VIA EMAIL ONLY

May 7, 2026

Ms. Vanessa Mascaro

Ms. Chelsea Siefert

Chief Operating Officer, Quonset Development Corporation

Dear Ms. Mascaro and Ms. Siefert:

We have completed our investigation into the Open Meetings Act (“OMA”) Complaint filed by Ms. Chelsea Siefert (“Complainant”) against the Quonset Development Corporation (“QDC”). For the reasons set forth herein, we find no violation.   

“The Chairperson will announce that a portion of the meeting will be held in Executive Session to consider and take appropriate action on such matters as permitted by subsection (6) (location of prospective businesses in Rhode Island), and subsection (7) (A matter related to the question of the investment of public funds where the premature disclosure would adversely affect the public interest) of Rhode Island General Laws, Section 42-46-5(a), the [OMA].”[1]

As to “specifying the nature of the business to be discussed” (see supra), the Complainant asserts that the QDC used “vague descriptions such as ‘prospective businesses,’ ‘new business,’ and ‘potential business.’” These depictions of the QDC’s executive session notices are incomplete, however. Read in their entirety, the QDC provided more information than asserted, using phrases such as: “location of prospective businesses in Rhode Island,” “[d]iscussion of new business at the Quonset Business Park,” and “[d]iscussion of potential business at [or ‘in’] the Quonset Business Park.”[2] Coupled with appropriate citations to “the applicable subdivision[s] of R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-5(a),” such notices avoid the use of “boilerplate language” which we have found, in certain contexts, to be violative of the OMA. See Solas v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, OM 25-26.

More to the point, while the use of such phrases, as cited by the Complainant, may be inadequate as to matters discussed in a public body’s open session[3], the standard for executive session notice is, by necessity, less exacting. We noted in Banfield v. Narragansett Town Council, Buffi v. Narragansett Town Council, OM 26-08 that:

“[i]f the [executive session] matter to be discussed is one of public record, such as a pending court case or the well publicized negotiation of a principal or executive director’s contract, the public body should cite the name of the case or reference that it will discuss the contract. However, where the matter to be discussed in executive session is not yet public, the public body may limit its open call to the nature of the matter, such as ‘litigation’ or ‘personnel.” See Graziano v. Lottery Commission, OM 99-06; see also Sullivan v. Coventry School Committee, PR 21-05. (Emphasis added).

In the instant matter, the QDC similarly sets forth that the executive session topics at issue were not yet public. Its Chief Operating Officer attests to the fact that these executive sessions concerned “prospective businesses considering locating in Rhode Island” and the “possible investment of funds” and that such matters could not be described with more particularity because:

“it would adversely impact the public interest if the QDC prematurely disclosed possible industry or businesses moving to Rhode Island or the investment of public funds related to Quonset Business Park concerning those projects because it would alter the competitive landscape within which QDC operates and make it more difficult for QDC to entice businesses to Rhode Island.”

We have previously recognized that public bodies may be less specific in their executive session agenda items when doing so is warranted by the circumstances and the reason the discussion is occurring in executive session. See Segalla v. Pawtucket School Committee, OM 25-35 (finding the agenda item “Pursuant to RIGL § 42-46-5(a)(2), a matter concerning possible litigation” provided sufficient notice); DiSanto v. Foster-Glocester School Committee, OM 25-34 (finding the agenda item “Per RI General Law 42-46-5(a)(2) Pending Litigation/Legal Advice” regarding “Title IX & District Policies” provided sufficient notice); Cushman v. Warwick School Committee, OM 25-15 (finding the agenda item “Investigation/Potential Litigation (RIGL 42-46-5(a)(2)” provided sufficient notice).

Thus, the inchoate posture of these commercial matters under the purview of the QDC mirrors the non-public nature of the legal matters we found to be properly described in PR 26-08, and as such the terse descriptions provided by the QDC were appropriate.

