VIA EMAIL ONLY

February 19, 2026

Mr. John Silva

Brenda Baum, Esq.

Acting Administrative & Legal Support Services Administrator

Rhode Island Department of Corrections

Dear Mr. Silva and Attorney Baum:

We have completed our investigation into the Access to Public Records Act (“APRA”) Complaint filed by Mr. John Silva (“Complainant”) against the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (“RIDOC”). For the reasons set forth herein, we find that the RIDOC did not violate the APRA.

The Complainant alleges that RIDOC violated the APRA because its denial of his request “did not identify these withheld documents with sufficient specificity, nor did they explain their basis for their classification in a way that allows for meaningful review.” What the Complainant describes is commonly known as a Vaughn index or privilege log. However, this Office has consistently found that such an index or log is not required by the APRA.[1] See Zurier v. Office of the General Treasurer, PR 23-30 (finding that providing the basis for withholding records at issue was enough to satisfy the requirements of R.I. Gen. Laws. § 38-2-7(a) and that a privilege log was not necessary).

Here, RIDOC provided the Complainant with the “specific reasons for the denial” by informing him that the responsive records were exempt from disclosure pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2(4)(A)(I)(b) and R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2(4)(D). This Office has previously recognized that R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-7(a)’s  requirement can be satisfied by citing to a specific APRA exemption or, at a minimum, providing enough information so the requester can understand the reason for the denial and fairly infer the relevant exemption(s). See Anonymous v. City of Warwick, PR 25-07; see also Piskunov v. City of Cranston, PR 16-41 (finding that a denial of records because they were “private and confidential” did not violate the APRA because “[t]his loosely tracks the APRA exemption found at R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2(4)(A)(I)(b)”). RIDOC here expressly cited the exemptions it invoked and even went a step further by providing the Complainant with legal citations to explain why his relationship to the content of the records was not relevant to the APRA analysis. Accordingly, we find that RIDOC satisfied the APRA’s requirement when it cited the specific exemptions pursuant to which it was withholding the responsive records.

·         Withholding of the records

The APRA provides that all records maintained by public bodies are subject to public disclosure unless the document falls within one of the twenty-eight (28) enumerated exemptions. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2(4)(A)-(BB). Among other exemptions, the APRA permits nondisclosure of “[p]ersonnel and other personal individually identifiable records otherwise deemed confidential by federal or state law or regulation, or the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.” R.I. General Law 38-2-2(4)(A)(I)(b) (“Exemption (A)(I)(b)”). The plain language of this provision contemplates a “balancing test” whereby the “public interest” in disclosure is weighed against any “privacy interest.” Consequently, we must consider the “public interest” versus the “privacy interest” to determine whether the disclosure of the requested records, in whole or in part, “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[.]” R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2(4)(A)(I)(b).

RIDOC asserts that the responsive probation and parole records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (A)(I)(b). We do not write on a blank slate as the Rhode Island Supreme Court has already addressed whether the public disclosure of parole records would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The Supreme Court held in the affirmative in Bernard, in which it found the withholding of parole records permissible under the APRA noting that “[u]ndoubtedly, [parole] board records contain personal information about inmates.” 730 A.2d at 32; see also The Providence Journal v. Rhode Island Department of Corrections, PR 16-45 (finding that RIDOC permissibly withheld parole records under Exemption (A)(I)(b) even where the subject-inmate was deceased); D’Amario, PR 08-22 (finding that the Probation Office permissibly withheld probation records citing Bernard).

The Complainant asserts that even if an APRA exemption applies, RIDOC should provide him with redacted copies of the responsive records. However, the specificity of his request (seeking records about himself) diminishes the likelihood that redaction could effectively address privacy concerns. See Pawtucket Teachers Alliance v. Brady, 556 A.2d 556, 559 (R.I. 1989) (“[T]he report at issue in the present case specifically relates to the job performance of a single readily identifiable individual. Even if all references to proper names were deleted, the principal’s identity would still be abundantly clear from the entire context of the report.”); see also The Providence Journal, PR 16-45 (finding that redaction of parole records was not possible as the redacted information would still be identifiable).

The fact that the Complainant is seeking his own records is of no relevance to this analysis as requesters do not have an “individualized right to review [their] parole records.” Bernard, 730 A.2d at 31. As the Supreme Court explained, if parole records “were subject to the Access to Public Records Act, those records would be open to the scrutiny of any member of the public who wanted to review them, contravening the purpose of the act.” Id. at 32 (emphasis added); see also McQuade v. Rhode Island State Police, PR 13-03 (“Accordingly, if this Department determines that a particular document is a public record, then any person may access or inspect that record regardless of whether or not that person is an interested party. Once a record is made public to one person under the APRA, that record is public to all.”). Accordingly, we find that RIDOC permissibly withheld the responsive records pursuant to Exemption (A)(I)(b).[2]

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Although this Office has engaged in the above analysis and determined that RIDOC’s APRA response complied with the APRA, we likely also could have resolved this Complaint by determining that the Complainant lacked standing and did not raise a cognizable request for relief. The record reveals that although RIDOC properly withheld the two pages of responsive records under the APRA (thereby making clear that they are not considered public records that would be available to any other APRA requester), it opted to nonetheless provide the records to the Complainant outside of the APRA process because they pertained to himself. We commend RIDOC for taking that action in the interests of transparency. RIDOC did precisely what this Office often encourages public bodies to do, which is to consider providing records to a requester outside of the APRA process when the requester has a personal interest in those records, even if the records are not public to all and the formal APRA request is denied. Unfortunately, it appears the Complainant may not have understood that RIDOC was providing him with the responsive records maintained by RIDOC, even though it was properly memorializing that such records are not public to everyone.