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VIA EMAIL ONLY

 

June 15, 2026

 

OM 26-18

 

Mr. Gregory J. Rice

 

Allan Fung, Esquire

 

Michael J. Lepizzera, Jr., Esquire

 

Re:      Rice v. Woonsocket City Council

 

Dear Mr. Rice, Attorney Fung and Attorney Lepizzera:

 

We have completed our investigation into the Open Meetings Act (“OMA”) Complaint filed by Mr. Gregory Rice (“Complainant”) against the Woonsocket City Council (“Council”). For the reasons set forth herein, we find the Council did not violate the OMA.   

 

Background

 

The Complainant takes issue with the Council’s April 6, 2026 meeting during which it unanimously voted to pass a property tax abatement for a specific property. The tax abatement request was submitted by the Complainant.

 

The Complainant alleges that the tax abatement was on the agenda for the Council’s February 2, 2026 meeting. However, Councilor James Cournoyer moved to table the vote. Subsequently, the Complainant withdrew his abatement request. The Council then voted to approve the abatement at its April 6, 2026 meeting. The Complainant alleges that there is a “reasonable basis to believe that substantive discussions, deliberations, and/or consensus-building occurred outside of a properly noticed public meeting.” To support his allegation, he asserts that “the resolution was passed instantly and unanimously without public deliberation.” He further alleges that the Council voted on his request for a tax abatement without notifying him.[1]

 

The Complainant then submitted a supplemental Complaint. He alleges “Councilman James Cournoyer and Councilwoman Sierra began speaking simultaneously” when the abatement item was discussed “indicating apparent familiarity with the matter.” He further alleges that “Councilwoman Sierra stated ‘he can do it,’ referring to Councilman Cournoyer, and did so while smiling.” He asserts that “[t]his exchange, combined with the immediate and coordinated manner in which the matter was presented and approved without any substantive discussion on the record, raises a reasonable inference that the substance of the resolution―including who would present it and what would be said―had been discussed or agreed upon in advance.”

 

The Council submitted a substantive Response to the instant Complaint through Assistant City Solicitor Allan W. Fung, Esq., along with a sworn affidavit from Councilor James Cournoyer. The Council states that at the Council’s February 2, 2026 meeting, Councilor Cournoyer moved to table the vote on the abatement because it was a “fairly significant abatement and [he had] a number of questions on” it. Following that meeting, Councilor Cournoyer spoke with the Tax Assessor about the abatement amount and the Complainant’s project. During that conversation, Council Cournoyer learned that there were errors in the original calculations. He then spoke to City Solicitor Lepizzera and requested that an updated resolution be submitted to the Council for consideration that reflected the updated numbers. Councilor Cournoyer confirmed in his sworn affidavit that he “did not have any conversations with any council members about” the abatement resolution.

 

The Council further asserts that the Complainant’s allegation that the abatement resolution was passed “‘without any discussion or deliberations’ is false.” After Councilor Cournoyer’s motion was seconded, he “put forward his remarks in support of the abatement” and explained the reasons for the updated numbers. Councilor Cournoyer also asked City Solicitor Lepizzera questions about the abatement. A unanimous vote was then taken.

 

The Council argues that “there was nothing untoward with how the abatement for Complainant Rice’s project … was handled.” It asserts that a “reasonable conclusion can be drawn that the other council members simply accepted the explanation and agreed with Councilman Cournoyer’s explanation.”

 

We acknowledge the Complainant’s Rebuttal and the supplemental submissions from both the Complainant and the Council.

 

 

Relevant Law and Findings

 

When we examine an OMA complaint, our authority is to determine whether a violation of the OMA has occurred. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8. In doing so, we must begin with the plain language of the OMA and relevant caselaw interpreting this statute.

