VIA EMAIL ONLY

April 28, 2026

Ms. Alexandra Leslie

Reporter, Target 12

WPRI-TV

Al-Amyn Sumar, Esquire

Senior Counsel, The New York Times Company

John M. Verdecchia, Esquire

Legal Counsel, Coventry Police Department

Dear Ms. Leslie, Attorney Sumar, and Attorney Verdecchia:

We have completed our investigation into the Access to Public Records Act (“APRA”) Complaints filed by Ms. Alexandra Leslie (“Complainant Leslie”) and Al-Amyn Sumar, Esquire, on behalf of The New York Times Company and its correspondent, Mitch Smith (“NYT”) against the Coventry Police Department (“Department”). We consolidate these Complaints and address them in a single finding, as they present substantively similar issues and both involve the Department. For the reasons set forth herein, we find no APRA violation.

In response, the Department reiterates that its denial was proper due to the “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” inherent in releasing the BWC footage. The Department again notes that the individual depicted in the footage was ultimately “not the suspect in the attack” and “completely innocent of any wrongdoing.” Any prior release of the individual’s identifying information, the Department argues, is of no consequence, as any subsequent release would only result in “compounding that [initial] error.” The Department asserts its obligation to prevent “further harmful release” of private information, while additionally noting that Exemption (D)(e) is implicated in that the footage depicts “techniques and procedures utilized by police pursuant to an investigation [which] are exempt from disclosure.”[1]

We acknowledge Complainant Leslie’s rebuttal.

• NYT’s February 3, 2026 Complaint

As to this same incident, the NYT sought: “All search warrant applications, [BWC] videos and incident reports related to an operation with the FBI at a Hampton Inn in Coventry on Dec. 14, 2025.” The Department again denied the request for BWC footage in full pursuant to Exemption (D)[2] and provided the incident reports in redacted form, subject to that same exemption. In its Complaint, the NYT challenges both the full denial of the BWC footage and the “withholding [of] other materials.” (Emphasis in the original). Much like Complainant Leslie, the NYT argues that there is “immense public interest in the [BWC] footage disclosure” in that “[t]he public … deserves a full accounting of the circumstances of the [December 14, 2025 detention of a person of interest].” The NYT similarly argues that the BWC footage can be subject to “narrow, targeted redaction” relative to any nonpublic information and that “there is no basis to withhold portions of the [BWC] footage that reflect[s] the words and actions of the law enforcement officers themselves.”

As to the “other materials” (the “search warrant applications” and the “incident reports”), the NYT first challenges the full denial of the “search warrant applications.” The NYT contends that the stated grounds for this denial, that the Department was “not involved in their issuance,” is an “immaterial” analysis under the APRA. The NYT further contends that the Department’s partial denial of the incident report was not sufficiently “justified” in that “in certain cases, redactions … [were] applied to non-identifying information” (and the NYT reproduced an example of this from the redacted report).[3]

In response, the Department largely reiterated its arguments in support of withholding the BWC footage in-full, as previously asserted in response to Complainant Leslie’s request. As to the remaining records, (“search warrant applications” and “incident reports”), the Department notes that it “did provide incident reports, albeit redacted, to the [NYT] … [and] the Department was not involved in the procurement of the search warrants … [which] were applied for and obtained by other agencies.”[4]

We acknowledge the NYT’s rebuttal.

The Complainants here requested BWC footage related to a specific incident involving an identifiable individual. The specificity inherent in these requests diminishes the likelihood that redaction could effectively address the well-articulated privacy concerns.[5] See Hunt v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 972 F.2d 286, 288-89 (9th Cir. 1992) (contrasting a FOIA request for a single investigatory file with requests for numerous disciplinary files and concluding that “[t]he single file *** will not shed any light on whether all such FBI investigations are comprehensive”); see also Pawtucket Teachers Alliance v. Brady, 556 A.2d 556, 559 (R.I. 1989) (“[T]he report at issue in the present case specifically relates to the job performance of a single readily identifiable individual. Even if all references to proper names were deleted, the principal’s identity would still be abundantly clear from the entire context of the report.”).

