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VIA EMAIL ONLY

 

February 25, 2025

OM 25-06

 

Ms. Etta Zasloff

 

Mr. Hayden Kendall

 

Mr. Christopher Kona

 

Ms. Amy Rodrigues

 

Attorney Jon M. Anderson

 

Attorney Joseph S. Larisa, Jr.

RE:     Zasloff et al. v. Chariho School Committee

 

Dear Ms. Zasloff, Mr. Kendall, Mr. Kona, Ms. Rodrigues, Attorney Anderson, and Attorney Larisa:

 

We have completed an investigation into the Open Meetings Act (“OMA”) complaints filed by Ms. Etta Zasloff, Mr. Hayden Kendall, Mr. Christopher Kona, and Ms. Amy Rodrigues (the “Complainants”) against the Chariho School Committee (“Committee”). For the reasons set forth herein, we find that the Committee did not violate the OMA.

 

Background

 

This finding addresses four (4) separate OMA complaints filed by four (4) separate Complainants against the Committee, all of which relate to the same December 17, 2024 Committee meeting.[1] At the meeting in question, Interim Chair Karen Reynolds was nominated to be Chair but did not receive sufficient votes. Thereafter, the Committee voted 7-5 to table the selection of a Chair until a new member, who was appointed by way of another member’s resignation, could be seated on the Committee. In essence, the Complainants allege that it was clear through sheer observation of the meeting in question that a quorum of Committee members met non-publicly in advance of the meeting and agreed to refrain from selecting a Chair, in violation of the OMA.[2] Complainant Zasloff argues that “[i]t seemed obvious to [her] and many others … that there had been outside collaboration by a quorum of members.” Complainant Kendall notes that an (unnamed) Committee member “claimed it was ‘obvious that members were communicating via text chains.’” Complainant Kona noted that Committee Member Louzon “challenged … the apparent alignment of a quorum [relative to selecting a Chair] … [indicative of] collaboration between school committee members outside [of] open meetings.” Complainant Rodrigues outlines this alleged non-public meeting in more detail, stating that “three [Committee] members (Donna Chambers, Craig Louzon, and Linda Lyall) contacted … Laura Chapman via text to elect Karen [Reynolds] … Karen [Reynolds] and … Jessica Purcell had prepared statements for the meeting [and] Karen [Reynolds] reached out to … Patricia Pouliot via email.” There are additional allegations suggesting that individual Committee members sought legal advice prior to the December 17, 2024 meeting, evidencing non-public pre-planning by a quorum before the selection of a Chair. Some of the Complainants included a link to a YouTube recording of the meeting in their Complaints, with references to timestamps reflecting the moments in the meeting relevant to their claims.   

 

Attorney Jon M. Anderson submitted a Response on behalf of “five members of the … Committee, Donna Chambers, Craig F. Louzon, Linda Delfino Lyall, Jessica M. Purcell, and Karen J. Reynolds.”[3] Appended to his Response are sworn affidavits executed by each of the aforementioned members. These members all attest to the fact that “[a]t no time prior to the Meeting did they participate in a quorum of the [Committee] regarding either the Agenda Item or a motion to table the Agenda Item.” In response to the insinuation that she was speaking from prepared remarks that were planned as a result of a non-public convening, Committee Member Purcell further stated that she “prepare[s] notes for my personal use prior to every … Committee meeting. I often refer to my personal notes … when I speak.” Finally, Committee Member Reynolds stated that she “sent an email regarding the Agenda Item to [Committee Member Pouliot] … who did not respond to my email and I don’t know if she received [it],” supporting her contention that no quorum was formed through email traffic.

Attorney Joseph S. Larisa, Jr. submitted a Response on behalf of “six present [Committee] members and one former member.”[4] Attorney Larisa’s Response focuses more on the action (or inaction) of the Committee at the meeting itself. He notes that “no action was taken at the December 17, 2024 meeting to elect a Chair or any other officer” and that there are no “‘aggrieved’ parties for the purposes of the OMA because no governmental action was taken.” (Emphasis in original). Because the Committee engaged in inaction as opposed to a cognizable governmental action, Attorney Larisa argues that there is “nothing to enjoin or revote.”

