56).

For unplanned outages, Ms. Donnelly testified that Bell Atlantic has a procedure in place which requires it to notify the E-911 Division. She related that "in the past we've been notified" (Tr. 59). She also testified that since the March 31 outage, E-911 Division and Bell Atlantic personnel have met to discuss notification procedures and future practice drills (Tr. 60-61). She opined that if Bell Atlantic follows its procedures in the future, and there are no other notification failures, the E-911 Division will be "satisfied" (Tr. 61). Ms. Donnelly also suggested that Bell Atlantic and E-911 Division personnel meet on a regular basis, perhaps every six months, to discuss notification procedures (Tr. 62).

Ms. Donnelly did provide some comments regarding the March 31 outage. She confirmed that the E-911 Division was never contacted by Bell Atlantic regarding the outage. She related that she had to contact Bell Atlantic herself on the morning of April 1 (about 7:30 a.m.) for an explanation of the March 31 outage (Tr. 63).

Ms. Donnelly testified that during the 46 minute outage the E-911 Division was unable to receive "Providence calls" (Tr. 64). She also related that the E-911 Division was unable to contact the Providence police and fire departments over the phone system. She explained that communications between the E-911 Division and the Providence police and fire departments had to be established over "intercity radio" (Id.). She also testified that E-911 Division personnel were sent to the Rhode Island State Police Headquarters, where the State maintains a "secondary answering point" (Tr. 64-65). However, she noted that it was not necessary to activate the secondary answering point.

Ms. Donnelly also testified that during the outage E-911 Division personnel attempted to contact Bell Atlantic's NOC in Manchester, but were unable to get through (Tr. 65-66). She testified that E-911 Division personnel queried Bell Atlantic about their inability to get through to Manchester, however, according to the witness, Bell Atlantic has yet to provide an answer (Tr. 66-67).

The Division's Advocacy Section also proffered Mr. Joseph P. Richardson, Jr. as a witness in this case. Mr. Richardson was identified as the Deputy Director of Communications within Providence's Department of Public Safety.

Mr. Richardson asserted that in the event of telephone service outages, or possible outages, Bell Atlantic is supposed to notify his department (Tr. 129). Mr. Richardson related that upon receiving this notification his department contacts the City's fire and police departments so that the City is prepared for the outage (Tr. 129-130). The witness stated that Bell Atlantic has followed this notification procedure in the past (Tr. 130).

Mr. Richardson testified that Bell Atlantic provided no such notification relative to the March 31 outage (Tr. 131). He related that his communications center dispatcher contacted him around 11:00 p.m. on March 31 to report a telephone service outage in the City. Mr. Richardson stated that he thereupon contacted the NOC in Manchester via a cellular telephone to determine the extent and possible duration of the outage. He related that the NOC could not provide any information other than to confirm that an outage was in progress (Tr. 132-133). Mr. Richardson related that he subsequently requested the police and fire departments to "go on the air," meaning that they ought to rely on their radio systems in lieu of telephones (Tr. 133). He also testified that police and fire units were moved out into the streets to better facilitate communications with the public (Id.).

In his concluding comments, Mr. Richardson suggested that Bell Atlantic install "an independent or a separate phone line," using radio technology if necessary, between its central office and his department to ensure that Providence emergency personnel can be contacted during an outage (Tr. 136). He also opined that regular meetings would be helpful (Id.).

The Advocacy Section also proffered Mr. James E. Lanni as a witness. Mr. Lanni was identified as the Division's Associate Administrator of Operations. Mr. Lanni sponsored a one page exhibit entitled "Telephone Notice of Certain Service Failures" (Advocacy Section Exh. 3). Mr. Lanni testified that this notice was forwarded to Bell Atlantic on April 10, 1997, and requires Bell Atlantic to immediately contact the Division by telephoning one or more specific Division staff members in the event of an outage affecting 500 or more customers (Tr. 141-142).  [2 The notice provides both business and residential telephone numbers for three named Division staff members. Mr. Lanni is identified on the notice as the first person to contact.]  Mr. Lanni asserted that Bell Atlantic failed to provide the Division with the required notice during the March 31 outage (Tr. 142).

