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VIA EMAIL ONLY

March 4, 2026

PR 26-12

Anonymous Complainant

Jon M. Anderson, Esquire

Legal Counsel, Coventry Public Schools

Re: Anonymous v. Coventry Public Schools

Dear Anonymous Complainant and Attorney Anderson:

We have completed our investigation into the Access to Public Records Act (“APRA”) Complaint filed by an anonymous Complainant (“Complainant”) against the Coventry Public Schools (“Coventry”). For the reasons set forth herein, we find that Coventry did not violate the APRA.

Background and Arguments

The Complainant asserts that Coventry violated the APRA by assessing an excessive prepayment estimate in connection with their APRA request related to: “health insurance and benefits services, including correspondence related to Requests for Proposals (RFPs) and contract negotiations with WB Community Health and [a specified individual described as a ‘[v]endor and/or [c]onsultant’ to the Schools].”[1] The Complainant argues that despite the fact that this request was “limited in scope by timeframe (January 1, 2020 to present [July 29, 2025]) and by subject matter (specific correspondence directly related to RFPs or contract negotiation and administration, and executed contracts),” Coventry provided them with “multiple fee estimates that [were] excessive, inflated, and inconsistent with reasonable staff effort or modern electronic recordkeeping practices.” The Complainant included with their Complaint correspondence between the parties reflecting the initial APRA request, Coventry’s response, and the subsequent efforts to narrow the scope of the request and reduce the prepayment estimate.

Coventry’s substantive Response detailed these exchanges with the Complainant and the rationale for each estimate produced based on those exchanges.[2] For ease, we will summarize each communication in turn.

· The Initial July 29. 2025 APRA Request and Coventry’s August 7, 2025 Response

In response to the Complainant’s initial APRA request, as submitted, Coventry provided the Complainant with a prepayment estimate of $416.25 “(27.75 hours x [$]15 per hour).” Coventry explained that this estimate reflected a search, review, and retrieval time of 5.75 hours for section “I” of the request, 13 hours for section “II” of the request, and 10 hours for section “III” of the request. An electronic search for records responsive to the three parts produced “3,824 emails across 37 accounts,” all of which would require review and potential redaction.

As to physical records, the prepayment estimate encompassed time needed to “[locate] physical files from [the] archives …unstapl[e] … photocopy … manual[ly] redact … sensitive information … scan … restapl[e] … [and] re-fil[e]” the records. This entire process, involving records covering the five-year period set forth in the request, required the participation of multiple records custodians, including the Schools’ Director of Finance, Director of Technology, Superintendent, Chief Financial Officer, and former employees.

· The August 12, 2025 Revised Request and Coventry’s August 18, 2025 Response

Dissatisfied with this estimate, the Complainant replied to Coventry, this time “limit[ing] [their] request to only electronic records in digital formats.” (Emphasis in original). They also sought some clarification relative to the basis of the prior estimate. Coventry then revisited the request and initial estimate and determined, in fact, that “the initial time estimate had been significantly understated.” Coventry explained that upon re-review of the request it determined that “there were a significant amount of [additional] potentially responsive emails to the entirety of [the Complainant’s] requests,” namely, “13,140 [total] emails.”[3] The new estimate that followed reflected (84 hours [of staff time] x $15 per hour),” which Coventry broke down for the Complainant section-by-section, explaining what was required to produce records responsive to each part of the request.[4] The resulting revised estimate came out to “$1260.00.” (Emphases in original).[5]

· The August 19, 2025 “Formal Appeal” of the Revised Estimate and Coventry’s August 21, 2025 Response

Understandably surprised by this sharp increase in the prepayment assessment following their attempt at narrowing, the Complainant “formally appealed” the $1260 estimate.[6] Chiefly, they asserted that “[t]he claimed number of potentially responsive emails is implausible given the narrowed scope and timeframe of the request.” The Complainant also challenged Coventry’s search and retrieval process as represented. Based on the foregoing, they “demand[ed] a recalculat[ion]” of the prior estimate. In response, Coventry further described the calculations driving its estimate.[7] Additionally, Coventry reduced its prepayment estimate from “$1,260.00 to 1,110.00” based upon a reduction of workhours from “84 hours to 74 hours,” as Coventry determined that it needed less time to search certain categories of records.