 

We acknowledge the Rebuttals of Complainants Kendall and Kona. Complainant Kendall argues that “no evidence [was] provided” by Attorney Larisa, thereby supporting “[t]he allegation that there was outside communication prior to [the] meeting.” Complainant Kona pushes back at Attorney Larisa’s contention that “no governmental action was taken,” arguing that “the vote to reject Karen Reynolds as chair” constituted a governmental action.

 

Relevant Law & Findings

 

When we examine an OMA complaint, our authority is to determine whether a violation of the OMA has occurred. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8. In doing so, we must begin with the plain language of the OMA and relevant caselaw interpreting this statute.

 

The OMA requires that all meetings of every public body “shall be open to the public.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-3. For the OMA to apply, however, a “quorum” of a “public body” must convene for a “meeting” as these terms are defined by the OMA. See Fischer v. Zoning Board of the Town of Charlestown, 723 A.2d 294 (R.I. 1999). Under the OMA, a “meeting” is defined as “the convening of a public body to discuss and/or act upon a matter over which the public body has supervision, control, jurisdiction, or advisory power.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-2(1). A “quorum” is defined as “a simple majority of the membership of a public body.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-2(4). It is undisputed that the Committee has twelve (12) members and thus seven (7) would constitute a quorum. All three of these elements — a quorum, a meeting, and a public body — must be present in order for the OMA to apply; the OMA is not applicable when one or more of these elements is absent. See Sirios v. Glocester Town Council, OM 20-50. 

 

A quorum may be created, and a meeting “convened,” by a “rolling” or “walking” quorum, where a majority of the members of a public body attain a quorum by a series of one-on-one conversations or interactions. See, e.g., In Re: South Kingstown School Committee Electronic Mail Policy, OM 04-01 (series of email communications among a quorum of a committee would satisfy the quorum requirement and implicate the OMA). Our findings have centered on the nexus between these one-on-one conversations and whether they serve as a chain of communication sufficient to constitute a collective discussion. See Finnegan v. Scituate Town Council, OM 20-22; Guarino, et al. v. Rhode Island Atomic Energy Commission, OM 14-07.

 

Based on this record, we do not find that the Committee violated the OMA. There is no question that the Committee is a public body, and it is clear from the record that the Committee has “supervision, control, jurisdiction, or advisory power” over the selection of its Chair and the manner in which it selects its Chair. Our focus, therefore, is limited to determining whether seven (7) or more Committee members convened and discussed this issue in a non-public manner. However, the record, including affidavits submitted by Committee members made under oath, does not reflect that a quorum of the Committee discussed or took action regarding selection of a Chair before the December 17, 2024 meeting.

 

Although each of the Complaints reference specific members of the Committee, only one Complaint (filed by Complainant Rodrigues) references specific members in conjunction with a clear and particular allegation of alleged non-public activity between these named members. Complainant Rodrigues states:

 

three [Committee] members (Donna Chambers, Craig Louzon, and Linda Lyall) contacted … Laura Chapman via text to elect Karen [Reynolds] … Karen [Reynolds] and … Jessica Purcell had prepared statements for the meeting [and] Karen [Reynolds] reached out to … Patricia Pouliot via email.”