Mr. Lanni testified that he first learned of the outage at 8:30 a.m. on April 1 when he arrived at work. He related that a message was left on his voice mail, at 6:02 a.m., from a Bell Atlantic employee  [3 Albeit Bell Atlantic questions the legal validity of the notice (Advocacy Section Exh. 3), Bell Atlantic stipulates that its personnel are familiar with the notice and the directives contained therein (Tr. 146-147).]  (Mr. Philip Wood) (Tr. 142).

As its last witness, the Advocacy Section requested an opportunity to question Ms. Theresa L. O'Brien, Bell Atlantic's Director of Regulatory Affairs  [4 Ms. O'Brien was present and made available to the Division.]  Ms. O'Brien was asked to detail Bell Atlantic's outage notification procedures. She deferred to Mr. Fraine on the comprehensive details, but she did discuss her specific responsibilities under the existing procedure. In short, Ms. O'Brien stated that it is her responsibility to contact the Division (Tr. 150). She explained, however, that in order to know of the outage and be able to notify the Division, she must first be contacted by the NOC.

Ms. O'Brien was also asked to reconcile a Providence Journal article wherein Bell Atlantic's president was quoted as being prepared to offer rebates to those customers affected by the March 31 outage, with a Bell Atlantic data response offered in this docket. The specific data response is reproduced below:

At the time of the incident, Bell Atlantic - Rhode Island was considering making some form of rebate to its customers. In the weeks following the Providence switch failure, the Company carefully examined the factors relating to this outage, namely, duration, time of day, potential customer impact and tariff requirements. The tariff provides for a prorata adjustment of charges for any complete failure of local service which lasts more than 24 hours. In this instance, the duration of the outage was 97% less than the threshold addressed in the tariff. Accordingly, Bell Atlantic decided to handle any customer complaints on a case-by-case basis (Advocacy Section Exh. 1)

In response to this question, Ms. O'Brien related that Bell Atlantic based this position on specific language contained in its approved rate tariff (Tr. 152-153) The pertinent tariff language is reproduced below:

For any complete failure of local exchange service continued more than 24 hours and brought to the notice of the Telephone Company within ten days, the Telephone Company will make a prorata adjustment of charges or guarantee. For the purpose of determining a prorata adjustment, every month is considered to have 30 days  [5 Excerpt from Bell Atlantic tariff "PUC - RI - No. 15", effective June 9, 1995.]  (Advocacy Section Exh. 4).

Ms. O'Brien testified that under the provisions of the tariff, because the outage was less than 24 hours, Bell Atlantic is not required to rebate its customers (Tr. 154-155).

At the conclusion of the hearing the Advocacy Section offered a statement with respect to the March 31 service outage. The Advocacy Section called the outage "significant" and called attention to our fortune that the outage did not lead to a "disaster" (Tr. 158).

The Advocacy Section cited Bell Atlantic's failure to provide the required notification, and further faulted Bell Atlantic for not providing the E-911 Division with notification of a possible outage "before the work started" (Tr. 159).

As a consequence of the 46 minute outage, the Advocacy Section recommended that affected customers receive a refund from Bell Atlantic. The Advocacy Section cited R.I.G.L., Sections 39-4-10 and 39-3-13.1 as the legal bases for the refund. As for the tariff language relied upon by Bell Atlantic, the Advocacy Section called it inapplicable under the circumstances (Tr. 161-162). Accordingly, the Advocacy Section recommended a $.60 refund to each affected customer (access line), for a total refund of approximately $59,454 (Tr. 162-163).

In response to this recommendation, Bell Atlantic asserted that:

There's absolutely no legal authority to provide a rebate for the interruption of service in this matter. The tariff is crystal clear ... (Tr. 163).