The adequacy of these executive session notices also speaks to the underlying appropriateness of the executive sessions themselves. The QDC’s actions here are consistent relative to our past findings addressing information which, if discussed openly, would have a detrimental effect on the interest of the public. While the QDC cited to R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-5(a)(6), and (7),[4] our findings concerning similar uses of executive sessions are instructive. For example, in Brien v. Woonsocket City Council, OM 13-04 we found no violation where the public body met in executive session pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-5(a)(5).[5] Referencing this finding in Riley v. I-195 Redevelopment District Commission, Scotti v. I-195 Redevelopment District Commission, OM 14-13, we observed that the public body:

“did not violate the OMA when it convened into executive session pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-5(a)(5) to discuss and review bid proposals for a wastewater contract …  ‘advanced public information would be detrimental to the interest of the public’ because the Director of Public Works in her affidavit stated that ‘allowing information from all three vendors to [b]e made public . . . ha[s] the potential to greatly increase the ultimate cost of the project,’ and that disclosure could be detrimental to the City’s negotiating position during contract negotiations.” See Riley v. I-195 Redevelopment District Commission, Scotti v. I-195 Redevelopment District Commission, OM 14-13.

Similarly, in a sworn statement, the QDC’s Chief Operating Officer attests to the fact that discussion of these topics openly would negatively impact the State’s commercial interests by making the recruitment of businesses to the Quonset Business Park more difficult. Therefore, to the extent that it has not been made clear through our analysis of the agendas themselves, the QDC’s underlying usage of executive sessions was proper and comes within the scope of the type of executive sessions permitted by the cited exemptions.

Although we have found no violation on the merits, we additionally find that the instant Complaint is also barred by the relevant statute of limitations. The most recent QDC meeting addressed in the Complainant’s Complaint took place on January 21, 2025.[6] The minutes for that meeting were approved on March 18, 2025. The Complainant filed the instant Complaint on March 23, 2026. Thus, the Complainant was tardy in submitting her Complaint by at least 190 days. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(b) (“No complaint may be filed by the attorney general after one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of public approval of the minutes of the meeting at which the alleged violation occurred, or, in the case of an unannounced or improperly closed meeting, after one hundred eighty (180) days from the public action of a public body revealing the alleged violation, whichever is greater”); see, e.g., Langseth v. Buttonwoods Fire District, OM 19-27 (“[W]hen the statute of limitations has expired or is about to expire before a complaint is filed within [this Office], we have consistently, but respectfully, declined to issue what would essentially be a non-binding advisory opinion”)[7]; see also Davis v. Town of Exeter, OM 25-25.

The Complainant in rebuttal contends that her Complaint is timely in that a complaint may be filed “within 180 days of when the alleged violation is revealed through public action.” We find this argument to be unavailing. The full text of this provision allows for such an extension in the case of “an unannounced or improperly closed meeting,” and, as discussed above, we find that the meetings in question were not “improperly closed.” See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(b). Further, the arguments advanced in the Complaint (i.e., the insufficiency of executive session notices and inappropriateness of the sessions themselves), are supported wholly by materials that were available to the Complainant at the time of the alleged infractions (i.e., the relatively contemporaneous meeting minutes and agendas). There is no additional evidence provided to support a delayed awareness of potential OMA violations that would support the expanded statute of limitations period asserted by the Complainant.[8]

Accordingly, we find no violation. However, we do remind the QDC to strive to provide as much notice regarding the executive session business as possible when doing so would not hinder the entity’s stated mission. See Banfield v. Narragansett Town Council, Buffi v. Narragansett Town Council, OM 26-08 (“We remind public bodies that although it may sometimes be permissible to be more vague when providing notice of executive session agenda items, such agenda items should provide as much notice as possible given the particular circumstances surrounding that agenda item and based on what information about it is already public.”).[9] We emphasize that the OMA is a floor, not a ceiling, and we encourage the QDC to be mindful of the importance of promoting public confidence in its work.

·         Executive session minutes

The Complainant additionally argues that the QDC has “[r]epeatedly sealed executive session minutes without later disclosure.”

There is no provision within the OMA that provides for the automatic unsealing of properly sealed executive session minutes. See Fortin v. Town of Narragansett, OM 19-41. In the interest of transparency, we encourage public bodies to review and unseal executive session minutes, or portions thereof, when the need for confidentiality is no longer applicable. However, nothing in the OMA compels a public body to do so. See Davis v. Town of Exeter, OM 25-25. Therefore, this allegation fails to state a claim under the OMA.