VIA EMAIL ONLY

October 27, 2026

Mr. Robert Jones

Gwendolyn Peel, Esq.

Legal Counsel, North Kingstown School Committee

Dear Mr. Jones and Attorney Peel:

We have completed our investigation into the Open Meetings Act (“OMA”) Complaint filed by Mr. Robert Jones (“Complainant”) against the North Kingstown School Committee (“Committee”). For the reasons set forth herein, we decline to find that the Committee violated the OMA.   

As to the Committee’s July 22, 2026 supplemental notice, the Complainant contends that agenda items “III.D.1. ‘Controller’ [and] III.D.2 ‘School Committee Clerk’” were similarly inadequate. The Complainant adds that the Committee “took action on the matters identified in [his] complaint,” and that the Committee’s use of inadequate agenda items following the issuance of OM 26-28 represents a “[p]attern of noncompliance.”[1] In support of his Complaint, the Complainant provided multiple screenshots reflective of the challenged agenda items.

Attorney Gwendolyn Peel submitted a substantive Response on behalf of the Committee. The Committee submits that it “recognizes that the [challenged agenda] items are similar to the agenda descriptions discussed in that [prior] decision [OM 26-28] and has treated them accordingly.” In that spirit, the Committee contends that it subsequently took a number of affirmative steps to rectify any potential issues arising from the inadequate agenda items highlighted by the instant Complaint. The Committee avers that on August 4, 2026, it “re-voted on the agenda items referenced in [OM 26-28] as well as additional items they believed may raise similar concerns” and implemented additional measures to prevent recurrence. In support of this substantive Response, the Committee provided this Office with various exhibits, including an affidavit executed by the Committee’s legal counsel and the relevant supplemental notices.

We acknowledge the Complainant’s Rebuttal.[2]

In the context of the OMA, this Office has previously determined it unnecessary for us to consider whether a public body violated the statute when, even if a violation has occurred, there is no appropriate remedy. See Cienki v. Rhode Island Special Commission on Reapportionment, OM 22-33; Ahlquist v. Scituate School Committee Policy Subcommittee, OM 24-11. The reason for this conclusion is because, even assuming a violation occurred, the OMA only provides for two types of remedies: injunctive relief and civil fines for a willful or knowing violation. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(a), (d). In a case where there is no need for injunctive relief and no evidence of conduct that would warrant pursuing civil fines, then no action by this Office would be appropriate, even if a violation were found.

Here, there is no need for injunctive relief. At issue are four identified insufficient agenda items, two from the May 5, 2026 meeting and two from the July 22, 2026 meeting. As noted, the Committee (through its legal counsel) attests to the fact that at an August 4, 2026 meeting the Committee “reconsidered and re-voted, in open session, [on] the matters identified in OM 26-28 as well as several additional matters in order to ensure full compliance with [OM 26-28].”[3] In so doing, the Committee provided more substantive information as to each challenged agenda item.[4] The Complainant does not challenge the sufficiency of these agenda items in their reconstituted form. Nor does the Complainant contest that the items were re-voted upon at this subsequent meeting. As such, because the agenda items at issue in this Complaint have been re-noticed and revoted upon and the Complainant does not contest the propriety of the subsequent notice and vote, any prospective injunctive relief is now moot. See Clark v. Barrington Town Council, OM 26-13 (finding injunctive relief to be moot where “review of the Secretary of State’s website confirm[ed] that the Council did in fact re-vote on the [challenged item]”); see also Middletown Concerned Neighbors v. Middletown Planning Board, OM 25-37 (“we do not find a need for injunctive relief as the vote that was discussed during the recess discussion was eventually held at a subsequent properly noticed open meeting.”).

There is also no evident conduct on the part of the Committee that would warrant the issuance of civil fines. The Complainant contends that the violation was willful or knowing based on this Office having found a similar violation in OM 26-28, but the record before us makes clear that the agenda items that are the subject of this Complaint were posted before the Committee had the benefit of receiving and reviewing that finding. It is true that OM 26-28 was issued on the same day as the July 22, 2026 meeting, but the Committee’s legal counsel states that his Office “received … OM 26-28 late in the afternoon [of July 22, 2026].” He further notes that “[t]he July 22, 2026 meeting started at 4:30 p.m.” and that OM 26-28 was transmitted to the Committee’s attorneys “at approximately 2:45 p.m.” Because OM 26-28 was issued mere hours prior to the start of the July 22, 2026 meeting, the Committee contends it would be unreasonable to expect the Committee to have reviewed that finding in time to take appropriate action regarding the July 22, 2026 meeting that took place only a couple of hours later. And the May 5, 2026 meeting took place more than two months before OM 26-28 was issued. We find these arguments persuasive and decline to view this sequence of events as constituting willful or deliberate conduct. See Mahoney v. Scituate Town Council, OM 20-03 (declining to find a willful or knowing OMA violation where “the prior finding was issued after the April and May Meetings occurred and the Town Council did not have the benefit of our analysis prior to posting the April and May Meeting agendas.”).

We also recognize that, after the issuance of OM 26-28, the Committee made adjustments to its agenda procedures in order to comply with relevant notice requirements. After the release of OM 26-28, the Committee promptly took proactive remedial actions regarding the agenda items challenged in this Complaint by re-noticing the challenged agenda items. Additionally, the Committee’s averment that it has since “revised its agenda preparation practices to conform to the requirements identified in [OM 26-28]” militates against a finding that its conduct was willful or knowing. See Nunes v. Coventry Planning Commission, OM 26-20B (“[t]his Office has regularly concluded that … remedial measures, affirmatively undertaken by a public body, militates against any finding that the underlying OMA violation was willful or knowing.”); see also Prince v. Langworthy Public Library Board of Trustees, OM 26-03 (declining to find a willful or knowing OMA violation where “we recognize[d] the subsequent remedial measures outlined by the [public body]”).

As we have determined that there is no appropriate remedy for the violations alleged in this Complaint, we decline to proceed further.[5]

Although the Attorney General has found no violation as to the Committee and will not file suit in this matter, nothing in the OMA precludes an individual from pursuing a complaint in the Superior Court as specified in the OMA. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-8(c). The Complainant may pursue an OMA complaint within “ninety (90) days of the attorney general’s closing of the complaint or within one hundred eighty (180) days of the alleged violation, whichever occurs later.” Id. Please be advised that we are closing this file as of the date of this letter. 

We thank you for your interest in keeping government open and accountable to the public

Sincerely,

PETER F. NERONHA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

By: /s/ Adam D. Roach

Adam D. Roach

Special Assistant Attorney General