Furthermore, our in camera review of the BWC footage determines that it is rife with non-public information, which only further diminishes the value of any attempt at redaction. Although the in camera nature of our review limits our ability to discuss it in specific detail, we can generally (and non-exhaustively) describe certain categories of information depicted in the footage which are clearly non-public. These include: the face of the ultimately-cleared individual, visible interior computer monitors within a law enforcement vehicle and visible smartphone screens of law enforcement officials[6] (see R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 38-2-2(4)(D)(a),(e)); depictions of a private domicile (see Leslie v. City of Providence, PR 25-10 (“footage of the living spaces … are all exempt from public disclosure.”))[7]; vehicle make, model, and registration information; license plate numbers (see Real World Media LLC v. Providence Police Department, PR 21-07 (“license plate numbers … could have (and perhaps even should have) been redacted”)); and information that implicates HIPAA (and, by extension, Exemption (S) of the APRA) (see the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 45 C.F.R. § 164). In multiple instances personally-identifiable information can be gleaned from the footage, including (but not limited to) private phone numbers and home addresses (see Gavin v. Pawtucket Police Department, PR 25-54 (‘[w]e have previously recognized the privacy interests inherent in the release of personally identifiable information such as an individual’s phone number.”)). Personal information was also disclosed through informal conversation captured in the video recording.   

The footage additionally depicts third parties. These private individuals, involved by happenstance in these interactions, have privacy interests relative to these encounters. See American Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 655 F.3d at 7 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2011). We have also previously recognized the heightened privacy interest inherent in video footage depicting a person, which typically implicates privacy concerns beyond those implicated by paper records. See Real World Media LLC v. Providence Police Department, PR 21-07 (“video footage depicting a person’s image and behavior can implicate greater privacy interests than reports or other types of records pertaining to the incident”); see also Prison Legal News v. Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys, 628 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that video footage can implicate greater privacy interests than photographs). As such, the withheld BWC footage implicates the significant privacy interests of multiple private members of the public, none of whom were found to have committed any wrongdoing in connection with the investigation.

Having outlined the significant privacy interests in the footage, we must also consider whether the public interest in the disclosure of the withheld BWC footage outweighs the privacy interests implicated. See Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772 (1989) (“[W]hether disclosure of a private document . . . is warranted must turn on the nature of the requested document and its relationship to ‘the basic purpose . . . to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.’”). “The touchstone concerning whether public disclosure of a record maintained by the government outweighs an individual’s privacy is whether the records concern official information about the government agency or sheds light on the conduct of government.” Farinelli v. City of Pawtucket, PR 23-39. Here, both Complainants have asserted a public interest in release of the footage. Complainant Leslie notes the “looming questions about why [the person of interest] was targeted, what was found at the hotel and how police handled the situation,” while the NYT argues that “[t]he public … deserves a full accounting of the circumstances of the raid.”

While both Complainants have raised legitimate public interest issues related to understanding how law enforcement officials carried out their official duties in the wake of a high-profile mass shooting incident, we find that release of the requested footage, which pertains to an easily-identifiable private individual and which is highly personal in nature, would not substantially serve the public interest, especially when weighed against the irrefutable privacy interests at stake. See Hunt, 972 F.2d 286, 289. Again, while we cannot describe the withheld footage in more detail given the in camera nature of our review, suffice it to say that upon this review it is our determination that disclosure of the footage would not “meaningfully advance the public interest, which in the APRA context means shedding light on government.” See Reddy v. Cranston Police Department, PR 26-07. Importantly, redaction would be impractical, as no reasonably segregable portion of the footage may be produced. See Leslie v. City of Providence, PR 25-10. As noted, the footage is teeming with non-public information, all of which pertains to third-parties and a since-cleared member of the public who unfortunately found himself at the center of this incident. The entire incident itself implicates this individual’s privacy interests. This makes redaction infeasible.

As such, we find that the Department’s withholding of the BWC footage in its entirety was permissible under the APRA, and we conclude that the Department did not violate the APRA though its full denials.

• The NYT’s Request for “Incident Reports”

The NYT also challenges the manner in which the Department redacted the relevant “incident reports.” This Office sought and subsequently reviewed the incident reports, both in the redacted form, as was provided to the NYT, and in unredacted form for an in camera review. Based upon that review, we find no violation.

As noted, the APRA permits nondisclosure of certain records maintained by law enforcement agencies if disclosure “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[.]” R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2(4)(D)(c). See supra. Additionally, R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2(4)(D)(e) permits nondisclosure where disclosure “would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations.”

The Department provided unredacted versions of a four (4) page incident report and a one (1) page “call screen” document for our in camera review.

After review of the filings, we conclude that the Department likely had the requisite statutory justification to withhold the subject records in full. In Stetson v. Rhode Island State Police, PR 25-71, the Complainant requested a police report relative to a specific law enforcement encounter involving a discernible member of the public. We determined that the RISP’s denial in full was lawful under the APRA. We explained that:

“the personal privacy interests at issue outweigh any public interest in the release of the responsive incident report. Furthermore, the specific nature of the request and the nature of the police report itself makes redaction impractical. As such, we find that the … withholding of the responsive incident report in its entirety was permissible under Exemption (D)(c).” See Stetson v. Rhode Island State Police, PR 25-71. 