· The August 25, 2025 Request for Clarification and Coventry’s August 26, 2025 Response

Finally, the Complainant queried once again to confirm that Coventry was utilizing the correct timeframe for its search. Coventry confirmed the same, and the Complainant responded soon thereafter by stating “[t]hank you for the clarification.”

In sum, the parties’ prepayment communications evolved as follows:

We acknowledge the Complainant’s Rebuttal to Coventry’s substantive Response.

Relevant Law and Findings

When we examine an APRA complaint, our authority is to determine whether a violation of the APRA has occurred. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-8. In doing so, we must begin with the plain language of the APRA and relevant caselaw interpreting this statute.

The APRA provides that “[a] reasonable charge may be made for the search or retrieval of documents” and expressly allows the responding public body to require prepayment for “costs properly charged.” R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 38-2-4(b); 38-2-7(b). Pursuant to the APRA, no costs shall be charged for the first hour of search and retrieval and any requests received within 30 days shall be considered one request. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-4(b).

The Rhode Island Supreme Court has made clear that in addition to the time to search and retrieve responsive records, the “costs of redaction should be borne by the requesting party because it is part of the process of retrieving and producing the requested documents.” DARE v. Gannon, 819 A.2d 651, 661 (R.I. 2003). As we have previously observed, “estimating the time to search, retrieve, review, and redact documents is an inexact science.” Farinelli v. City of Providence, PR 19-04.

Coventry carefully set forth the methods it utilized in calculating its estimates in its various touchpoints with the Complainant. See supra. Importantly, its per-email review estimate of “three (3) emails a minute” is well within the prior prepayment ranges that this Office has determined to be acceptable. See Langseth v. City of Warwick [8.9.24], [3.21.25], PR 25-32 (“We do not find the [public body’s] estimate of two minutes per email to conduct its review to be unreasonable”); see Jerry Transparancy v. City of Providence, PR 19-29 (finding that an estimate of two minutes per email for review and redaction was reasonable); Langseth v. Rhode Island Airport Corporation, PR 25-37 (finding that “a per-email estimate of less than one minute of review time … [was] reasonable”). Consequently, we find Coventry’s ultimate estimate to be reasonable, particularly given the fact that it took great pains to show its work. See Mattero v. South Kingstown School Department, PR 21-01 (declining to find an excessive prepayment estimate where “the Department provided at least some evidence in support of its estimate.”).

Additionally, Coventry represents that the sensitive nature of the records at issue required a heightened level of care in its review and redaction process. It noted, for example, that “[t]he exclusion of attorney-client communications was a particularly sensitive concern” given that the sought-after records could relate to both a pending lawsuit and an ongoing arbitration process. This Office has previously held that the complexity of the requested records is a valid consideration when used to inform the calculation of prepayment estimates.[8] See “Three Boys” v. South Kingstown School Department, PR 22-01 (finding that the public body’s prepayment estimate was reasonable, in part, due to the “sensitive nature” of the responsive emails); see also Crandall and Machado v. Office of the Governor, PR 24-12 (finding that the prepayment estimates at issue did not violate the APRA based, in part, on “the nature of the requested records”). Additionally, given the scope of the request and the information in the record before us, we also do not find that Coventry’s search methods or retrieval of potentially responsive documents was unreasonable. [9]

While Coventry is encouraged to review its method for calculating prepayment considering that it appears to have underestimated search and retrieval time at the outset of the request process, we recognize that oftentimes determining an accurate prepayment estimate may be difficult, particularly when a request is as complex as the one at bar (and given the many factors discussed herein that contributed to the reasonableness of Coventry’s ultimate prepayment estimate).[10] See supra; see also Langseth v. Rhode Island Airport Corporation, PR 25-37 (“we recognize that providing prepayment estimates is not an exact science and estimates may evolve as a public body progresses through its search, retrieval, and review.”); Harris v. City of Providence, PR 17-51.[11]

Here, based on the totality of the circumstances, the revised final estimate provided by Coventry did not violate the APRA. Nonetheless, we reiterate in this finding, as in other findings from this Office, that the APRA is a floor and not a ceiling. Although the APRA permits the assessment of prepayment, a public body is free to not assess prepayment and to produce public records without cost, or with a discounted cost, especially when the records pertain to a subject matter that is of public interest. We find no violation.

