Background

The Complainant takes issue with the notice provided by the Council for its December 5, 2025 meeting. The Complaint alleges that the Council posted its agenda for the December 5, 2025 meeting to be held at 9:00 am on the Secretary of State’s website on December 3, 2025 at 9:06 am. He asserts that this violated the OMA as it fell outside of the statutorily required 48 hour posting requirement by six minutes.

The Complainant further alleges that the Council’s meeting agenda was “[i]naccurate and [m]isleading.” He asserts that the meeting agenda stated that the Council would discuss “An Ordinance Amendment to Chapter 148 … §148-19 Forfeiture of Space.” However, at the meeting the Council discussed “substantive amendments to §148-15 Assignment of mooring space in addition to §148-19.”

The Council submitted a substantive Response to the instant Complaint through Assistant Town Solicitor Amy H. Goins., Esq. The Council concedes that it posted the December 5, 2025 meeting agenda six minutes outside of the required 48 hour notice period. It asserts that it was “due to simple human error.” Due to this, the Council states that it “will re-introduce this ordinance at a duly-posted meeting.” The Council further asserts that this Office has not issued any recent findings against the Council for OMA violations and that the instant violation “was both de minimus and inadvertent.”

Regarding the sufficiency of the notice, the Council asserts that the meeting agenda made clear the subject matter to be discussed as it referenced Chapter 148, Article IV of the Code of Ordinances, even if one section number was omitted. It further asserts that it posted the ordinance to be discussed on its Clerkbase webpage, so the “allegation that the Town was in any way attempting to hide or misstate the nature of the ordinance is unfounded.” Regardless, it asserts that “[g]iven that the Town Council intends to re-vote on the ordinance, however, the issue of fair notice is a moot point.”

We acknowledge the Complainant’s rebuttal.

Relevant Law and Findings

When we examine an OMA complaint, our authority is to determine whether a violation of the OMA has occurred. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8. In doing so, we must begin with the plain language of the OMA and relevant caselaw interpreting this statute.

The OMA requires that all public bodies provide supplemental public notice of all meetings at least forty-eight (48) hours in advance of the meeting. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b). “This notice shall include the date the notice was posted, the date, time and place of the meeting, and a statement specifying the nature of the business to be discussed.” Id. (emphasis added).

In the context of the OMA, this Office has previously determined it unnecessary for us to consider whether a public body violated the statute when, even if a violation has occurred, there is no appropriate remedy. See Solas v. South Kingstown Library Board of Trustees, OM 26-04; Ahlquist v. Scituate School Committee Policy Subcommittee, OM 24-11; Cienki v. Rhode Island Special Commission on Reapportionment, OM 22-33. The reason for this conclusion is because, even assuming a violation occurred, the OMA only provides for two types of remedies: injunctive relief and civil fines for a willful or knowing violation. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(a), (d). In a case where there is no need for injunctive relief and no evidence of conduct that would warrant pursuing civil fines, then no action by this Office would be appropriate, even if a violation were found. 

Here, we do not find that injunctive relief would be appropriate. The Council stated in its Response that it intended to re-introduce and re-vote on the ordinance at issue at an upcoming meeting. Our review of the Secretary of State’s website confirms that the Council did in fact re-vote on the ordinance at its next meeting held on January 5, 2026. The agenda for such meeting was posted more than 48 hours before the meeting and the agenda expressly stated that the Council would be discussing and acting upon an ordinance to amend “Chapter 148, Use and Protection of Public Waters of; Article IV- Mooring Regulations §148-15. Assignment of mooring space: §148-19 Forfeiture of Space.” This meeting notice made clear to the public that the Council intended to discuss and potentially act upon an ordinance that dealt with both §148-15 and §148-19. Given that the Council has re-voted on the ordinance at issue at a properly noticed meeting and the meeting notice sufficiently informed the public of the ordinance to be discussed, we find no injunctive relief would be appropriate.

Further, we do not find any evidence in the record before us that the untimely posting of the meeting agenda by six minutes, or the wording of the meeting agenda, assuming it violated the OMA, would have constituted a willful or knowing violation that would warrant civil penalties. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(a), (d). While the Council concedes that it failed to post the meeting agenda within the required 48 hour time period, it is notable that it only missed this deadline by a mere six minutes. We see no reason to doubt the Council’s explanation that this was “due to simple human error.” See Davis v. Town of Exeter, OM 25-25 (“[t]his Office routinely declines to find willful or knowing violations of the OMA where the behavior at issue is attributable to inadvertent human error”). Regarding the sufficiency of the meeting agenda, we credit the Council’s unrebutted statement that it posted the full ordinance to be discussed on its ClerkBase webpage and as such was not attempting to hide or misstate the nature of the ordinance. Although the posting of additional information on a public body’s own webpage does not cure or avoid an OMA violation, see R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(c) (sufficient notice must be posted on the Secretary of State’s website), the Council’s efforts to increase transparency and post additional supplemental information on its webpage undercuts any suggestion that it willfully or knowingly violated the OMA. The Council’s willingness to immediately re-notice and re-vote on the ordinance at its next meeting when it became aware of the instant Complaint also undercuts any such suggestion. See Ephraim v. North Tiverton Fire District, OM 23-15 (declining to find a willful or knowing OMA violation where the public body undertook subsequent remedial measures). We also observe that there have been no recent, similar violations as to the Council. See Langseth v. Warwick Sewer Authority, OM 20-37 (declining to find a willful and knowing violation where there were no recent similar violations found against that entity). As such, we decline to further analyze this matter as it is clear that even assuming the Town violated the OMA, no further relief would be appropriate.

Conclusion

Although the Office of the Attorney General will not file suit in this matter, nothing within the OMA prohibits an individual from instituting an action for injunctive or declaratory relief in Superior Court. See R.I. Gen Laws § 42-46-8(c). The OMA allows the Complainant to file a complaint within ninety (90) days from the date of the Attorney General’s closing of the complaint or within one hundred eighty (180) days of the alleged violation, whichever occurs later. See id. Please be advised that we are closing this file as of the date of this letter.

We thank you for your interest in keeping government open and accountable to the public.

Sincerely,

PETER F. NERONHA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

By: /s/ Patrick Reynolds

Patrick Reynolds

Special Assistant Attorney General