 

·         Discussion outside of a public meeting

 

The OMA requires that all meetings of every public body “shall be open to the public.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-3. For the OMA to apply, however, a “quorum” of a “public body” must convene for a “meeting” as these terms are defined by the OMA. See Fischer v. Zoning Board of the Town of Charlestown, 723 A.2d 294 (R.I. 1999). Under the OMA, a “meeting” is defined as “the convening of a public body to discuss and/or act upon a matter over which the public body has supervision, control, jurisdiction, or advisory power.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-2(1). A “quorum” is defined as “a simple majority of the membership of a public body.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-2(4). It is undisputed that the Council consists of seven (7) members and thus four (4) would constitute a quorum. All three of these elements — a quorum, a meeting, and a public body — must be present in order for the OMA to apply; the OMA is not applicable when one or more of these elements is absent. See Sirios v. Glocester Town Council, OM 20-50. 

 

A quorum may be created, and a meeting “convened,” by a “rolling” or “walking” quorum, where a majority of the members of a public body attain a quorum by a series of one-on-one conversations or interactions. See, e.g., In Re: South Kingstown School Committee Electronic Mail Policy, OM 04-01 (a series of email communications among a quorum of a committee would satisfy the quorum requirement and implicate the OMA). Our findings have centered on the nexus between these one-on-one conversations and whether they serve as a chain of communication sufficient to constitute a collective discussion. See Finnegan v. Scituate Town Council, OM 20-22; Guarino, et al. v. Rhode Island Atomic Energy Commission, OM 14-07.

 

Here, the Complainant alleges that a quorum of the Council discussed his abatement request outside of a public meeting. To support his allegation, he asserts that “the resolution was passed instantly and unanimously without public deliberation.” As an initial matter, our review of the video footage of the Council’s April 6, 2026 meeting undercuts the Complainant’s allegation. Contrary to his allegation, there was public deliberation prior to the Council’s vote. Councilor Cournoyer explained the reasons he was in support of the abatement request and the reason for the updated numbers, and he asked questions of City Solicitor Lepizzera (this in addition to the presentation from the Tax Assessor that occurred at the Council’s February 2, 2026 meeting). But even if the Council had not engaged in any deliberation prior to its vote at its April 2, 2026 meeting, this would still not establish an OMA violation. See Drix v. Providence City Council Finance Committee, OM 23-08 (“because there is only a general allegation that a rolling quorum transpired due to how ‘quickly’ the amendments were passed and because the Committee was ‘already familiar with the amendments,’ we conclude there is insufficient evidence to establish a rolling quorum or that a quorum of the Committee convened [in a closed manner]”); Rose v. Warwick School Committee, OM 22-56 (finding that “the mere efficiency of the meeting … does not establish that substantive Committee business was discussed non-publicly”); Mulanaphy v. South Kingstown School Committee, OM 19-24 (finding that speculation of a pre-public meeting discussion based only on the nature of the discussion during the public meeting is not enough evidence to establish an OMA violation).

 

The Complainant also asserts that a quorum of the Council discussed his abatement request outside of a public meeting because Councilors Cournoyer and Sierra “indicat[ed] apparent familiarity with the matter” and Councilor Sierra stated that Councilor Cournoyer could “do it” and smiled. This similarly fails to establish that an OMA violation occurred. As this Office has previously found, members of a public body being “already familiar” with issues they will be voting on does not “establish a rolling quorum or that a quorum of the Committee convened [in a closed manner].” Drix, OM 23-08. Indeed, members of a public body receive notice ahead of time about the business to be discussed at a public meeting; just as members of the public do. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6. It is not abnormal, and indeed expected, that a member of a public body would be familiar with business to be discussed at an upcoming public meeting and not learn about it for the first time during the meeting. As to the fact that Councilor Sierra allegedly smiled at Councilor Cournoyer, pure speculation and conjecture is not enough to establish a violation of the OMA.  See Pontarelli v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, OM 24-03 (finding no OMA violation while stating that “[the Complainant] offers little more than unsupported speculation and conjecture. This is not enough to overcome the evidence of record”).

