State of Rhode Island

 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

150 South Main Street- Providence, Rl 02903

(401) 274-4400  www.riag.ri.gov

 

Peter F. Neronha

 

Attorney General

 

VIA EMAIL ONLY

 

October 10, 2023

OM 23-23

 

Carolyn DiLeo

 

 

Thomas M. Dickinson, Esquire

 

 

Re:          DiLeo v. Bonnet Shores Fire District  

 

Dear Ms. DiLeo and Attorney Dickinson:

 

We have completed our investigation into the Open Meetings Act (“OMA”) Complaint filed by Ms. Carolyn DiLeo (“Complainant”) against the Bonnet Shores Fire District Council (“Fire District”)[1]. For the reasons set forth herein, we find the Committee violated the OMA.   

 

Background

 

The Complainant takes issue with the posted agenda for the April 4, 2023 meeting of the Fire District. Specifically, the Complainant asserts that items B, C, and E under the “New Business” heading on the agenda were deficient so as to constitute a violation of the OMA.  The identified agenda items were as follows:

 

“B. Motion on position of Council on Charter Commissions Proposed Voting

Amendments -Discussion-Vote

C. Motion on position of Council on a proposed alternate Charter proposal,

Informational Correspondence from BSBC Amendments-Motion -Discussion-Vote

E. Harbor proposal-Motion-Discussion-Vote”

 

The Complainant asserts that agenda item B was deficient as it was incorrectly listed under the “New Business” heading when in fact it belongs under old business as it pertains to a motion that was tabled at a prior meeting on February 15, 2023. Additionally, the Complainant asserts that “no information or documents have been made available either to Council members, the public, or the Charter Commission” making it impossible “to discuss this further without these documents.”

 

The Complainant further asserts that agenda item C was deficient as it did “not provide sufficient information” and “the mentioned correspondence has not been supplied to the Council members, public or Charter Commission.” The Complainant additionally asserts that “there cannot be discussion without first sending the documents to the Charter commission and the Attorney for the Charter Commission to review any such alternate proposal.”

 

Finally, the Complainant asserts that agenda item E was deficient as “no proposal has been supplied to the Council members or public in advance of this meeting.”

 

When asked by this Office to specify which section of the OMA the Complainant asserts was violated by the Fire District, she cited to the public policy statement of the OMA that “[i]t is essential to the maintenance of a democratic society that public business be performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens be advised of and aware of the performance of public officials and the deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-1.

 

The Fire District, through its legal counsel, Thomas More Dickinson, Esq., provided a substantive response. The Fire District argues that documentation related to agenda item B was readily available to the public on its website on subpages dedicated to the “Charter Committee” and the “Voting Lawsuit.” In regard to agenda item C, the Fire District argues that the “gravamen of the of the complaint is that the Council should not have considered any alternative without first alerting the Charter Commission and its counsel so that they could be heard on the issue,” but such is a complaint about internal District communications and “does not set out any violation of the [OMA].” Finally, the Fire District argues that documentation related to agenda item E was readily available to the public on its website on subpages dedicated to the “Harbor.”[2]

 

We acknowledge the Complainant’s rebuttal.

 

Relevant Law and Findings

 

When we examine an OMA complaint, our authority is to determine whether a violation of the OMA has occurred. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8. In doing so, we must begin with the plain language of the OMA and relevant caselaw interpreting this statute.

 

Although the OMA does not require public bodies to make available documents to be discussed at an open meeting,[3] the OMA does require that all public bodies provide supplemental public notice of all meetings at least forty-eight (48) hours in advance of the meeting. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b). “This notice shall include the date the notice was posted, the date, time and place of the meeting, and a statement specifying the nature of the business to be discussed.” Id. (emphasis added). The Complainant in this case asserted that “[a]s a citizen of Bonnet Shores Fire District, I have been denied the ability to understand the nature of the following motions because insufficient information is provided in the statement of the Motions prior to the discussion and vote.” We deemed this allegation as implicating R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b), as reflected in this Office’s acknowledgement letters to the parties which framed the Complaint as alleging that the Fire District violated the OMA by including “inadequate agenda items in its supplemental notice.”  Additionally, this Office is empowered to initiate a compliant on behalf of the public interest. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(e).

 

In Tanner v. Town of East Greenwich, the Rhode Island Supreme Court examined the OMA’s requirement that a public notice contains “a statement specifying the nature of the business to be discussed.” 880 A.2d 784 (R.I. 2005). The Court determined that the appropriate inquiry is “whether the [public] notice provided by the [public body] fairly informed the public, under the totality of the circumstances, of the nature of the business to be conducted.” Id. at 797-98; see also Anolik v. Zoning Board of Review of the City of Newport, 64 A.3d 1171, 1173 (R.I. 2013) (holding that R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b) requires the “public body to provide fair notice to the public under the circumstance, or such notice based on the totality of the circumstances as would fairly inform the public of the nature of the business to be discussed or acted upon”).

