Header

VIA EMAIL ONLY

 

June 15, 2026

 

OM 26-19

 

Mr. Gregory J. Rice

 

Michael A. Calise, Esq.

Senior Assistant City Solicitor

 

Re:      Rice v. Providence City Council Special Committee on Health, Opportunity, Prosperity, and Education

 

Dear Mr. Rice and Attorney Calise:

 

We have completed our investigation into the Open Meetings Act (“OMA”) Complaint filed by Mr. Gregory Rice (“Complainant”) against the Providence City Council Special Committee on Health, Opportunity, Prosperity, and Education (“Committee”). For the reasons set forth herein, we find the Committee did not violate the OMA.   

 

Background

 

The Complainant takes issue with the Committee’s March 26, 2026 meeting in which it discussed and voted on a rent stabilization ordinance. The Complainant alleges that the Committee took a recess during its meeting and when it returned “it was stated that amendments had been agreed upon by leadership, and a vote was subsequently taken based on those changes.” He asserts that “[t]his sequence raises serious concerns about whether substantive discussions or deliberations occurred outside of public view during an active open meeting.”

 

The Committee submitted a substantive Response to the Complain through Deputy City Solicitor Michael A. Calise, Esq., along with a sworn affidavit from City Councilor and Committee member Shelley Peterson. The Committee asserts that the instant Complaint “surmises the existence of a violation, based on the occurrence of the recess and the sequence of events, but it does not evidence one or even allege a specific allegation.” The Committee states that “[f]ollowing the recess, Councilwoman Peterson made comments detailing her thoughts on the relevant issues and her support” for the rent stabilization ordinance. Her comments were “in the context of certain amendments” and she “indicated that these amendments had the support of the [ordinance’s] lead sponsors.” She was “specifically referring to the support of the Chairman of the … Committee, Juan M. Pichardo, and Council President Rachel M. Miller (who is not a member of the … Committee).” It asserts that Councilor Peterson “had no discussions regarding the Act or the amendments with other members of the … Committee during the recess.” This is confirmed by Councilor Peterson’s sworn affidavit.

 

The Committee argues that Councilor Peterson’s affidavit is “uncontroverted evidence” that no violation occurred. It asserts that there is “no evidence of any discussions of the [ordinance] by a quorum of the members of the … Committee outside of the subject meeting” and the instant Complaint presents only “unsupported speculation and conjecture.”

 

We acknowledge the Complainant’s Rebuttal.

 

Relevant Law and Findings

 

When we examine an OMA complaint, our authority is to determine whether a violation of the OMA has occurred. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8. In doing so, we must begin with the plain language of the OMA and relevant caselaw interpreting this statute.

 

The OMA requires that all meetings of every public body “shall be open to the public.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-3. For the OMA to apply, however, a “quorum” of a “public body” must convene for a “meeting” as these terms are defined by the OMA. See Fischer v. Zoning Board of the Town of Charlestown, 723 A.2d 294 (R.I. 1999). Under the OMA, a “meeting” is defined as “the convening of a public body to discuss and/or act upon a matter over which the public body has supervision, control, jurisdiction, or advisory power.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-2(1). A “quorum” is defined as “a simple majority of the membership of a public body.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-2(4). It is undisputed that the Committee consists of five (5) members and thus three (3) would constitute a quorum. All three of these elements — a quorum, a meeting, and a public body — must be present in order for the OMA to apply; the OMA is not applicable when one or more of these elements is absent. See Sirios v. Glocester Town Council, OM 20-50. 

 

A quorum may be created, and a meeting “convened,” by a “rolling” or “walking” quorum, where a majority of the members of a public body attain a quorum by a series of one-on-one conversations or interactions. See, e.g., In Re: South Kingstown School Committee Electronic Mail Policy, OM 04-01 (a series of email communications among a quorum of a committee would satisfy the quorum requirement and implicate the OMA). Our findings have centered on the nexus between these one-on-one conversations and whether they serve as a chain of communication sufficient to constitute a collective discussion. See Finnegan v. Scituate Town Council, OM 20-22; Guarino, et al. v. Rhode Island Atomic Energy Commission, OM 14-07.

 

Here, the Complainant alleges that a rolling quorum may have occurred during the recess in the Committee’s March 26, 2026 meeting. To support his allegation, he asserts that when the Committee returned from its recess, “it was stated that amendments had been agreed upon by leadership, and a vote was subsequently taken based on those changes.”

It is undisputed that the statement in question was made by Councilor Peterson. In her sworn affidavit, Councilor Peterson explained that her statement was referring to support for amendments that she had discussed beforehand with the Chairman of the Committee (Councilor Juan M. Pichardo), and Council President Rachel M. Miller (who is not a member of the Committee). Councilor Peterson’s undisputed, sworn statement provides no factual basis for this Office to find the Committee violated the OMA. See Pierson v. Coventry Town Council, OM 26-02 (declining to find an OMA violation while noting that “[t]his Office … traditionally gives great weight to undisputed, sworn statements”); Zasloff et al. v. Chariho School Committee, OM 25-06 (“[o]ur precedent supports declining to find an OMA violation when the sworn and undisputed statements of the implicated members rebut the allegations”).

 

It is undisputed that the Committee consists of five members and thus three members would constitute a quorum. However, the evidence in the record reflects that Councilor Peterson only discussed the proposed amendments to the ordinance with one member of the Committee (Councilor Pichardo). Although she also discussed the amendments with Council President Miller, it is undisputed that she is not a member of the Committee and does not count towards establishing a quorum. We have not been presented with any evidence or specific allegations of any additional non-public discussions about the amendments involving any members of the Committee. Thus, the record does not reflect that a quorum of the Committee discussed the ordinance outside of a public meeting. See Chrostowski v. South Kingstown Town Council, OM 23-18 (“[a]lthough Councilor Rose discussed the election for President with Councilor Bergner, their conversation on its own did not violate the OMA as their conversation did not involve a quorum of the Council”). And although the allegations in the Complaint were directed against the Committee and not the Providence city Council, we also note that the record also does not reflect that a quorum of the Providence City Council discussed the ordinance outside of a public meeting as Councilor Peterson’s statement represents that only three Councilors discussed the ordinance. However, seven Councilors are required to establish a quorum of the City Council as it has fifteen members.

 

While we find no violation of the OMA in this instance, we recognize that there is evidence that three Councilors non-publicly discussed a matter pending before the Committee and the City Council. Even if discussions among less than a quorum of the Committee or the City Council do not violate the OMA, it can still degrade public confidence in the political process and detract from transparency. We remind the Committee and the City Council of the underlying policy of the OMA, which is to ensure that the public good is served and that “citizens be advised of and aware of the performance of public officials and the deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-1.

 

Conclusion

 

Although the Office of the Attorney General will not file suit in this matter, nothing within the OMA prohibits an individual from instituting an action for injunctive or declaratory relief in Superior Court. See R.I. Gen Laws § 42-46-8(c). The OMA allows the Complainant to file a complaint within ninety (90) days from the date of the Attorney General’s closing of the complaint or within one hundred eighty (180) days of the alleged violation, whichever occurs later. See id. Please be advised that we are closing this file as of the date of this letter.

 

We thank you for your interest in keeping government open and accountable to the public.

 

Sincerely,

 

PETER F. NERONHA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

 

By: /s/ Patrick Reynolds

Patrick Reynolds

Special Assistant Attorney General

 

OMA
Published by ClerkBase
©2026 by Clerkbase. No Claim to Original Government Works.