Background

The Complainant takes issue with the Council’s vote to appoint an alternate member to the Board of Canvassers at its April 6, 2026 meeting.

The Complainant notes that the Council’s April 6, 2026 meeting agenda stated that the Council would be acting on the appointment of “Board of Canvassers, Full Member” and “Board of Canvassers, Alternate Member.” However, she asserts that the Council actually voted to appoint three members to the Board of Canvassers, not two as the agenda language would suggest. She alleges that the Council voted to appoint an alternate member and also voted to appoint a then-alternate member of the Board of Canvassers to a full member. This created a new vacancy for an alternate member position (a third vacancy in total) that the Council voted to fill at the same meeting rather than at a future meeting.

The Council submitted a substantive Response through Westerly Solicitor William J. Conley, Jr. The Council concedes that the “facts of this case are not in dispute.” The Council explains that it “appropriately noticed two vacancies, as a result of term expirations, on the Board of Canvassers.” One of the vacancies was for a full Board member that “could be filled by a member of any political party” and one was “specifically for the Republican alternate board seat.” However, a third vacancy was created during the meeting “as a result of the first appointment as the member selected was serving on the democratic alternate board member role.” Thus, the Council “decided to fill that vacancy at the Council meeting as the correspondence received by the Democratic Town Committee also provided its choice for that alternate board member position.”

The Council argues that its agenda “listed that appointment to the Board [of Canvassers] would be discussed and acted upon” thus “[a]nyone who had reason to be interested in the Board appointments had adequate notice that the matters would be discussed and acted upon.” It further argues that its actions were reasonable as it “had the letter from the Democratic Town Committee that clearly stated who they wanted to fill the alternate Board position if the Council chose to fill the full Board member position with the Town Committee’s selection.”

Relevant Law and Findings

When we examine an OMA complaint, our authority is to determine whether a violation of the OMA has occurred. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8. In doing so, we must begin with the plain language of the OMA and relevant caselaw interpreting this statute.

The OMA requires that all public bodies provide supplemental public notice of all meetings at least forty-eight (48) hours in advance of the meeting. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b). “This notice shall include the date the notice was posted, the date, time and place of the meeting, and a statement specifying the nature of the business to be discussed.” Id. (emphasis added).

In Anolik v. Zoning Board of Review of the City of Newport, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b) requires the “public body to provide fair notice to the public under the circumstance, or such notice based on the totality of the circumstances as would fairly inform the public of the nature of the business to be discussed or acted upon.” 64 A.3d 1171, 1173 (R.I. 2013); see also Tanner v. Town of East Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784, 797 (R.I. 2005) (appropriate inquiry is “whether the [public] notice provided by the [public body] fairly informed the public, under the totality of the circumstances, of the nature of the business to be conducted”).

In Tanner, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the East Greenwich Town Council provided insufficient notice when its meeting agenda mentioned “Interviews for Potential Board and Commission Appointment” but did not specify that any appointments or votes would be occurring. 880 A.2d at 798. Since Tanner, our Office has issued numerous findings addressing when agenda item language is sufficient for appointments. For instance, our Office has found that public bodies are required to indicate on their agendas the positions for which appointments are to be made but are not required to include the names of the proposed appointees. See Mudge v. North Kingstown School Committee, OM 06-34 (discussing prior findings); see also Spodnik v. Town of West Warwick and West Warwick Town Council, OM 19-28 (determining that agenda items titled “Appointment of West Warwick Police Chief” and “Appointment of Tree Warden” did not violate the OMA).

Here, the Council’s April 6, 2026 meeting agenda made the public aware that the Council would be making appointments for the “Board of Canvassers, Full Member” and “Board of Canvassers, Alternate Member.” The use of the singular version of these phrases implied that only two members would be appointed to the Board of Canvassers during the Council’s meeting. Indeed, the Council concedes as much, stating that it “appropriately noticed two vacancies, as a result of term expirations, on the Board of Canvassers.” (Emphasis added). It is undisputed that the Council made a third appointment to the Board of Canvassers during its meeting and that the vacancy it voted to fill was created during that same meeting, thus it could not have been contemplated by the Council’s meeting agenda (and even to the extent the Council could have potentially anticipated such a third potential vacancy, it did not notice it).

The Council’s meeting agenda items were insufficient to inform the public as to the business to be discussed and acted upon. We have recognized that general statements that appointments to public boards will occur is not sufficient. See Oliveira v. Newport City Council, OM 06-26 (“considering the number of positions associated with the City, public notice that appointments would be made to some board and commission is particularly general and does not sufficiently apprise the public”). Here, the Council’s agenda items did at least identify the Board to which appointments would be made but were insufficient as their very language specifically narrows the agenda items to include only one full member and one alternate member to be appointed to the Council. A member of the public reading the agenda would not be on notice that the Board would also be voting to fill a third vacancy.

The Council argues that the agenda “listed that appointment to the Board [of Canvassers] would be discussed and acted upon” thus “[a]nyone who had reason to be interested in the Board appointments had adequate notice that the matters would be discussed and acted upon.” But it is not enough that the Council generally made a reference to appointments to the Board of Canvassers. See Oliveira, OM 06-26. A public body’s burden is to provide fair notice of the particular public business to be conducted at the specific meeting in question. See Tanner, 880 A.2d at 797. Accordingly, we find that the Council violated the OMA by providing insufficient notice to the public of the business to be conducted at its April 6, 2026 meeting.

Conclusion

The OMA provides that the Office of the Attorney General may institute an action in Superior Court for violations of the OMA. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(a), (e). The Superior Court may issue injunctive relief and declare null and void any actions of the public body found to be in violation of the OMA. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(d). Additionally, the Superior Court may impose fines up to $5,000 against a public body found to have committed a willful or knowing violation of the OMA. Id.