 

We have previously determined that public bodies violate the OMA by posting broad and insufficient agenda items such as “Tax Collector’s Report,” “Treasurer’s Report,” “Chief’s Report,” “Committee Reports,” “Old Business,” and “New Business.” These broad agenda items typically fail to “fairly inform the public of the nature of the business to be discussed or acted upon.” Spodnik v. West Warwick, OM 19-28; Beagan v. Albion Fire District, OM 10-27.

 

Here, given the totality of the circumstances, we find that certain agenda items for the Fire District’s April 4, 2023 meeting failed to sufficiently “inform the public of the nature of the business to be discussed or acted upon.” See Tanner, 880 A.2d at 796.

 

As an initial matter, our review of the minutes of the April 4, 2023 meeting reveals that no vote took place regarding Item C. Because the Fire District did not vote affirmatively or negatively on this item, injunctive relief is not appropriate, and as the record does not demonstrate that the Fire District’s actions were a willful or knowing violation (assuming a violation occurred), as explained infra, civil penalties are not warranted. As such, even assuming a violation occurred, there is no appropriate relief available under the OMA. See Cienki v. Rhode Island Special Commission on Reapportionment, OM 22-33 (“there are only two principal remedies available for alleged violations of the OMA: injunctive relief and civil fine”); Childs v. Bonnet Shores Fire District, OM 22-14; see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(d). Accordingly, this Office declines to further address the merits of this allegation.

 

Turning to agenda items B and E, both items reference potential discussion and votes on proposals before the Fire District. Item B references the “Charter Commission[’]s Proposed Voting Amendments” and item E references the “Harbor proposal.” Neither agenda item contains any other information that specifies what these proposals entail or what will be discussed and voted upon at the April 4, 2023 meeting. The Complainant avers that the Fire District should have supplied documentation regarding these proposals to the public.

 

The OMA does not obligate public bodies to supplement its agendas by posting related documentation. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6; Brown v. PVD, OM 21-16 (finding the complainant had not identified any provision of the OMA that would “require the [public body] to post back-up information along with the agenda”). That said, supplementing agendas by posting related documentation could potentially provide important context and supplement an agenda. However, if such documentation is not posted with the respective agenda (in all the places where agendas must be posted under the OMA), then it cannot supplement the notice of the agenda or be considered in determining whether the agenda provided notice that complied with the OMA. See Pontarelli v. Rhode Island Bd. Council on Elementary & Secondary Educ., 151 A.3d 301, 306 (R.I. 2016) (holding a public body provided insufficient notice for an agenda item where the agenda item did not sufficiently describe the business to be discussed or acted upon and where the agenda referenced an enclosed document but failed to post the document along with the agenda).

 

In its substantive response, the Fire District argues that it provided proper notice with its April 4, 2023 meeting agenda because documents related to the Charter Commission and Harbor proposals were “available on the Fire District’s user-friendly website.” But this argument is unavailing as the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held documentation “being accessible on [the public body’s] website is irrelevant to our analysis, as G.L. 1956 § 42–46–6 requires that it be placed on the Secretary of State’s website, and there is no duty placed upon the public to search elsewhere.” Pontarelli, 151 A.3d at 306; see DeCubellis v. William M. Davies Career and Technical High School Board of Trustees, OM 21-08 (“Although the adequacy of an agenda item must be assessed in light of the totality of the circumstances, the agenda item itself must provide adequate notice without expecting members of the public to piece together information available elsewhere to surmise what the agenda item may refer.”). Therefore, this Office considered the text of the April 4, 2023 meeting agenda alone to determine whether it “fairly inform[ed] the public of the nature of the business to be discussed or acted upon.” See Tanner, 880 A.2d at 796.

 

The minutes of the April 4, 2023 meeting reveal that under agenda item B, the Fire District discussed the Charter Commission’s proposal that related to a court case and that pertained to the voting rights of short-term and long-term residents and also discussed an alternative proposal authored by Faith LaSalle. The Fire District voted affirmatively on a motion to not support the Charter Commission’s proposal and to have the Commission and Council meet to explore other options, specifically Ms. LaSalle’s alternative proposal.

 

Under agenda item E, the Fire District discussed a number of harbor-related regulations involving, inter alia, minimum boat length, a grace period for unused moorings, and enforcement of mooring inspections. The Fire District voted affirmatively on motions “that the sharing of moorings be at the discretion of the harbormaster, that the BSFD is fully supportive of the harbormaster on the topic of mooring inspections” and to “agree that the minimum vessel length be 12 feet and exclude dinghys, row boats and similar.” The Fire District also voted to table consideration of proposals “to limit mooring waitlist size and length.”