Bell Atlantic contends that the tariff language is consistent with tariffs used in other states. According to Bell Atlantic, this tariff language is used to limit liability, not to provide notice that an outage has occurred (Tr. 163). Bell Atlantic concluded that a rebate would be improper as a matter of law.

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

After the June 25 hearing the parties expressed an interest in working toward a possible stipulated disposition which could be proposed to the undersigned hearing officer. As a result of this expression, a final report and order on the issues raised through this docket was delayed in order to give the parties time to explore the possibility of a settlement.

On November 4, 1998 the parties proffered a proposed "SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT" wherein the parties were able to agree on a disposition. The settlement agreement is attached to this report and order as Appendix 1, and is incorporated by reference. The attached settlement agreement, if adopted by the Administrator, would require Bell Atlantic to provide the following services as a penalty for the outage and notification failures which took place on March 31:

1. BA-RI, after analysis and consultation with the Division, will identify and implement a foreign exchange service which will diminish the risk of a service outage for the E-911 Public Service Answering Point location ("PSAP") at 1951 Smith Street in North Providence. The PSAP's main telephone number is (401) 354-0911. Providing foreign exchange service will minimize the risk of a service problem in the PSAP's regular serving central office.

2. BA-RI will absorb all non-recurring charges, including any premises work, if any, associated with the implementation of the foreign exchange service described in 1 above. BA-RI will also forego monthly billing of this foreign exchange arrangement for a period of five years.

FINDINGS

During the course of this investigation the Division has had an opportunity to thoroughly examine the events leading up to and through the 46 minute March 31, 1998 service outage, and the subsequent responsiveness displayed by Bell Atlantic. From this investigation the Division has reached a number of findings.

The record reflects that Bell Atlantic was performing "growth work" on March 31, 1998 in furtherance of augmenting its trunk capacity. Bell Atlantic has stated that the work was necessary to meet the increased demand coming from competing local exchange carriers. The record also reflects that in order to effectuate this expansion it was necessary for Bell Atlantic to disable certain features within its Providence switch. This disabling effectively transformed the Providence DMS-100 switch from a duplex switch with service back-up protection, to a simplex switch without any back-up protection. These facts are undisputed between the parties.

Bell Atlantic provided a very detailed description of the procedures and steps it used in performing this work. Bell Atlantic also detailed the equipment problems it encountered on March 31 which ultimately resulted in the 46 minute service interruption. The Advocacy Section was not critical of the work steps and procedures utilized by Bell Atlantic on March 31.

At this juncture, the Division must determine whether Bell Atlantic's work efforts on March 31, 1998 were unreasonable in any way. From the evidence of record, the Division must find that Bell Atlantic executed its "growth job" work on March 31 in a reasonable manner. The record reflects that Bell Atlantic had appropriate technicians doing the switch work on March 31 and that these technicians did all they could do to avert a protracted outage. The record also supports a conclusion that the equipment failure which caused the service outage, a marginal hardware component, was quite anomalous and unforeseeable. In fact, Mr. Fraine related that he had never experienced this type of malfunction in a DMS switch before (Tr. 41-42). This conclusion is further buttressed by Northern Telecom's conclusion that Bell Atlantic's technicians performed the switch work in issue in full conformance with its [Northern Telecom's] recommended procedures.

In reaching this conclusion, the Division did consider the preceding two minute outage which occurred on March 29. While this much shorter outage was connected to the same "growth job" the record does not substantiate a clear nexus between the two failures. However, as evidenced by Bell Atlantic's decision to field additional technicians at the Providence switch on March 31, Bell Atlantic was obviously troubled by the March 29 "two minute initialization." For this reason alone, Bell Atlantic should have contacted the E-911 Division to notify them that the work planned for March 31 could have resulted in a short service interruption.

