VIA EMAIL ONLY

June 16, 2026

Mr. Jason Nunes

John M. Verdecchia, Esquire

Assistant Town Solicitor, Town of Coventry

Dear Mr. Nunes and Attorney Verdecchia:

We have completed our investigation into the Open Meetings Act (“OMA”) Complaint filed by Mr. Jason Nunes (“Complainant”) against the Coventry Planning Commission (“Commission”). For the reasons set forth herein, we find that the Commission violated the OMA only as to the vote that it took just prior to the conclusion of the meeting.

The instant Complaint stems from the Commission’s January 28, 2026 meeting, the entirety of which related to the “Village at Tiogue” project. The Complainant contends that the agenda for this meeting included an assurance that “no new business [would] be conducted after 10PM,” but that nevertheless after an 11PM break and after some in-person and virtual attendees departed, “[t]he meeting resumed past 11PM” and “[a] vote was taken and passed for item 7 and item 8 of the agenda.” The Complainant argues that it was “misleading that a vote was … taken” in that any actions as to “item 7” and ‘item 8” consisted of “new business,” in contravention of the notice provided by the Commission and, as such, in violation of the OMA.[1]

Attorney John M. Verdecchia, Assistant Town Solicitor for the Town of Coventry, submitted a substantive Response on behalf of the Commission. The Commission argues that it “did not initiate new business after 10:00 P.M. as alleged by the [C]omplainant” and that “[a]ny decision which transpired after 10:00 P.M. was a mere continuation of discussions on previously introduced agenda items.” The Commission invited this Office to review the “meeting transcript and or video of the meeting, either of which will corroborate the [Commission’s] representations.”

We acknowledge the Complainant’s Rebuttal.

Tiogue Ave, East Shore Dr, Minglewood Dr, & Tiffany Road”[2]

The meeting began at approximately 6:30 p.m. At roughly the “3:37” (three hours and thirty-seven minutes) mark of the meeting’s YouTube footage, a member of the public named “Jean McMahon” provided public comment via Zoom. At the conclusion of her remarks, a Commission member stated: “It’s past 10 o’clock … we have an applicant that’s probably anxious to have us get this wrapped up.” The Commission then accepted public comment from two additional members of the public including, importantly, the Complainant himself (who was the final member of the public to speak).

The Complainant began his remarks at roughly the “4:24” (four hours and twenty-four minutes) mark of the YouTube footage and concluded the same approximately one minute later, after which there was some discussion in response to the previously raised points. Then, at about the “4:37” (four hours and thirty-seven minutes) mark, a Commission member requested a brief sidebar with legal counsel, stating “Okay, let’s do 5, and then we can try to wrap this thing up tonight.” At the conclusion of this break, the Commission closed the public hearing portion of the meeting (the same was also memorialized in the meeting minutes). The Commission was then advised by an individual seated in front of the Commission’s dais[3] to “[vote] on the [Preliminary Plan for the] project [itself] first [agenda item ‘7’], and then [to set] the bond second [agenda item ‘8’]” in order to be “comfortable with the numbers as they are laid out” relative to the bond (agenda item “8”). After some further conversation related to the Preliminary Plan, the Commission followed suit, voting to approve agenda items “7” and “8” unanimously.[4] Between the conclusion of the Complainant’s remarks and adjournment of the meeting, about 35 minutes had elapsed.

This sequencing and timing of the above-described events, along with these specific, highlighted remarks, are instructive. They first demonstrate that the Complainant was not prejudiced by the fact that business was conducted past 10 p.m. In Frank DiGregorio v. Exeter Town Council, OM 18-18, this Office declined to find an OMA violation related to potential improper notice where the public body addressed an agenda item during a different part of the meeting than as was noticed. We remarked that the “complaint in no way detail[ed] how moving … [around] items … on the agenda and/or the alleged insufficient agenda in any way aggrieved or injured [the Complainant] to confer legal standing to file this complaint.” See also R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8 (“Any citizen or entity of the state who is aggrieved as a result of violations of the provisions of this chapter may file a complaint with the attorney general.”). Although this Office often pursues complaints in the public interest even when a complainant fails to demonstrate that they were aggrieved, in this case, for the reasons discussed below, we do not find that the timing of the meeting prejudiced any right protected by the OMA or that the Complainant has demonstrated that his or anyone else’s access to the meeting was impaired as a result of the Complainant’s timing allegations related to the meeting.

The Complainant here fails to articulate how the continuation of business past 10 p.m. caused him any sort of injury, as his Complaint relative to this point is limited to merely describing the manner in which the meeting transpired. As noted, the Complainant was the last member of the public to speak, and he concluded his remarks with only 35 minutes left in the meeting (of a meeting that lasted over five hours, total). The Complainant was clearly present when the Commission verbally indicated that the meeting was approaching its conclusion and, indeed, his Complaint describes what transpired at the meeting from beginning to the end, underscoring the fact that he was present for the duration of the meeting and observed the Commission’s actions.[5] There is therefore no indication that he was in any way aggrieved by the fact that the meeting ran past 10 p.m. See Patterson v. Bonnet Shores Fire District Council, OM 25-27 (declining to find an OMA violation due partly to the Complainant’s actions evidencing that “it [was] apparent that he suffered no injury”); see also Ford v. Cranston City Council Ordinance Committee, OM 25-07 (declining to find that notice was inadequate where “the Complainant’s argument … [was] impeded by his own statements.”).