Many of the privacy considerations addressed above with regard to the BWC footage also apply to the incident report and call screen. As such, the Department went above and beyond what is required by the APRA in granting access to these records in redacted form.[8]

Given this context, our in camera review only further confirms that the Department’s redactions comported with the statute.

Again, while the in camera nature our review limits our ability to discuss specifics, the Department redacted personally identifiable information both from the top of the incident report and that same information to the extent that it was embedded throughout the body of the report. For the same reasons articulated herein as applicable to the BWC footage, this personally identifiable information, including the cleared-individual’s name and his out-of-state address, social security number, date of birth, physical characteristics, and other, similar information, was appropriately redacted. All of this information is exempt from disclosure under the APRA.[9] See Lee v. Town of Richmond, PR 24-35 (finding no APRA violation where the Town redacted an incident report where “the information redacted was personal information”).[10]

The NYT more specifically objects to a passage that it recreated as follows:

“It should be noted that [redacted] had applied for a [redacted] from [redacted] on 09/12/25 which had been [redacted] based on [redacted].”

The redacted information is again of the type that, if produced, would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. While the basic categories of withheld information, as well as the general crux of the sentence, can likely be gleaned based upon the information that was provided, the specific information itself would reveal personal information that is non-public in nature. See Jackson v. Coventry School Department, PR 16-03 (“some of these general categories [of information] would also likely be [lawfully] redacted since disclosure would be identifiable to specific unsuccessful applicants”)

Finally, the Department redacted a photograph image of a separate document which was located in the top right-hand corner of the incident report. We find that this image was lawfully redacted pursuant to Exemption (4)(D)(e), as it documents certain aspects of the law enforcement action at the hotel that fit squarely within this provision.

Consequently, the Department did not violate the APRA in the manner that it implemented these redactions, particularly given that the Department had a strong legal basis to deny this aspect of the request in toto.

• The NYT’s Request for “warrant applications”

As previously noted, the APRA provides that all records maintained by public bodies are subject to public disclosure unless the document falls within one of the twenty-eight (28) enumerated exemptions. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2(4)(A)-(BB). (Emphasis added). As such, the initial relevant analysis under the APRA is whether a public body possesses the records sought by the requester. The underlying source of, or the circumstances surrounding the creation of, the subject records is immaterial under the APRA. See Sherman v. Office of the Governor, PR 22-45 (“[t]he Office of the Governor does not dispute that the record at issue here was forwarded to a state employee on her state email address. Therefore, as an initial matter, we find that the record in question is maintained by the Office of the Governor. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-3(a).”).

Consequently, the Department’s response to the NYT’s properly-articulated request for “warrant applications” was insufficient under the APRA. The Department responded to this request initially by stating that it “was not involved in their issuance.” In response to the NYT Complaint, the Department again stated: “the Department was not involved in the procurement of the search warrants. These were applied for and obtained by other agencies.”

While this phrasing perhaps seems to indicate that the Department does not maintain responsive “warrant applications,” it also does not amount to an unequivocal denial by the Department reflective of the same.[11]

These circumstances suggest that the Department likely may have violated the APRA by either failing to state it did not maintain a responsive record or by failing to either exempt or produce a record that it maintained. However, we find that further investigation of this issue would be inappropriate because, in either event, no relief would be warranted. The APRA provides for two types of remedies: injunctive relief and civil fines for a willful and knowing or reckless violation. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-9(d). Neither type of remedy would be appropriate here.

Here, no injunctive relief would be appropriate. If the Department does not maintain the record, then it is well-settled that it would have no obligation to produce it. See Robinson v. Rhode Island Department of Transportation, PR 25-05 (“[i]t is well-settled that a public body does not violate the APRA by not producing records it does not maintain.”). If the Department does maintain the record, we conclude that it would not be a public record because its disclosure would implicate all of the significant privacy reasons discussed above. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2(4)(D)(c). Pursuant to the same considerations discussed above, warrant applications related to a specific incident and a private individual who was not found to have engaged in wrongdoing would detrimentally impact that individuals’ privacy interests in a manner that outweighs any public interest as that term is defined in the APRA. See Caldwell v. Rhode Island College, PR 24-02 (finding that “good cause exists to not find waiver because the redacted information implicates third-party privacy interests”). Additionally, even if a violation occurred, it would not warrant the remedy of civil fines as there is no evidence that the Department engaged in willful and knowing or reckless conduct. As noted above, the record indicates the Department thoughtfully responded to these APRA requests that pertain to a unique and difficult incident and likely disclosed more than the APRA would have required. We recognize the public interest and curiosity in the records sought by these requests, but the privacy interests are paramount and permit nondisclosure.