VIA EMAIL ONLY

May 26, 2026

Mr. Matthew F. Gunnip

President, Local 580, SEIU, AFL-CIO

Benjamin Copple, Esquire

Legal Counsel, Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families

Dear Mr. Gunnip and Attorney Copple:

We have completed an investigation into the Access to Public Records Act (“APRA”) Complaint filed by Mr. Matthew Gunnip (“Complainant”) against the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families (“DCYF”). For the reasons set forth herein, we find that DCYF did not violate the APRA.

“for all qualifying cases of fatalities or near fatalities due to child abuse or neglect, self-harm, or other unnatural causes— that includes near fatalities … please provide: 1. The child’s age and gender; 2. The cause of the fatality or near fatality if it has been determined; 3. The date of the fatality or near fatality; 4. The alleged offender’s relationship with the child; 5. A summary of any previous child maltreatment reports and investigations; 6. A description of any past or current services offered or provided by the Department; 7. In the case of a fatality, the name of the child.”[1]

In responding to the request, DCYF provided the Complainant with forty-four (44) hyperlinks to DCYF public notices of a fatality or near fatality between the dates of June 3, 2023 and October 24, 2025. Soon thereafter, the Complainant appealed this response to DCYF’s chief administrative officer. The Complainant’s arguments made in that appeal mirror the substance of his instant Complaint. Essentially, the Complainant contends that DCYF’s response lacked “the specific information that ... [is] require[d] to be disclosed upon request [per his cited authority]” and that “the response appears incomplete and/or withholds information responsive to [his] request.” The Complainant seeks: 1) “[t]he seven categories of information” [identified in his initial request], 2) “[c]onfirmation that the [APRA] response includes all incidents [responsive to the Complainant’s request],” and 3) citation to “the specific statutory exemption” justifying any nonproduction of responsive records as well as a determination as to “whether redaction would permit partial release” of the records. The Complainant also provided a number of exhibits in support of his Complaint.[2]

Attorney Benjamin Copple submitted a substantive response on behalf of DCYF. In pertinent part, DCYF argues that it responded to the Complainant’s request in the manner that it interpreted the request. DCYF construed the request as seeking the “public disclosures” of “fatalit[ies] or near fatalit[ies]” that it is required to make pursuant to R.I. Gen Laws § 42-72-8(c)(2). Per the agency’s interpretation, the produced public notices serve that statutory purpose and include some of the categories of information specifically identified in the request. DCYF further argues that had the Complainant specifically requested its “confidential disclosures” of “fatalit[ies] or near fatalit[ies]” that it makes to this Office[3] and the Rhode Island Office of the Child Advocate pursuant to separate provisions of that statute (R.I. Gen Laws § 42-72-8(c)(3), (4)), it would have denied the request in full pursuant to multiple State laws and provisions of the APRA. It adds that no reasonably segregable portion would be available for public disclosure. Additionally, DCYF argues that the burden is on the requester to properly frame the scope of a request and that it was under no obligation under the APRA to create a document reflective of the information sought by the Complainant.

We acknowledge the Complainant’s Rebuttal.[4] Among other arguments, the Complainant invokes CAPTA and its underlying purpose to “examine the performance of the child-welfare system” through its “public-disclosure provision,” which the Complainant contends requires DCYF to provide him with his requested information.[5]

Here, careful review of the Complainant’s initial, November 16, 2025 request makes clear that at no point did the Complainant explicitly request a specific set of records, but instead broadly sought certain categories of information. Several paragraphs leading up to the actual content of the Complainant’s request itself consist of legal authority that the Complainant asserts “establish [DCYF’s] public disclosure obligations.” This preamble, however, does not reference any specific records that were being sought. More to the point, the wording of this portion of the request affirms that the Complainant is seeking “information” rather than particular records. For example, the request states that DCYF is required to disclose “information when there are no findings” and notes that “the State must provide disclosure of this information.” (Emphasis added). The specific content of request itself is consistent with this preliminary language, as it is worded as not seeking records or documents but rather seven (7) categories of information pertaining to “qualifying cases of fatalities or near fatalities.” As such, the Complainant’s request was improperly framed at the outset by seeking categories of information as opposed to specified records. See Caldwell v. Department of Administration, PR 23-40 (“Although the statutory definition of public records is extensive, the APRA—like its federal counterpart, the Freedom of Information Act (‘FOIA’)—ultimately deals with ‘records, not information in the abstract.’” (quoting Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 185 (1980))); see also Goldgar v. Office of Administration, Executive Office of the President, 26 F.3d 32, 34 (5th Cir. 1994) (“The distinction that [plaintiff] attempts to make between ‘information’ and ‘records' does not advance his case; in fact, such a distinction supports the trial court’s dismissal of his suit, because the FOIA applies only to information in record form.”).[6]

Nevertheless, despite a lack of “sufficient particularity [in the wording of the request] … to enable [DCYF] to determine precisely what records [were] being requested” by the Complainant, DCYF made a good faith attempt to fulfill the Complainant’s request. As noted, DCYF provided the Complainant with “public disclosures” (in essence, press releases) which served to notify the public of child “fatalit[ies] or near fatalit[ies]” pursuant to R.I. Gen Laws § 42-72-8(c)(2). The produced notices cover the time period specified in the Complainant’s request. Review of a sampling of these “public disclosures” demonstrate that they contain at least some of the itemized information sought by the Complainant. See Crenshaw v. Rhode Island Department of Public Safety, PR 18-06 (declining to find an APRA violation partially due to the DPS’s “good faith attempt to resolve [the request]”).