 

Based upon the record before us, and Rhode Island Supreme Court precedent, we find that agenda items B and E failed to sufficiently inform the public of the nature of the business the Fire District discussed and acted upon at their April 4, 2023 meeting as reflected in the meeting minutes. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b) (“This notice shall include the date the notice was posted, the date, time and place of the meeting, and a statement specifying the nature of the business to be discussed.”) (emphasis added). The items in the Fire District’s posted agenda only made reference to the “Charter Commission[’]s Proposed Amendments” and the “Harbor proposal” without further specifying the nature of these proposals. For instance, agenda item B did not identify the nature of the proposed amendments and someone looking at the agenda would not have notice that agenda item B pertained to the voting rights of short-term and long-term residents. It also did not specify that the Fire District would be discussing Ms. LaSalle’s alternate Charter proposal. Regarding agenda item E, the agenda did not provide notice regarding the nature of the harbor proposal or the various issues that were ultimately considered and voted upon under this agenda item. The reference to these proposals did not specify that the Fire District would be taking votes on topics such as mooring policies and minimum vessel lengths. Accordingly, we find the Fire District violated the OMA. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b).[4]

 

Conclusion

 

The OMA provides that the Office of the Attorney General may institute an action in Superior Court for violations of the OMA. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(a), (e).  The Superior Court may issue injunctive relief and declare null and void any actions of the public body found to be in violation of the OMA.  See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(d).  Additionally, the Superior Court may impose fines up to $5,000 against a public body found to have committed a willful or knowing violation of the OMA. Id.

 

This Office is concerned by the fact that this is not the Fire District’s first OMA violation related to insufficient agendas. See Fandetti v. Bonnet Shores Fire District, OM 22-37. Additionally, the Complainant and another individual voiced concerns about the insufficient notice at the meeting in question, yet the Fire District failed to take any action to remedy this issue. Nonetheless, the Fire District did make the Charter Commission and Harbor proposals readily available on its public website. Although this is not sufficient to provide notice under the OMA for the reasons discussed above, it does cut against a finding of a willful or knowing violation on the part of the Fire District as it suggests that the Fire District took measures to promote transparency related to these proposals.

 

Although there may be grounds to find a willful or knowing violation of the OMA, this Office will not pursue civil fines if the Fire District complies with our directive for remedying the violations, set forth infra.  However, this finding serves as notice to the Fire District that the conduct discussed herein violates the OMA and may serve as evidence of a willful or a knowing violation in any similar future situation.

 

Regarding agenda items B and E, injunctive relief may be appropriate, but we prefer to allow the Fire District an opportunity to comply with this finding. Pursuant to agenda item B, the Fire District took a vote to not support the Charter Commission’s proposal. We were not provided with any evidence indicating that this vote has been mooted or superseded such that injunctive relief might not be necessary. This vote, which was taken without sufficient notice, must be re-noticed and re-voted upon.

 

Pursuant to agenda item E, the Fire District took votes related to mooring sharing and mooring inspections and setting a minimum vessel length. We were not provided with any evidence indicating that these votes have been mooted or superseded such that injunctive relief might not be necessary. These votes, which were taken without sufficient notice, must be re-noticed and re-voted upon. The Fire District need not re-notice or re-vote regarding its decision to table consideration of a proposal to limit mooring waitlist size and length as this vote was not material because it only tabled consideration rather than substantively acting upon the proposals.

 

Within ten business days of the date of this finding, the Fire District should provide evidence to this Office demonstrating that it has re-noticed and re-voted on the issues noted above regarding which this Office has determined that a re-vote and re-notice is necessary.


Although the Attorney General will not file suit in this matter at this time, nothing in the OMA precludes an individual from pursuing a complaint in the Superior Court as specified in the OMA. The Complainant may pursue an OMA complaint within “ninety (90) days of the attorney general’s closing of the complaint or within one hundred eighty (180) days of the alleged violation, whichever occurs later.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8. Our file will remain open pending receipt of the notice specified above.

 

 

We thank you for your interest in keeping government open and accountable to the public.

 

Sincerely,

 

PETER F. NERONHA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

 

By: /s/ Patrick Reynolds

Patrick Reynolds

Special Assistant Attorney Gen

 

 

 

OMA


[1] The Complainant is herself a member of the Fire District Council.

[2] The Fire District incorrectly refers to the agenda item involving the “Harbor Proposal” as agenda item D rather than item E. This appears to be a scrivener’s error.

 

[3] This Office frequently notes that the OMA is a floor, not a ceiling, and encourages public bodies to post documents to be discussed at a meeting when feasible.

[4] The Complainant further asserts that agenda item B provides deficient notice as it is incorrectly listed under the “New Business” heading when it is in fact old business because it relates to a motion that was tabled at a previous meeting. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held in Anolik that listing an agenda item under an incorrect heading can cause an agenda to provide deficient notice in violation of the OMA when such an error “could quite rationally cause a member of the public to infer” something other than the action that was to be taken at the respective meeting. Here, the Complainant did not present any arguments about how labeling agenda item B as new business rather than old business contributed to the insufficiency of the agenda item.

 

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