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September 22, 2023

Anonymous

Attorney Christopher R. Alger, Esquire

Legal Counsel, Pascoag Fire District

We have completed an investigation into the Open Meetings Act (“OMA”) complaint filed by an anonymous member of the public (“Complainant”) against the Pascoag Fire District (“District”). For the reasons set forth herein, we find that the Committee did not violate the OMA.

The OMA requires that all meetings of every public body “shall be open to the public.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-3. For the OMA to apply, however, a “quorum” of a “public body” must convene for a “meeting” as these terms are defined by the OMA. See Fischer v. Zoning Board of the Town of Charlestown, 723 A.2d 294 (R.I. 1999). Under the OMA, a “meeting” is defined as “the convening of a public body to discuss and/or act upon a matter over which the public body has supervision, control, jurisdiction, or advisory power.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-2(1). A “quorum” is defined as “a simple majority of the membership of a public body.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-2(4).  All three of these elements — a quorum, a meeting, and a public body — must be present in order for the OMA to apply; the OMA is not applicable when one or more of these elements is absent. See Sirios v. Glocester Town Council, OM 20-50. 

Here, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the District met privately to address the Fire District merger issue or the sale of District assets. As an initial matter, the only District member specifically identified in the Complainant’s filings as having participated in an alleged “rolling meeting” is Chairman Toti. Based upon review of the District’s meeting minutes provided by the Complainant, the District consists of five (5) members. Because a quorum consists of a “simple majority of the membership” of the District, and because Chairman Toti is the only individual identified in the Complaint as allegedly having engaged in a non-public meeting, there is no evidence that a quorum discussed any issue outside of a properly noticed open meeting. Consequently, based on the record before us, we find that the solitary actions of Chairman Toti did not constitute a “meeting” as defined by the OMA. See Drix v. Providence City Council Finance Committee, OM 23-08 (finding that no “meeting” transpired, and thus there could be no OMA violation, when the Complainant failed to identify with specificity the members of the Committee alleged to have formed a quorum[1]).

Additionally, in a sworn statement, Chairman Toti attests to the fact that he “had no discussions with other board members [prior to the March 28, 2023 Fire District merger hearing]” and that although he ultimately did not end up testifying, he intended to do so in his “personal capacity, and not on behalf of the [District].” As to the selling of District assets, Chairman Toti states that “I set the agenda for this special meeting [alone]” because “[t]he bylaws grant the Chairman authority to set the agenda for special meetings.” Article II, Section 2, of the District’s bylaws support the same, setting forth that “the Chairperson of said [District] shall call a special meeting.” The Complainant does not dispute these attestations. See Hevey v. Coventry Town Council, OM 19-23 (“[g]iven these undisputed affidavits, we find no evidence [of] a rolling quorum”). 

Thus, based on the totality of the circumstances, there is insufficient evidence that the District convened a non-public meeting to discuss the Fire District merger issue or the sale of District assets. As such, in these particular circumstances and based upon the uncontested sworn statements of Chairman Toti, we find no violation of the OMA.[2]