In the instant matter, faced with a request that did not identify any specific documents it was seeking, DCYF interpreted the request as seeking the “public disclosures” made pursuant to R.I. Gen Laws § 42-72-8(c)(2), which it produced in its initial response. The Complainant’s unclear framing of his request (including by seeking information rather than identified records) and DCYF’s good faith attempt to fulfill that request sufficiently demonstrate DCYF’s compliance with the APRA.[7]

Although the Complainant’s request did not specifically seek the “confidential disclosures” made to certain State entities pursuant to R.I. Gen Laws § 42-72-8(c)(3) and (4), we choose to provide some guidance regarding the status of such records under the APRA in the event that the Complainant should choose to submit a new APRA request to DCYF seeking specific identified records. 

R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-72-8(c)(3) states that “[t]he director shall disclose to the office of the child advocate [specified] information … when there is a substantiated finding of child abuse or neglect that resulted in a child fatality or near fatality … [and] may disclose the same information to the office of the attorney general and other entities allowable under [CAPTA].” (Emphasis added). R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-72-8(c)(4) sets forth “[t]he information that must be disclosed in accordance with [this prior provision],” and these categories of information enumerated in § 42-72-8(c)(4) closely resemble the information sought by the Complainant. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-72-8(c)(3), (4). The plain language of R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-72-8(c)(3) does not contemplate a disclosure of this specified information to the public at large, but rather to distinct State entities, i.e., “the office of the child advocate,” “the office of the attorney general” and “other entities allowable under [CAPTA].” The fact that R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-72-8(c)(4) sets forth certain categories of information that is disclosable to certain enumerated State entities does not support any contention that such records are public to all under the APRA. Indeed, these provisions must be read in harmony with a different provision of the statute, which provides that “[a]ny records of the department pertaining to children and their families in need of service pursuant to the provisions of this chapter; or for whom an application for services has been made, shall be confidential and only disclosed as provided by law.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-72-8(a).

The Complainant has not identified any such “law” that would provide for the disclosure to the public of the reports to certain state entities containing the information enumerated in R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-72-8(c)(4). Reading these provisions together, the statute reflects a legislative intent to limit disclosure of the reports contemplated in R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-72-8(c)(3) and (4) to the specifically enumerated entities identified in the statute as the recipients of those reports. Similarly, the subject records entirely consist of DCYF records and relate to incidents of “child abuse or neglect.” See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-72-8(c)(3). R.I. Gen. Laws § 40-11-13(a) generally deems such records to be confidential. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 40-11-13(a) (“[a]ll records concerning reports of child abuse and neglect, including reports made to the department, shall be confidential”).

This determination is further supported by the fact that the enumerated categories of information implicate privacy interests and healthcare information, which are subject to APRA exemptions. See Bilow v. Coventry Police Department, PR 25-22 (“[w]e note that the … response did reference that the report contains ‘medical information prohibited from release under the HIPAA Act,’ which may have sufficiently referenced Exemption (S), which exempts records that are confidential by law”); Ebertz v. Department of Corrections (“[w]e note that both state and federal health care laws generally provide privacy protections regarding a decedent's healthcare information. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013) (defining ‘protected health information’ under … (HIPAA) as individually identifiable health information for a person who has been deceased for fifty years or less); R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37.3-3(1)(iii)”) (emphasis added); see also R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 38-2-2(4)(A)(I)(b), (S). Also, the sensitive nature of these records is reinforced in that all responsive information pertains to a “child” or children. See, e.g. Lee v. Town of Richmond, PR 24-35 (“[o]ur in camera review of the responsive … [records] confirms that the requested records implicate significant privacy concerns for the subjects of the records, especially a minor child mentioned in the report”). (Emphasis added).[8]   

To be sure, this analysis does not mean that all information sought by the Complainant would be exempt under the APRA. Both DCYF’s procedures[9] and the law confirm that some information related to the Complainant’s request is public. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-72-8(c)(2) (“The director shall make public disclosure of a confirmed fatality or near fatality of a child who is the subject of a DCYF case within 48 hours of confirmation, provided disclosure of such information is in general terms and does not jeopardize a pending criminal investigation.”). The press release-type notices that DCYF provided to the Complainant in response to his APRA request similarly demonstrate DCYF’s own acknowledgment that not all of the information relevant to the Complainant’s request is non-public. And although we conclude that R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-72-8(c)(3) and (4) only pertains to the enumerated state entities and does not create a public entitlement to the information delineated therein, that does not necessarily mean that none of that information is public. On this record and in light of our other conclusions, we find it unnecessary to definitively determine whether any segregable portions of those “confidential reports” may be public to the extent that they contain information that is public, such as if they contain information contained in the press releases DCYF provided to the Complainant. In this finding, we do not intend to conclusively define the entire universe of what DCYF information may be public, or what public (or partially public) documents DCYF may maintain reflecting that information. But any APRA analysis must take into account the highly sensitive nature of the information at issue and the statutory confidentiality provisions pertaining to DCYF records.

As noted, the Complainant is free to submit another APRA request specifically identifying the records being sought, and if he does so, DCYF should respond in a manner consistent with the APRA, including by identifying any responsive records being withheld and the basis for such withholding, and whether any portions are reasonably segregable. We also urge both the Complainant and DCYF to bear in mind the guidance provided in this finding in connection with any future APRA requests, and we encourage the Complainant to frame any such requests in a manner that is consistent with the DCYF confidentiality statutes discussed herein.