State of Rhode Island | |
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OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL | |
150 South Main Street- Providence, Rl 02903 (401) 274-4400 | |
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Peter F. Neronha | |
| Attorney General |
VIA EMAIL ONLY
December 4, 2020
OM 20-52
Ms. Paula Childs
Ms. Anita Langer
Thomas More Dickinson, Esq. Counsel, Bonnet Shores Fire District
RE: Childs, et al. v. Bonnet Shores Fire District
Dear Ms. Childs, Ms. Langer, and Attorney Dickinson:
We have completed an investigation into the Open Meetings Act (“OMA”) Complaints filed by Ms. Paula Childs (“Childs”) and Ms. Anita Langer (“Langer”) against the Bonnet Shores Fire District Council (“Fire District”). For the reasons set forth herein, we find that the Fire District violated the OMA.
Ms. Childs alleges that the Fire District convened a meeting outside of the public purview before and after the Fire District’s June 17, 2020 meeting, which pursuant to the Governor’s Executive Order regarding public meetings during the COVID-19 pandemic, was conducted virtually via Zoom. Ms. Childs contends that although the meeting was conducted virtually, “four council members . . . met in person at the community center both before and after the public portion of the Meeting.” Ms. Langer similarly alleges that four members of the Fire District convened a meeting outside the public purview after the June 17, 2020 meeting.[1]
Ms. Childs also alleges that the notice for the Fire District’s June 27, 2020 meeting, which was physically posted on the door of the local community center, failed to indicate the date of said posting. Lastly, Ms. Childs contends that the meeting agenda for the June 27, 2020 meeting was inadequate in that it “failed to list the candidates under consideration for the office of council member and treasurer.”
Attorney Thomas Dickinson submitted a response on behalf of the Fire District as to both Complaints. With respect to the claim that members of the Fire District met outside the public purview, the Fire District produced sworn statements from five members of the Fire District.[2] Each affiant attested that no official business was conducted before the June 17, 2020 virtual meeting commenced via Zoom, and that upon conclusion of the open meeting, the “Council members packed up their things and left the Community Center. No Council business was discussed during that time.”
In response to Ms. Childs’ second allegation regarding failure to include the date when the notice was posted on the door of community center, the Fire District argues that notice for the June 27, 2020 meeting was properly posted by electronic means on the Secretary of State’s website “on June 25, 2020, at 2:51 pm.” The Fire District also states that “Clerk Mannix advises that he posted the notice/agenda at the Community Center on the same date that he posted to the Secretary of State’s website, which would have been June 25, 2020.”
Lastly, with regards to the allegedly insufficient meeting agenda items for the June 27, 2020 meeting, the Fire District enclosed a copy of said agenda, which in pertinent part lists two items under “Old Business”: “Discuss and appoint council vacancy” and “Discuss and appoint Treasurer vacancy.” The Fire District contends that this agenda “complied fully with the Act’s requirements.”
We acknowledge the rebuttals of both Complainants.
When we examine an OMA complaint, our authority is to determine whether a violation of the OMA has occurred. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8. In doing so, we must begin with the plain language of the OMA and relevant caselaw interpreting this statute. We will address each of the three allegations in turn.
Alleged Meetings Outside the Public Purview Before and After June 17, 2020 Meeting
The OMA requires that all meetings of every public body “shall be open to the public.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-3. For the OMA to apply, however, a “quorum” of a “public body” must convene for a “meeting” as these terms are defined by the OMA. See Fischer v. Zoning Board of the Town of Charlestown, 723 A.2d 294 (R.I. 1999). Under the OMA, a “meeting” is defined as “the convening of a public body to discuss and/or act upon a matter over which the public body has supervision, control, jurisdiction, or advisory power.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-2(1). A “quorum” is defined as “a simple majority of the membership of a public body.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-2(4). All three of these elements — a quorum, a meeting, and a public body — must be present in order for the OMA to apply; the OMA is not applicable when one or more of these elements is absent. See Sirios v. Glocester Town Council, OM 20-50.
Here, there is no question that the Fire District is a “public body”[3] and that at least four (4) members who were physically present before and after the meeting constitute a quorum of the seven member body.[4] However, the Fire District disputes that its members engaged in a “meeting” as defined by the OMA. Each of the sworn statements provided to this Office expressly states that the Fire District members did not discuss official business either before or after the Zoom open meeting. Additionally, neither of the Complainants provides any specific evidence or allegations indicating that the members engaged in a substantive discussion before or after the Zoom meeting took place regarding a matter “over which the public body has supervision, control, jurisdiction, or advisory power.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-2(1).
Based on the totality of the evidence presented, we do not find sufficient evidence that a quorum of the Fire District engaged in a collective discussion regarding a matter over which the Fire District has supervision, control, jurisdiction, or advisory power outside the public purview before or after the June 17, 2020 meeting such that the OMA was implicated. Notably, the Complaints do not provide any evidence to dispute the sworn statements submitted by the Fire District. We find no violation with respect to this allegation.
Indicating Date of Posting Notice for June 27, 2020 Meeting
Ms. Childs’ second allegation is that the notice for the June 27, 2020 meeting posted at the community center failed to indicate the date of posting. The OMA requires that all public bodies provide supplemental public notice of all meetings at least forty-eight (48) hours in advance of the meeting. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b). “This notice shall include the date the notice was posted, the date, time and place of the meeting, and a statement specifying the nature of the business to be discussed.” Id. (Emphasis added).
Further, the OMA requires that supplemental notice of a meeting be posted in three locations: “the principal office of the public body holding the meeting, or if no principal office exists, at the building in which the meeting is to be held, and in at least one other prominent place within the governmental unit, and electronic filing of the notice with the secretary of state [.]” R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 42-46-6(c).