 

Most critically, Councilor Cournoyer stated in his sworn affidavit that he “did not have any conversations with any council members about” the abatement resolutions. See Pierson v. Coventry Town Council, OM 26-02 (declining to find an OMA violation while noting that “[t]his Office … traditionally gives great weight to undisputed, sworn statements”); Zasloff et al. v. Chariho School Committee, OM 25-06 (“[o]ur precedent supports declining to find an OMA violation when the sworn and undisputed statements of the implicated members rebut the allegations”). He explained that he moved to table the abatement resolution at the February 2026 meeting because he had “many questions regarding this significant tax abatement.” He then discussed the abatement calculations with the Tax Asessor and the City Solicitor. These discussions between Councilor Cournoyer and the Tax Asessor and City Solicitor do not implicate the OMA as a quorum of the Council was not present, and there is no evidence or allegation that these non-members served as a conduit for a collective discussion among a quorum of members. See Fischer, 723 A.2d 294. Accordingly, we do not find that the Council violated the OMA in this instance.

 

·         Notice to the Complainant

 

The OMA requires that all public bodies provide supplemental public notice of all meetings at least forty-eight (48) hours in advance of the meeting. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b). “This notice shall include the date the notice was posted, the date, time and place of the meeting, and a statement specifying the nature of the business to be discussed.” Id. This notice must be posted “at the principal office of the public body holding the meeting, or if no principal office exists, at the building in which the meeting is to be held, and in at least one other prominent place within the governmental unit” and electrically filed on the Secretary of State’s website. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(c).

 

In his Complaint, the Complainant objects to the Council placing his abatement request on its April 2026 meeting agenda “without his consent” and “without any notice to [him].” However, his Complaint does not say anything about the wording of the specific agenda item. He asserts that the Council acted “unilaterally and without [his] participation.” The Complainant’s allegation centers on the Council’s failure to personally notify him about its intention to discuss and vote on his abatement request.[2] However, this fails to state a potential violation of the OMA.

 

The OMA requires that public bodies provide notice of the public business they will discuss at public meetings. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b). Public bodies are instructed to provide such notice via posting of meeting agendas at public buildings and on the Secretary of State’s website. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(c). The OMA requires public bodies to inform the public generally in this way. The OMA places no obligation on public bodies to individually inform or provide notice to individuals if they may have an interest in an agenda item during an open session of an upcoming public meeting.[3] Similarly, the OMA does not require that public bodies permit the “participation” of individuals who may have an interest in an agenda item. Cf. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(d) (“[n]othing contained in this chapter requires any public body to hold an open-forum session to entertain or respond to any topic”). Accordingly, we do not find that the Council violated the OMA in this regard.

 

Conclusion

 

Although the Office of the Attorney General will not file suit in this matter, nothing within the OMA prohibits an individual from instituting an action for injunctive or declaratory relief in Superior Court. See R.I. Gen Laws § 42-46-8(c). The OMA allows the Complainant to file a complaint within ninety (90) days from the date of the Attorney General’s closing of the complaint or within one hundred eighty (180) days of the alleged violation, whichever occurs later. See id. Please be advised that we are closing this file as of the date of this letter.

 

We thank you for your interest in keeping government open and accountable to the public.

 

Sincerely,

 

PETER F. NERONHA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Special Assistant Attorney General

 

By: /s/ Patrick Reynolds

Patrick Reynolds

Special Assistant Attorney General

 

OMA


[1] The Complainant also raises allegations about the Council’s jurisdiction and the prudence of the Council’s actions. However, such allegations are not addressed in this finding as they fall outside of this Office’s purview. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8.

[2] To the extent the Complainant raised additional allegations or arguments about sufficiency of the notice provided by the Council for the first time in his Rebuttal, our finding does not address any such allegations or arguments. See Aiello v. Westerly Town Council, OM 22-54 (“[c]onsistent with this Office’s precedent and acknowledgement letters to the parties, this Office declines to review issues raised for the first time in a rebuttal”).

[3] Individualized notice is only required for a narrow subsection of executive session meetings, see R.I.G.L. §§ 42-46-5(a)(1), (8), which do not apply here. See Ross v. Cumberland School Committee, OM 25-38 (finding a school committee “had no obligation under the OMA to provide advance written notice to the Complainant” because the discussion did not fall under R.I.G.L. § 42-46-5(a)(1)).

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