 

This is the most detailed account of alleged non-public activity of all the Complaints submitted, yet the plain language of the allegation still fails to establish an OMA violation because it sets forth no coordinated activity amongst seven (7) (or more) members of the Committee. The Complainant first alleges that “three [Committee] members contacted … [a fourth] via text.” Assuming this to be true, it provides for activity between four (4) members, which is not enough to form a quorum. See Chrostowski v. South Kingstown Town Council, OM 23-18 (”[a]lthough Councilor Rose discussed the election for President with Councilor Bergner, their conversation on its own did not violate the OMA as their conversation did not involve a quorum of the Council”). There is no allegation detailing a conduit between these members and additional members such that a rolling or walking quorum was established. See, e.g. Finnegan v. Scituate Town Council, OM 20-22. “Karen [Reynolds] and Jessica Purcell had prepared statements” also fails to form a quorum, as these actions involve two (2) members, and they could have prepared their statements independently. And again, the allegation that “Karen [Reynolds] reached out to … Patricia Pouliot” only involves communication between two (2) members. The other Complaints are less detailed and fail to allege specific outside actions by named members. See Drix v. Providence City Council Finance Committee, OM 23-08 (“because there is only a general allegation that a rolling quorum transpired due to how ‘quickly’ the amendments were passed and because the Committee was ‘already familiar with the amendments,’ we conclude there is insufficient evidence to establish a rolling quorum or that a quorum of the Committee convened [in a closed manner]”).

 

This failure to provide evidence of a coordinated, non-public action amongst seven (7) (or more) members is further buttressed by the Response filed by Attorney Anderson, as it includes sworn, uncontested statements from five (5) of the members named in this most specific Complaint, each of whom deny under oath that a quorum discussed the election of a Chair.[5] Our precedent supports declining to find an OMA violation when the sworn and undisputed statements of the implicated members rebut the allegations. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Pascoag Fire District, 23-21 (declining to find an OMA violation partly due to the Chairman’s undisputed attestation that he met with no other members in advance of deciding to testify at the State House); Hevey v. Coventry Town Council, OM 19-23 (“[g]iven these undisputed affidavits, we find no evidence [of] a rolling quorum”). 

 

The remaining allegations are, as mentioned, general in nature, and speak to the Complainants’ perception of the meeting in real time and how certain behaviors seemingly indicated prior, non-public coordination. For example, the Complaints include allegations such as:

 

“many of the members that voted in favor were each reading from a script,” “[i]t seemed obvious to me and many others in attendance that there had been outside collaboration by a quorum of members,” and “[the Committee members] acted in implicit unison, with advance legal counsel, without any debate over the legal implications or practical qualifications of the implied chair nomination.”

 

Our independent review of the footage of the meeting leads to a contrary conclusion. The subject footage evidences reactions and behaviors, both individually and in a collective manner, that one would expect in response to any divisive issue within a public body. There are certainly instances wherein members acted “in unison,” ostensibly due to a partisan divide, but actions aligning based on sectarian lines is a reality of elective politics. This alone by no means indicates prior, non-public action. If that were the standard by which potential non-public activity was judged, any divisive vote along coalition lines would be suspect.

 

The same is true as to the allegations that members spoke from prepared statements or had prior consultations with legal counsel. These actions (preparing statements or consulting counsel) can be taken individually, and we expect if not encourage members of public bodies to properly prepare for meetings (while complying with the strictures of the OMA), whether that be by drafting prepared remarks or independently seeking legal counsel. See Schuler v. Johnston School Committee, OM 22-31 (finding no OMA violation where, prior to a meeting, “[a public body] Chair … asked [a public body member] if he had any questions for legal counsel … [a] conversation between [the public body member] … and legal counsel ensued”).

 

Additionally, while not determinative, we acknowledge Attorney Larisa’s argument. Even assuming that a non-public convening transpired such that an OMA violation took place, “[t]here are two remedies available in suits filed under the OMA: (1) ‘[t]he court may issue injunctive relief and declare null and void any actions of a public body found to be in violation of [the OMA];” or (2) “the court may impose a civil fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000) against a public body or any of its members found to have committed a willful or knowing violation of [the OMA].’ R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8.” See Cushman v. Warwick Retirement Board, OM 15-05. Although we disagree with Attorney Larisa’s contention that “no action was taken at the December 17, 2024 meeting to elect a Chair or any other officer,”[6] we do agree that no injunctive relief in this instance would be appropriate even if a violation occurred. Our hypothetical injunctive relief would consist of directing the Committee to re-vote on selecting a Chair, which, to the best of our knowledge, has already transpired.[7] As discussed above, we have received the sworn statements of Committee members attesting to their knowledge that no non-public quorum occurred, which would also evidence that there was no willful or knowing violation of the OMA that would warrant a civil fine. As such, to the extent any question could remain regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, we find any further investigation unwarranted because the evidence before us indicates that no violation occurred, and that even if a violation did occur, no relief would be appropriate in these circumstances.

