VIA EMAIL ONLY

October 2, 2026

Ms. Sandra Puchalski

David R. Petrarca, Jr., Esquire

Assistant Town Solicitor, Town of Charlestown

Dear Ms. Puchalski and Attorney Petrarca:

We have completed our investigation into the Open Meetings Act (“OMA”) Complaint filed by Ms. Sandra Puchalski (“Complainant”) against the Charlestown Town Council (“Council”). For the reasons set forth herein, we find no violation.   

The Complainant alleges that the May 26, 2026 agenda was insufficient because under this specific agenda topic “there was a scheduled, invited, tele,-communication via the web of the paid consultant of the Charlestown Fire District not on the agenda as a speaker or presenter (sic)” and that this violated the OMA because “web presenters must be on the posted agenda for transparency and public awareness as to who or who. Is speaking [at a meeting] (sic).” In support of her Complaint, the Complainant also provided multiple attached records, all of which were reviewed in assessing the Complaint-in-chief.[1]

Charlestown’s Assistant Town Solicitor submits that he “conducted a substantive investigation regarding the Complaint” in response to the Complainant’s filing and, on behalf of the Council, avers that “the OMA was not violated.” To wit, the Council argues that both the meeting minutes and the video footage of the meeting evidence that the challenged agenda item reflected “exactly what happened” at the meeting. The Council contends that “under the totality of the circumstances, the detailed [agenda] statement reasonably describe[d] the purpose of the action proposed to be taken” and “fairly inform[ed] the public of the nature of the business to be discussed or acted upon.” Underscoring the adequacy of the notice, the Council notes, is that fact that the Complainant was present at the meeting and “was well versed and well prepared for the agenda item and participated in the discussion.” The Council included with its Response an affidavit executed by the Town Clerk.  

We acknowledge the Complainant’s Rebuttal.

The OMA requires that all public bodies provide supplemental public notice of all meetings at least forty-eight (48) hours in advance of the meeting.[2] See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b). “This notice shall include the date the notice was posted, the date, time and place of the meeting, and a statement specifying the nature of the business to be discussed.” Id. (emphasis added).

In Tanner v. Town of East Greenwich, the Rhode Island Supreme Court examined the OMA’s requirement that public notice contain “a statement specifying the nature of the business to be discussed.” 880 A.2d 784 (R.I. 2005). The Court determined that the appropriate inquiry is “whether the [public] notice provided by the [public body] fairly informed the public, under the totality of the circumstances, of the nature of the business to be conducted.” Id. at 797-98; see also Anolik v. Zoning Board of Review of the City of Newport, 64 A.3d 1171, 1173 (R.I. 2013) (holding that R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b) requires the “public body to provide fair notice to the public under the circumstance, or such notice based on the totality of the circumstances as would fairly inform the public of the nature of the business to be discussed or acted upon”).

We have previously determined that public bodies violate the OMA by posting broad and insufficient agenda items such as “Tax Collector’s Report,” “Treasurer’s Report,” “Chief’s Report,” “Committee Reports,” “Old Business,” and “New Business.” These broad agenda items typically fail to “fairly inform the public of the nature of the business to be discussed or acted upon.” Spodnik v. West Warwick, OM 19-28; Beagan v. Albion Fire District, OM 10-27.

Here, upon review of the record before us, we find that the challenged notice complied with the OMA.

As noted, the challenged agenda item stated in full:

“D. Discussion, Update and Potential Action Regarding the Status of the Demolition of the Former Fire Station Located at 2370 Matunuck Schoolhouse Rd, Including HUD Grant, Land Use Authority, and Timeline.”

The plain words of the instant Complaint do not challenge the sufficiency of the agenda item as a whole but rather the fact that a video conferencing presentation took place under this topic. Again, the Complainant argues that “web presenters must be on the posted agenda for transparency” and that “[the Council] intentionally kept this web speaker from it's (sic) posted agenda.” Our focus, therefore, is limited to determining whether noticing the participation of an expert speaker was necessary for the Council to comply with R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-6(b).

