VIA EMAIL ONLY

March 31, 2026

Ms. Steph Machado

Reporter, The Boston Globe Rhode Island

Nicholas Poulos, Esquire

Associate City Solicitor, City of Providence

Dear Ms. Machado and Attorney Poulos:

We have completed our investigation into the Access to Public Records Act (“APRA”) Complaint filed by Ms. Steph Machado (“Complainant”) against the City of Providence (“City”). For the reasons set forth herein, we decline to find that the City violated the APRA.

In its substantive Response, the City clarifies that there was some miscommunication between the Department’s communications officer and the Complainant, with each individual interpreting the email correspondence differently. The City contends that it did not perceive the Complainant’s email request to be the kind that would receive “formal treatment as an APRA request, providing the full protections of” the statute. This is particularly true, the City argues, given the fact that it has “promulgated [APRA] procedures” which “provide that APRA requests be sent through our NextRequest platform or via mail.”[1] The City explains that the statement at issue, (made by the Department’s communications officer), was intended to convey that several APRA requests for the same BWC footage had already been made in advance of this informal request, and that the Complainant would receive the BWC footage at the same time as these similarly situated formal APRA requesters. Additionally, the City argues in a footnote that the Complainant should have easily been able to recognize this distinction because she had followed the City’s APRA procedure previously, “having submitted 53 such requests” through the NextRequest portal.

We acknowledge the Complainant’s Rebuttal. The Complainant notes that while she has indeed used the City’s NextRequest portal in the past, she also “made hundreds of requests via email to both the mayor’s administration and the [Department] over the past 10+ years,” and that such email communications have been treated by the City as properly transmitted APRA requests.

At issue here is the parties’ conflicting interpretations of the statement: “I am going to treat your request for [BWC footage] as an APRA.” As such, this finding will be narrowly limited to assessing the City’s handling of the request for BWC footage.[2]

Injunctive relief would not be appropriate in this instance because the City made the BWC footage publicly available on February 9, 2026, soon after the parties’ submissions had been received by this Office. This public release via a City webpage was intended to fulfill multiple requests for the BWC footage, seemingly made both pursuant to the APRA and informally.[3] This Office has received no indication from the Complainant that the City’s production of the BWC footage was substantively insufficient. See Solas v. North Providence School Department, PR 26-11 (“We also do not find that injunctive relief would be appropriate given that the Department has already responded to the request and the Complainant has not raised any objections to the Department’s substantive response”). Importantly, we also note that the issue of the sufficiency of the produced BWC footage is not properly before us, as the instant Complaint solely concerns the timeliness of the City’s response, and both parties make colorable arguments in support of their subjective interpretations of the legal effect of the email at issue.[4] See infra.

We also find no evidence of a willful and knowing or reckless violation, as it is clear that reasonable minds could disagree as to whether the Complainant’s email constituted a formal APRA request in light of the exchange between the parties. The Complainant’s request did not comply with the City’s APRA procedures, so the request would only potentially be considered an APRA request as a result of the communications officer’s response. Clearly the communications officer’s use of the verbiage “I am going to treat your request … as an APRA” was a major contributor to the divergence in understanding between the two parties and gave the Complainant a reasonable basis to conclude that her request was being processed as a formal APRA request notwithstanding that she submitted it while not using APRA procedures. Use of more precise language would have likely prevented this situation and avoided creating an impression that the response was being treated as an APRA request. Still, the context of this communication and the City’s ex post facto clarification render the City’s explanation at least somewhat reasonable (i.e., that the City was managing a number of similar requests in the wake of an unprecedented event and sought to inform the Complainant that she would receive the BWC footage at the same time as the formal APRA requesters), and suggest that it was made in good faith. Although the City’s language should have been more precise to avoid giving the wrong impression, the Complainant’s decision to make an informal request and to not submit a clearly labeled APRA request pursuant to the City’s established procedures adds to the murkiness of the situation.[5] Additional factors could lead one to believe that the Complainant’s request was made outside of formal APRA channels, including the fact that she sought the production of records on a “rolling basis” (something not provided for in the APRA)[6] and that her January 12 and January 15, 2026 follow-up communications with the Department made no mention of the BWC request.

Consequently, the collective misunderstanding between the parties militates against a finding of any willful and knowing or reckless behavior on the part of the City. This conclusion is bolstered by a lack of any recent, similar violations on the part of the City.[7] As such, we decline to determine whether the City violated the APRA by failing to provide a timely formal response to an APRA request, because even if the Complainant’s request was deemed a formal APRA request, and even if the City violated the APRA by failing to timely respond, in these circumstances there would be no appropriate relief. 

Before concluding this finding, it is worth addressing some additional points raised in the filings.

The Complainant refers to this Office’s “April 26, 2023 advisory opinion” (hereinafter, “ADV PR 23-01”) and its directive “that public bodies may not restrict APRA requests to methods that are not ‘readily accessible’ and that there is ‘no reason’ public bodies should not accept requests by email.” To be clear, ADV PR 23-01 does not require public bodies to accept APRA requests via email. It plainly states that public bodies should “accept APRA requests submitted by email and/or using an electronic portal.” See Advisory Opinion Regarding Methods For Accepting APRA Requests, ADV PR 23-01. (Emphasis added). While we certainly do encourage public bodies to utilize a variety of methods in accepting APRA requests, the City’s use of the NextRequest portal complies with the spirit of ADV PR 23-01.[8] Moreover, nothing in this Office’s Advisory Opinion was intended to modify the APRA’s requirement that requesters utilize request procedures promulgated by the public body.

The Complainant further states in rebuttal that “the [C]ity has … always allowed … requests to be made via email” and argues it would be a detrimental change in practice if the City no longer did so. Those prior requests are not before this Office, but to the extent they were similar to the “request” that is the subject of this finding in that they were informal in nature, it is not clear that the APRA would apply to these requests and appears that they may instead have been media requests made and responded to outside of the APRA process (or perhaps that the City voluntarily opted to treat them as APRA requests despite not being required to do so). In other words, if these email requests were not clearly identifiable as APRA requests and/or not submitted in accordance with the City’s established procedures, the statute would seemingly not be implicated, and this Office would lack the statutory authority to intervene. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-8.

While we of course encourage being as responsive as possible to requesters in the interest of transparency,[9] we note that adherence to APRA procedures serves an important statutory purpose as well. See Anonymous v. RI Office of the Postsecondary Commissioner, PR 24-56 (“The APRA’s requirement that a public body establish procedures to ensure access to records … is not meaningless. Among the reasons for this requirement is to ensure a process is in place whereby members of the public may make APRA requests that are uniformly funneled through a public body’s process so that they may be responded to in a timely manner.”).

In sum, we often stress “that communication between the parties is key, as communication between a requester and a public body can often promote understanding, clarify ambiguities, and resolve disputes.” See Rourke v. Rhode Island Judiciary, PR 25-01. While it is not our intention for this finding to chill the free-flowing communication between the Complainant and the City, we reiterate that adherence to APRA procedures is grounded in the statute itself and advances its overall purpose. To the extent some requesters (including members of the media) and public bodies routinely engage in informal requests and responses outside of the APRA process by mutual agreement, we encourage such interactions, as they can promote efficient and transparent disclosures of information and records. But such communications would generally not be subject to the APRA.