Additionally, while we understand how inclusion in the agenda of the phrase “NO NEW BUSINESS WILL BE CONDUCTED AFTER 10PM” was somewhat confusing, the execution of the meeting itself did not necessarily undermine this restriction. While the completion of agenda item “7” and agenda item “8” did take place after 10 p.m., the agenda nevertheless provided notice that these items would be reached towards the latter portion of the meeting, and the Commission provided multiple verbal cues acknowledging that it was running late but that it would conclude its remaining business that evening. See McGwin v. North Kingstown School Committee, OM 22-22 (finding no OMA violation due to a meeting venue change that differed from what was on the agenda because “there [was] no contention that anyone missed the public portion of the meeting because of [the change of venue]” and because all actions of the public body were visible to the public such that the “spirit of the OMA was met.”).

Bolstering our conclusion is the fact that, when strictly construed, the “NO NEW BUSINESS” phrase was included in the agenda specifically as to agenda item “7,” and was seemingly not applicable to the entirety of the agenda at large. As such, the “NO NEW BUSINESS” phrasing could easily be interpreted as being applicable only to agenda item “7,” leaving the Commission to safely address the remaining agenda items (items “8” and “9”) after 10 p.m. without running afoul of this advisement. See Durfee v. Tiverton Town Council, OM 19-40 (noting that an agenda must be interpreted by reviewing “the more specific agenda item” as opposed to “general notation[s],” particularly where such verbiage is contradictory). The record also shows that item “7” was commenced prior to 10 p.m.

Significantly, with the exception of the item discussed below, there is no dispute that the agenda gave notice of the substantive nature of the business to be discussed. Subject to the below exception, the Complainant does not dispute that the public had notice of the substantive nature of the business that would take place, in conformance with Rhode Island Supreme Court precedent. See Tanner, 880 A.2d at 797. In these circumstances, where the substantive business was properly noticed such that anyone who had an interest in the subject would know to attend the meeting, where the record reflects that it was made clear to the attendees that the business regarding item “7”  (commenced prior to 10 p.m.) was being discussed past 10 p.m., and where the Complainant has failed to identify any prejudice experienced by him or anyone else as a result of this circumstance, we decline to find a violation.

For this reason, we find no OMA violation stemming from the fact that the Commission conducted business after 10 p.m. Nonetheless, we encourage the Commission to be more precise and careful in the language it utilizes in its agenda and to refrain from including statements that could give the impression that the meeting will end at a certain time if the Commission does not intend to be constrained by such time limits.

·         Notice of Vote

The instant Complaint includes an allegation that the agenda was “misleading [in] that a vote was … taken” in connection with activities occurring during the latter portion of the meeting. Based on our aforementioned independent review, we have determined that improper public notice was provided relative to agenda item “8” in that this item did not specifically provide notice that the Commission would vote as to this item.

As to item “8,” at roughly the “4:51” (four hours and fifty-one minutes) mark of the YouTube footage, the Commission addressed this item, which concerned “BOND SETTING.” Relative to this item, the supplemental notice reads as follows:

8. BOND SETTING

Public comment will be taken for the following item

8.1       "Village at Tiogue"

Preliminary Plan, Major Land Development/Comprehensive Permit Owner/Applicant: 232 Realty Associates

AP 32, Lots 149, 150, 151, & 153; Zone R-20 (Residential)

Tiogue Avenue, East Shore Drive, Minglewood Drive, & Tiffany Road

Nevertheless, despite this part of the agenda being styled as featuring “public comment,” no such public comment took place. Instead, the meeting minutes (and meeting footage) reflect that during the very end of the meeting:

“A motion [was] made by Secretary Burke and seconded by Member Reyes to set the bond at $3.4 Million per the recommendation of the Town Engineer. All voted aye. Motion carried.” 

This action item, i.e., the Commission’s vote to “set the bond at $3.4 Million per the recommendation of the Town Engineer,” was not contemplated by the agenda as drafted. This section of the agenda was not even accompanied by any generic advisement that it was subject to potential action. We have regularly found agenda items that fail to include notice of similar concrete measures, such as a vote, to be violative of the OMA. For example, in Solas v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, OM 25-26, we noted that:

“This Office has routinely held that providing notice as to any potential public body action is a key element in the fact-specific inquiry required to ascertain the adequacy of an agenda item. See Noordzy v. South Kingstown Town Council, OM 20-38 (finding an OMA violation where ‘the agenda item [wrongfully] … provided ‘no further indication that any action would be taken’’); see also Fandetti v. Bonnet Shores Fire District, OM 22-37 (‘there is no factual dispute that the Council … vote[d] on the Quickbook issue, which was not included on the agenda and therefore violated the OMA’); Aiello v. Westerly Town Council, OM 22-54 (‘this notice contained no information … that the Council may be voting … Accordingly we find the Council violated the OMA’).”

Further, in Tanner v. Town of East Greenwich, the Rhode Island Supreme Court examined the OMA’s requirement that a public notice contain “a statement specifying the nature of the business to be discussed.” 880 A.2d 784 (R.I. 2005). The Court determined that the agenda item “Interviews for Potential Boards and Commission Appointments” did not adequately apprise the public of the nature of the business to be discussed at a Town Council meeting. In that case, after conducting interviews as indicated on the notice, the Town Council proceeded to vote to appoint various individuals to the planning and zoning boards for the Town and the Court determined that the agenda item failed to provide notice that the Town would vote on appointments. Id. at 798.

Similarly here, because the agenda relative to item “8” indicated that only “[p]ublic comment” would occur as to this topic and did not provide sufficient notice that the Commission would vote on setting a multi-million dollar bond under this agenda item, we find the Commission’s vote to “set the bond at $3.4 Million” under agenda item 8 was not properly noticed and violated the OMA.[6] We find no additional OMA violations.[7]