In Ford v. Cranston City Council Ordinance Committee, OM 25-07, this Office addressed a substantially similar set of facts. The Complainant in that matter alleged that the Committee’s notice was inadequate because under an agenda item concerning a proposed ordinance “a representative of the Cranston Police Department introduce[d], in a slide show format, pictures of [unhoused] encampments, allegedly within the borders of the City … [neither] [t]hese photos, nor the potential for accompanying testimony of the police officer, were noticed.” We nevertheless found that the Committee’s notice was adequate. We explained that, upon review of the meeting footage, it became clear that:

“the [challenged] testimony stayed within the confines of the noticed topic. The Department officials’ remarks spoke to the ordinance’s origin and the various sections of the ordinance that were included with the agenda … The photos displayed during these remarks were simply used to illustrate the points that were being made by the speaker.” See Ford v. Cranston City Council Ordinance Committee, OM 25-07.

As such, the mere fact that a third party was invited by the Council to discuss the noticed topic does not render item “D” inadequate, particularly (as is the case here) where there is no allegation that the invited presenter diverted from the agenda topic as noticed. See Frank DiGregorio v. Exeter Town Council, OM 18-18 (“[w]e have previously opined that not every ‘nuance’ to a public body discussion need be posted”); see Beagan v. Albion Fire District, OM 11-06.[3]

Further, and consistent with our precedent, the Complainant’s argument is impeded by her own actions. In another similar matter, Patterson v. Bonnet Shores Fire District Council, OM 25-27, the Complainant alleged that an agenda item stating “[t]o consider for approval reconstituting the Charter Committee” was impermissibly vague. In declining to find a violation, this Office noted that:

“while the Complainant contends that the agenda was impermissibly vague, it is apparent that he suffered no injury as to the same. Review of the footage of the … meeting … shows [the Complainant] to have been physically present and engaged while the Council took up [the challenged] agenda item … The Complainant can be seen reacting to the Council’s discussion, and at one point he attempted to interject when he disagreed with a Councilmember’s statement.” See Patterson v. Bonnet Shores Fire District Council, OM 25-27.

The same is true here. While largely disagreeing with the statements made by the Council and the remote guest, the Complainant was nevertheless conversant as to the subject matter of agenda topic. While the topic was being discussed, the Complainant, visible in the footage, rose from her seat with documents in hand, seemingly poised to interject. When offered an opportunity by the Council to respond to the points made by the speaker, she did so, even referencing the documents she had provided to the Council in advance of the meeting. (The Complainant had provided the Council with fifty pages of records in advance of her scheduled public comment).[4] The Complainant’s demonstrated preparedness rather than any sort of evident surprise or disadvantage militates against a finding that agenda item “D” was statutorily deficient. See Ford v. Cranston City Council Ordinance Committee, OM 25-07 (“any argument made by the Complainant that notice was insufficient is undermined by the fact the Complainant … offered prepared remarks during the public comment portion of the meeting that were particularized to the content of [the agenda item]”); see also Davis v. Town of Exeter, OM 25-25 (“The only alleged injury relative to [the challenged] agenda item … is specific to the Complainant himself and his contention that he could not sufficiently prepare for the meeting. This allegation, however, is undermined by his own concession that he became aware of the Council’s typographical error while ‘prepar[ing] for the meeting.’”).  

Finally, our conclusion that the Council complied with the OMA is bolstered by the fact that it did not take any sort of official action in connection with agenda topic “D” beyond mere discussion. Towards the close of the meeting, the Council President stated “there is no motion needed, it was just discussion … potential action if necessary … and I think I’ll leave it at that.” Thus, even assuming that this Office were to find a violation due to agenda topic “D” not referencing the virtual presenter, there is no need for injunctive relief, as this topic was solely informational in nature. See Barrett v. Council on Education, OM 22-17 (“Injunctive relief is not required with regard to the ‘Commissioner’s Report’ agenda item because there is no indication that any action or vote was taken under that agenda item.”).[5]

Therefore, based on the foregoing, we find no violation.