The Division does not subscribe to the philosophy that every telephone service outage ought to result in fines and refunds. In this particular case, the record does not support a conclusion that Bell Atlantic's March 29 and 31 expansion work was reckless or negligent in any way. Consequently, the Division does not find that punitive action is warranted under the facts connected to the service outage.

Although the Division cannot fault Bell Atlantic for the marginal hardware component glitch which caused the 46 minute service outage on March 31, or the two minute initialization which occurred on March 29, the Division has before it a record replete with evidence that Bell Atlantic improperly and unreasonably withheld notification of the outage to the E-911 Division, the public safety officials in Providence and Division personnel. The record shows that despite Bell Atlantic's internal mandate to provide notification, as delineated in its "Significant Network Failure Notification Procedure," its managers and technicians failed to adhere to the notification protocols. Mr. Fraine testified that during the March 31 outage it was incumbent upon the Bell Atlantic NOC to directly contact E-911 Division personnel in Rhode Island. He related that the NOC was also responsible for contacting Bell Atlantic public relations staff in Rhode Island who in turn must contact the Division. Mr. Fraine attributed the NOC's failure to provide notice to "the techs ... [being] out of practice" (Tr. 45). He conceded that Bell Atlantic "messed up" (Tr. 42).

Not only did Bell Atlantic ignore its own notification protocols, it also ignored a written Division request for immediate notification of significant telephone service outages. Bell Atlantic admitted that it was aware of the Division's written notification request at the time of the March 31 service outage. Ms. O'Brien testified that she was unable, however, to notify the Division of the outage due to the NOC's failure to first notify her.

The Division finds that Bell Atlantic's failure to comply with its own notification procedures, and the Division's specific request for outage notification reflect both unprofessional and potentially dangerous conduct. The record clearly shows that Bell Atlantic has historically notified the E-911 Division and Providence's Department of Public Safety of both outages and possible outages associated with the Providence switch. Ms. Donnelly and Mr. Richardson both testified to this effect. Similarly, the "Telephone Notice of Certain Service Failures" directive forwarded to Bell Atlantic in 1997 by Mr. Lanni cannot be ignored. While the Division agrees with Bell Atlantic's assertion that the 1997 directive from Mr. Lanni cannot currently be accorded the weight of law, the record shows that Bell Atlantic was aware of the Division's request for notification. Indeed, Bell Atlantic's own internal notification procedures incorporate the Division's notification directive.

The Division must find this breach of notification "unprofessional" because Bell Atlantic failed to abide by its own outage notification protocols. Moreover, the record reflects that Bell Atlantic NOC personnel were not properly prepared or trained for the type of service outage experienced on March 31. This would explain why no disciplinary action resulted from the deficiencies in issue.

The Division finds the notification deficiencies "potentially dangerous" for obvious reasons. The purpose behind the notification to the Division and to public safety officials (E-911 Division) is to ensure that police and fire personnel can be alerted to the outage so that alternative emergency response measures may be implemented. Mr. Richardson described these alternative response measures in his testimony. This is why the timeliness of the notification is so crucial. The Division's "Telephone Notice of Certain Service Failures" directive, albeit informal, represents another level of communications designed to quickly notify public safety officials of a telephone service outage in progress.

For Bell Atlantic's March 31 notification failure, the Division will adopt the settlement agreement proffered by the parties. The Division finds the disposition proposal reasonable and suitably punitive based on the facts. Additionally, however, the Division will also direct Bell Atlantic to comply with the following remedial/corrective measures for the future:

First, Bell Atlantic is hereby ordered to comply with the Division's 1997 "Telephone Notice of Certain Service Failures" directive, as identified herein. This order will also apply to any future modifications made to the 1997 telephone service outage notification directive.

Second, Bell Atlantic is hereby ordered to provide notification to the E-911 Division and local authorities, of all telephone service outages, or potential outages, involving more than 300 access lines. This notification shall be provided in a timely manner.