Here, the Fire District does not dispute that the meeting notice posted at the community center failed to include “the date the notice was posted.” See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b). Indeed, Attorney Dickinson states that “Mr. Mannix assures that, in future, he will note the date of the physical posting when he posts such notices of BSFD meetings.” As such, it is undisputed that the Fire District failed to include the date the notice was posted on the notice posted at the community center.[5] Accordingly, we find a violation with regard to this allegation.
Notice of Business to Be Discussed at June 27, 2020 Meeting
Finally, Ms. Childs alleges that the Fire District’s meeting agenda for the June 27, 2020 meeting failed to properly inform the public as to the nature of the matters to be discussed. Specifically, the Complainant takes issue with two agenda items that she contends should have indicated the candidates being considered in connection with council member and treasurer vacancies.
In Anolik v. Zoning Board of Review of the City of Newport, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b) requires the “public body to provide fair notice to the public under the circumstance, or such notice based on the totality of the circumstances as would fairly inform the public of the nature of the business to be discussed or acted upon.” 64 A.3d 1171, 1173 (R.I. 2013); see also Tanner v. Town of East Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784, 797 (R.I. 2005) (appropriate inquiry is “whether the [public] notice provided by the [public body] fairly informed the public, under the totality of the circumstances, of the nature of the business to be conducted”).
Here, based on the evidence, we find no violation. The agenda indicated that the Fire District was going to “Discuss and appoint council vacancy” and “Discuss and appoint Treasurer vacancy.” Review of the minutes for the June 27, 2020 meeting indicates that with regard to each agenda item, the Fire District voted to appoint a specific individual for each of the vacant positions. The Fire District’s June 27, 2020 agenda items, which provided notice that the Fire District would make an appointment with regard to each of these positions, thus provided “fair notice to the public” under the circumstances and “fairly inform[ed] the public of the nature of the business to be discussed.” Anolik, 64 A.3d at 1173; see also Spodnik v. Town of West Warwick and West Warwick Town Council, OM 19-28 (determining that agenda items titled “Appointment of West Warwick Police Chief” and “Appointment of Tree Warden” did not violate the OMA).
The Complainant does not identify any authority for the proposition that the Fire District was required to list on the agenda all candidates being considered for the vacancies. Indeed, our Office has previously determined that the OMA does not require a public body to list the names of proposed appointees. See Mudge v. North Kingstown School Committee, OM 06-34 (discussing prior findings determining that a public body was required to indicate on its agenda the positions for which appointments would be made but was not required to include the names of proposed appointees.) Accordingly, we find no violation. Nonetheless, we encourage public bodies to provide as much specificity as possible in their meeting notices.
The OMA provides that the Office of the Attorney General may institute an action in Superior Court for violations of the OMA on behalf of a complainant or the public interest within one hundred eighty (180) days of public approval of the minutes of the meeting at which the alleged violation occurred. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(a), (e). The Superior Court may issue injunctive relief and declare null and void any actions of the public body found to be in violation of the OMA. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(d). Additionally, the Superior Court may impose fines up to $5,000 against a public body found to have committed a willful or knowing violation of the OMA. Id.
Here, we do not find injunctive relief is necessary. Although the meeting notice posted at the community center failed to include a required date of posting, there is no allegation that the posting itself was untimely. Additionally, the Fire District provided undisputed evidence that the notice was timely filed on the Secretary of State’s website.
The record also does not support a finding of a willful or knowing violation, nor are we aware of any recent, similar violations by the Fire District. This finding serves as notice that the conduct discussed herein violates the OMA and may serve as evidence of a willful or a knowing violation in any similar future situation.
Although the Office of the Attorney General will not file suit in this matter, nothing within the OMA prohibits an individual from instituting an action for injunctive or declaratory relief in Superior Court. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(c). The OMA allows a complainant to file a complaint within ninety (90) days from the date of the Attorney General’s closing of the complaint or within one hundred eighty (180) days of the alleged violation, whichever occurs later. See Id. Please be advised that we are closing this Complaint as of the date of this letter.
We thank you for your interest in keeping government open and accountable to the public.
Sincerely,
PETER F. NERONHA ATTORNEY GENERAL
By: /s/ Adam D. Roach
Adam D. Roach
Special Assistant Attorney General
[1] As both Complaints contain similar allegations, we address them both in this consolidated finding. Ms. Langer has multiple complaints pending against the Fire District; this finding pertains only to Ms. Langer’s Complaint about which this Office sent acknowledgement letters on July 7, 2020.
[2] The Fire District submitted the same sworn statements on behalf of the Fire District in response to both Complaints.
[3] Attorney Dickinson notes that the Fire District “continues to question whether it is a public body as that term is described in the Open Meetings Act” but acknowledges, “I understand that your Department has previously opined on this point, and we will not address it in this response.” This Office previously concluded that the Fire District is a public body under the OMA. See Childs et al. v. Bonnet Shores Fire District, OM 20-29. As the Fire District has not presented any new evidence or argument that would warrant revisiting that finding and expressly notes that it is not raising that issue in response to these Complaints, we consider the Fire District to be a public body subject to the OMA and need not revisit our prior finding.
[4] The record, including the sworn statements and meeting minutes, indicate that at least four members were physically together before the start of the meeting and that one additional member attended the meeting by telephone and physically joined the others by the end of the meeting. Additionally, Ms. Langer, who is also a member of the Fire District, indicates she joined the meeting while it was in progress, although it appears she did so only virtually and was not physically present with the other five members. In any event, the evidence indicates that a quorum of at least four members was present at all relevant times.
[5] We note that our review of the Secretary of State website indicates that the notice posted there likewise failed to indicate the date when it was posted. We also note, however, that Complainant does not allege that the notice was not timely posted, only that the notice failed to indicate the date it was posted.