 

Based on the record, in these particular circumstances, we do not find sufficient evidence that a quorum of the Committee engaged in collective discussion or took action outside the public purview. As such, we find no violation of the OMA. We are nevertheless concerned by suggestions that at least some members communicated with each other non-publicly about matters pending before the Committee. Even if communications among less than a quorum do not violate the OMA, it can still degrade public confidence in the political process and detract from transparency. We are also concerned about the divisiveness exhibited by these matters, evidenced most obviously by the bifurcated manner in which the Committee responded to these Complaints and how quickly these Complaints came about following a change in the Committee’s membership. We remind the Committee of the universal, underlying policy of the OMA, which is to ensure that the public good is served and that “citizens be advised of and aware of the performance of public officials and the deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy.” See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-1.

 

Conclusion

 

Although the Attorney General has found no violation as to the Committee and will not file suit in this matter, nothing in the OMA precludes an individual from pursuing a complaint in the Superior Court as specified in the OMA. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(c). The Complainants may pursue OMA complaints within “ninety (90) days of the attorney general’s closing of the complaint or within one hundred eighty (180) days of the alleged violation, whichever occurs later.” Id. Please be advised that we are closing these files as of the date of this letter.

We thank you for your interest in keeping government open and accountable to the public.

Sincerely,

 

PETER F. NERONHA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

 

By: /s/ Adam D. Roach

Adam D. Roach

Special Assistant Attorney General

OMA


[1] A fifth Complaint was filed and then soon thereafter withdrawn by the Complainant.

[2] Three (3) of the Complainants reference an alleged violation of the “Chariho Act” in connection with the events that gave rise to this OMA Complaint. Specifically, they contend that the failure to select a Chair at the meeting violated the Chariho Act. This Office’s authority is limited to investigating violations of the OMA. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8. Thus, compliance with the “Chariho Act” is outside the scope of this Office’s authority, and is only discussed in the context of our OMA analysis. 

[3] We note that in analyzing OMA complaints, this Office reviews the actions of the public body as a whole and does not recognize Complaints lodged against specific individual members or coalitions within public bodies. See Wilson v. Coventry Sewer Subcommittee, OM 19-34 (“[a]n individual member is not a ‘public body’ under the OMA”).

[4] We reiterate that OMA complaints are reviewed as to the entity as a whole and not as to individual members or factions. That said, the parties in this matter raised no objection to the submission of separate Responses. Additionally, our review of the filings reveals that the separate Responses complement rather than contradict each other. As such, this Office has accepted all submissions.

[5] The affidavits of Committee members Chambers, Louzon, Lyall, Purcell, and Reynolds each state: “[a]t no time prior to the meeting did I communicate with any other member of the … Committee regarding the Agenda Item.”

[6] A failure to act can in certain circumstances constitute a state action. See, e.g. Jennings v. Patterson, 488 F.2d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 1974) (“the failure of the City and its governing officials to dismantle the fence constitutes state action”).

[7] Based on our independent review, the supplemental notice for the Committee’s January 14, 2025 meeting includes the following agenda item: “VI. Reorganization of the Committee … 1. Nomination(s) and vote(s) for Chairperson.” (Emphasis in Original). This is consistent with Attorney Larisa’s statement that “the vote to table the election of a Chair and all officers [was] until the next meeting … all officers will presumably be elected at the next meeting.” Subsequent meeting minutes indicate that Louise Dinsmore is now the Chair. We have not been presented with any allegations that the meeting that resulted in electing the current Chair violated the OMA.

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