| State of Rhode Island | |
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| OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL | |
| 150 South Main Street- Providence, Rl 02903 (401) 274-4400 www.riag.ri.gov | |
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| Peter F. Neronha | |
| | Attorney General |
August 11, 2022
OM 22-48
Bethany Sorrentino
Viera Levitt
Andrew Henneous, Esq.
Attorney, South Kingstown School Committee
RE: Sorrentino et al v. South Kingstown School Committee
Dear Ms. Sorrentino, Ms. Levitt, and Attorney Henneous:
We have completed our investigation into the Open Meetings Act (“OMA”) Complaints filed by Ms. Bethany Sorrentino and Ms. Viera Levitt (collectively, “Complainants”) against the South Kingstown School Committee (“School Committee”). Due to the similarity of the Complaints and the School Committee’s response, we have consolidated the Complaints and issue one (1) finding. For the reasons set forth herein, this Office finds that the School Committee did not violate the OMA.
On June 14, 2022 and June 16, 2022, Complainants filed separate Complaints raising the same allegation concerning the School Committee’s January 20, 2022 meeting. During that meeting, the Complainants allege the School Committee, without the proper notice required by the OMA, voted under an Agenda item titled “Discussion/Action: Redistricting/Reconfiguration Plan” to close Wakefield Elementary School.
The School Committee submitted a substantive response through its legal counsel, Andrew Henneous, Esquire. The School Committee contends that it did not violate the OMA because the Agenda item in question was “entirely accurate and appropriate” and provided proper notice to the public of the business to be discussed and acted upon in accordance with R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b).
The School Committee provides, by way of background, that it created a Redistricting Subcommittee to investigate the various options that the district had for restructuring, reconfiguring, and reorganizing the local school system. The Redistricting Subcommittee created fourteen (14) options for District reconfiguration and reorganization “which included various machinations of program changes, grade configurations, and school closures.” All the Redistricting Subcommittee’s meetings were open to the public and took place over several months. After the Redistricting Subcommittee had analyzed several possibilities for reconfigurations of the district, a Budget Subcommittee was then charged with analyzing the conclusions of the Redistricting Subcommittee and presenting three (3) final options to the full School Committee. The Budget Subcommittee's meetings were public, and the three (3) final options were presented to the public on January 11, 2022. These three (3) options were then presented to the School Committee during its January 20 meeting. There, the School Committee held a vote on which option to pursue.
According to the School Committee, the above-described events and discussions was reflected in the Agenda item titled “Discussion/Action: Redistricting/Reconfiguration Plan.” Further details revealed by the School Committee include that it did not vote solely to close Wakefield Elementary School, but rather approved an entire redistricting plan that had been developed over many months and in public meetings by the School Committee’s Redistricting Subcommittee. This redistricting plan included the closure of other schools, the re-organization of grades and classes, and other changes to the school district’s long-term plans. The School Committee contends that, although the Agenda item at issue did not explicitly mention “school closures,” it did sufficiently describe the intention of the School Committee to discuss and take action on the “Redistricting” plan presented to it by the Budget Subcommittee.
Furthermore, the School Committee claims that neither Complainant is an aggrieved party as defined in R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(a) and thus lack standing to bring their Complaints. The School Committee argues that the husband of one Complainant attended the January 20 meeting virtually, and the other Complainant attended herself, therefore both Complainants were aware of the January 20 discussion and vote. See Graziano v. Rhode Island State Lottery Commission, 810 A.2d 215 (R.I. 2002) (“actual appearance before a tribunal constitutes a waiver of the right of such person to object to a real or perceived defect in the notice of the meeting”).
We acknowledge both Complainants’ rebuttals.
When we examine an OMA complaint, our authority is to determine whether a violation of the OMA has occurred. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8. In doing so, we must begin with the plain language of the OMA and relevant caselaw interpreting this statute.
As an initial matter, we pause to address the School Committee’s contention that each of the Complainants lacked standing because neither was an “aggrieved party” as defined in R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(a). This Office's authority to initiate an OMA investigation on behalf of the public interest is derived from the plain text of the OMA, which provides that "[n]othing within this section shall prohibit the attorney general from initiating a complaint on behalf of the public interest." R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(e). We believe that the public interest is implicated in this case because the School Committee discussed and voted on an issue that could have a substantial impact on the public education within a municipality in the State of Rhode Island. Because the Office of the Attorney General may initiate a complaint on behalf of the public interest, see R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(e), we need not address whether the Complainants qualify as an aggrieved person under the OMA. Pursuant to our statutory authority, we proceed to consider the alleged violations set forth in the Complaints.
The OMA requires all public bodies provide supplemental public notice of all meetings at least forty-eight (48) hours in advance of the meeting. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b). “This notice shall include the date the notice was posted, the date, time and place of the meeting, and a statement specifying the nature of the business to be discussed.” Id. (Emphasis added). The level of specificity that must be detailed for each agenda item depends on the facts and circumstances surrounding each item.
In Tanner, the Supreme Court discussed what constitutes a statement specifying the nature of the business to be discussed. The Court stated that “the Legislature intended to establish a flexible standard aimed at providing fair notice to the public under the circumstances, or such notice, based on the totality of the circumstances, as would fairly inform the public of the nature of the business to be discussed or acted upon.” See Tanner v. Town of East Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784, 797 (R.I. 2005) (appropriate inquiry is “whether the [public] notice provided by the [public body] fairly informed the public, under the totality of the circumstances, of the nature of the business to be conducted”).
Similarly, in Anolik v. Zoning Board of Review of the City of Newport, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b) requires the “public body to provide fair notice to the public under the circumstance, or such notice based on the totality of the circumstances as would fairly inform the public of the nature of the business to be discussed or acted upon.” 64 A.3d 1171, 1173 (R.I. 2013). As we have previously noted, “[t]he level of specificity that must be detailed for each agenda item depends on the facts and circumstances surrounding each item.” Mudge v. North Kingstown School Committee, OM 14-01.
Here, we find that based upon the totality of the circumstances, the January 20 agenda item “Discussion/Action: Redistricting/Reconfiguration Plan” fairly informed the public of the nature of the business to be discussed. We reach this conclusion based upon the evidence that school redistricting and reconfiguration options had been the subject of public discussion and review for many months. Additionally, the agenda accurately reflected the “nature of the business to be discussed,” i.e., discussion and/or vote on potential options regarding the redistricting/reconfiguration of the school district. Although this Office encourages public bodies to provide as much information as possible when drafting their agenda items, we find that the agenda item in question met the OMA standard of “statement specifying the business to be discussed.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b). Accordingly, we find no violation.
Although the Attorney General has found no violation and will not file suit in this matter, nothing in the OMA precludes an individual from pursuing a complaint in the Superior Court as specified in the OMA. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(c). The Complainant may pursue an OMA complaint within “ninety (90) days of the attorney general’s closing of the complaint or within one hundred eighty (180) days of the alleged violation, whichever occurs later.” Id. Please be advised that we are closing this file as of the date of this letter.
We thank you for your interest in keeping government open and accountable to the public.
Sincerely,
PETER F. NERONHA
ATTORNEY GENERAL
By: /s/ Kayla E. O’Rourke
Kayla E. O’Rourke
Special Assistant Attorney General