Third, Bell Atlantic is hereby ordered to meet, at least annually, with members of the E-911 Division to discuss notification procedures and practice drills.

Fourth, Bell Atlantic is hereby ordered to conduct whatever additional training it deems appropriate for the purpose of better familiarizing its NOC and local personnel with its own "Significant Network Failure Notification Procedure" and the notification mandates established through this order. This training shall take place on a regular basis.

CONCLUSION

Through this order, the Division shall take a first step toward officially mandating specific notification procedures for local exchange carriers to follow in the event of significant telephone outages, or potential outages. The goal is "...to protect and promote the convenience, health, comfort, safety, accommodation, and welfare of the people" (R.I.G.L., Section 39-1-1(a)(2)).

Accordingly, it is

(15731) ORDERED:

1. That Bell Atlantic - Rhode Island shall abide by all findings and directives discussed and contained herein.

2. That the attached settlement agreement is hereby approved and adopted.

3. That the Division's 1997 "Telephone Notice of Certain Service Failures" is hereby adopted in toto by the Division, and consequently conferred the full force and effect of law.

Dated and Effective at Providence, Rhode Island on November 17, 1998.

RI Division of Public Utilities and Carriers

============================================================

"APPENDIX 1"

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES AND CARRIERS

Investigation into telephone service outage of March 31, 1998

Docket No. D-98-21

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

On March 31, 1998, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Bell Atlantic-Rhode Island ("BA-RI") experienced a switch outage in Providence that lasted approximately 46 minutes. BA-RI did not notify E-911 authorities or the Division of Public Utilities and Carriers ("Division") during the unplanned outage. The Division's Advocacy section conducted a formal investigation and hearing on June 25, 1998, pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws, Section 39-4-14. The hearing developed a complete record of the circumstances surrounding the outage and E-911 notification concerns. The factual and legal issues were subsequently briefed by the Advocacy Section and BA-RI.

In order to assure that such notification lapses do not occur in the future, BA-RI fully described their internal notification procedures which were implemented subsequent to the March 31, 1998 outage during the hearing in this docket. The Advocacy section concurs with the implementation of these procedures.

After full and thorough consideration of the facts, law and other circumstances in connection with the March 31, 1998, unplanned outage, the Advocacy Section and BA-RI agree that the public interest and safety will best be furthered by the terms of this agreement rather than further litigation of the issues pending before the Hearing Officer. Accordingly, the Advocacy Section and BA-RI agree:

1. BA-RI, after analysis and consultation with the Division, will identify and implement a foreign exchange service which will diminish the risk of a service outage for the E-911 Public Service Answering Point location ("PSAP") at 1951 Smith Street in North Providence. The PSAP's main telephone number is (401) 354-0911. Providing foreign exchange service will minimize the risk of a service outage for the PSAP in the event of a service problem in the PSAP's regular serving central office.

2. BA-RI will absorb all non-recurring charges, including any premises work, if any, associated with the implementation of the foreign exchange service described in 1 above. BA-RI will also forego monthly billing of this foreign exchange arrangement for a period of five years.

3. BA-RI and the Advocacy Section will seek a final order in this matter requesting approval of the settlement agreement and dismissal of this docket with prejudice to both parties.

4. The Division and BA-RI further agree that by entering into this Settlement neither party makes any admissions of fact or concessions on any legal issues litigated in this docket.

Respectfully submitted,

BELL ATLANTIC-RHODE ISLAND

by its attorney,

Jeffrey J. Binder

General Counsel - New England

185 Franklin Street, Room 1403

Boston, Massachusetts 02110-1585

Tel (617) 743-5745

DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

AND CARRIERS

Jeffrey B. Pine

Attorney General

by its attorney,

Elizabeth A. Kelleher

Special Assistant Attorney General

150 South Main Street

Providence, RI 02903

Tel (401) 274-4400

Dated: November 2, 1998

__________________________________________________________________________