Conclusion

Although this Office has found no violation, nothing within the APRA prohibits an individual or entity from instituting an action for injunctive or declaratory relief in Superior Court as provided in the APRA. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-8(b). Please be advised that we are closing this file as of the date of this letter.

We thank you for your interest in keeping government open and accountable to the public.

Sincerely,

PETER F. NERONHA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

By: /s/ Adam D. Roach

Adam D. Roach

Special Assistant Attorney General

APRA

[1] The request itself contained three (3) main parts inclusive of thirteen (13) subsections (some of which also had subparts). In the interest of brevity, the full text of the Complainant’s request has not been reproduced herein.

[2] Coventry’s Response included an affidavit executed by Coventry’s APRA Coordinator attesting to the facts set forth in the Response.

[3] Coventry determined at this point that there were additional responsive hardcopy records as well. As noted, the August 12, 2025 revised request sought only electronic records.

[4] For example, as to section “2.4” of the request, Coventry stated that the “preliminary search returned 3854 emails that must be reviewed to determine whether they are responsive to this request and, if so, redacted as necessary. While electronic redaction tools are utilized, each email must still be read to identify required redactions and verified to ensure accuracy.”

[5] Coventry also provided the Complainant with some records at this juncture, including “RFP responses from each respondent, the inventory checklist from the RFP Opening, and various documents in response to the request for scoring sheets that were used to award the RFP.”

[6] While this appeared to be an administrative appeal as contemplated by R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-8(a), the Complainant did not clearly articulate an allegation relative to Coventry’s compliance with the administrative appeal process until their Rebuttal. Consequently, our analysis herein is limited to the propriety of Coventry’s prepayment estimates. See Aiello v. Westerly Town Council, OM 22-54 (“[c]onsistent with this Office’s precedent and acknowledgement letters to the parties, this Office declines to review issues raised for the first time in a rebuttal.”).

[7] As an example, Coventry noted that they “took the total emails to review and redact and divided that by three (3) emails a minute and then divided by an hour.”

[8] The complexity of these records also undermines one of the Complainant’s main arguments challenging Coventry’s calculation methods. The Complainant infers that Coventry could have utilized methods such as “bulk export and electronic redaction”, and that “thousands of emails” would not require “individual review.” This argument conflicts with our precedent, and such a methodology would be inappropriate given the character of these records. See Sacharczyk v. Office of the General Treasurer [9.26.25], PR 25-65 (noting that providing a requester with “an entire database” or “unabridged email accounts” would not comport with the APRA given the need to deliberately review each responsive record to determine whether it is public).

[9] Moreover, in addition to the complex structure of the request (in that it included over a dozen sections, some of which had subparts), the sheer number of records custodians that Coventry needed to consult with in order to gauge its prepayment estimate underscores the difficulty inherent in responding to this request. See Rhode Island Housing Justice Organizing Committee v. RIPTA, PR 23-59 (declining to find that a prepayment estimate was excessive based partially on “the number of employees whose records would need to be searched.”).

[10] We dismiss the Complainant’s allegation, raised in rebuttal, that Coventry formulated its estimates by “count[ing] every email between identified employees” regardless of content or timeframe. The exhibit the Complainant points to in support of this allegation indicates otherwise. The APRA Coordinator requested searches based on timeframes narrower than the request itself and directed certain IT searches between distinct employees, evidencing a targeted strategy. Additionally, the request itself was provided to those conducting the search, thereby providing a valuable context for the execution of the IT searches. Finally, it may sometimes be reasonable and necessary to conduct a somewhat over-inclusive search in order to avoid missing potentially responsive records.

[11] While the Complainant made some attempts to narrow their request, such as removing hardcopy records from consideration, their subsequent outreach did not meaningfully limit the universe of potential records. For example, at no time did the Complainant decrease the timeframe of records sought, nor did they eliminate in toto specific sections of their multipart request. If the goal was to reduce the cost to the Complainant, more concrete measures as described above would have likely accomplished the same. See Langseth v. Rhode Island Airport Corporation, PR 25-37 (finding no violation where “[i]n attempting to clarify his request, the Complainant still broadly sought ‘documents and emails,’ without providing limiting language that would narrow the scope of the request.”).