Background and Arguments

The Complainant submitted a public records request to the Department seeking:

[1.]  Access/custody logs (electronic audit trails and physical sign-out sheets) showing every instance any part of my personnel file was viewed, printed, scanned, e-mailed, or handled. (I already possess the file itself.)

[2.] All internal communications (e-mails, Teams/Slack messages, texts, memoranda) referencing my employment, discipline, termination, or the anonymous Facebook posts dated 26 Mar 2025 and 28 Mar 2025.

[3.]  Telephone-system and voicemail logs for my 27 Mar 2025 11:58 AM voicemail to Jessica Santiago, including any play, forward, save, or delete actions.

[4.]  Voicemail metadata / audit logs for that message: creation time, each access/forward/deletion event, user ID/extension, and any indication of speaker-phone or remote playback.

[5.]    Audit logs for Jessica Santiago’s e-mail and Teams/Slack accounts from 27 Mar 2025 11:00 AM to 29 Mar 2025 11:00 AM, showing any forwarding or transmission of the voicemail (audio or transcript).

[6.]  Current policies and procedures governing confidentiality of employee records, data-security controls for MUNIS/HRIS and paper files, and breach-notification duties under the Identity Theft Protection Act of 2015 (R.l. Gen. Laws § 11-49.3).

[7.]    Investigative notes, reports, or draft findings prepared in response to my 28 Mar 2025 complaint or any related review of unauthorized access to personnel records.

The Department responded to the Complainant’s requests for items number one, four, five, and seven by informing him that “[n]o such records exist” and the Department “does not have or maintain such records.” In response to item two, the Department provided the Complainant with responsive emails, however it withheld an additional two emails in their entirety pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2(4)(M) (“Exemption (M)”) and § 38-2-2(4)(P) (“Exemption (P)”). In response to item three, the Department provided the Complainant with two responsive call logs. Finally, in response to item six, the Department provided the Complainant with an excerpt from the employee handbook regarding personnel files.

The Complainant then administratively appealed the Department’s partial denial to Acting Superintendent Randy Buck. The Complainant challenged the Department’s assertion that various types of records did not exist as these requests sought “basic items such as electric audit trails, voicemail metadata, internal HR investigation materials, and IT security logs.” He asserted that “any functioning public HR/IT system―including those managed under MUNIS/HRIS or Tyler Technologies―should retain such records under both public records and data protection laws.” He further asserted that the Department did not “adequately explain[ ] why such standard system records are missing” and “[i]f no such records truly exist, this could represent a failure to comply with R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-49.3, the Rhode Island Identify Theft Protection Act of 2015.”

He additionally challenged the Department’s withholding of two emails under Exemption (M) as he argued this “exemption is narrowly tailored to protect constituent communications with elected officials” and “[i]t does not apply to interdepartmental communications involving staff.” He asserted that here “[n]one of the records [he] requested involve constituent correspondence or deliberations between elected officials.” He further challenged the Department’s withholding of those same emails under Exemption (P) as this “exemption is only applicable when a public body is formally investigating a violation of law” and he requested records “related to the handling of [his] personnel complaint, not a criminal prosecution or law enforcement inquiry.”

Acting Superintendent Buck affirmed the Department’s partial denial. Superintendent Buck stated that the Complainant was previously advised that several requested records did not exist and Buck had “confirmed with the appropriate subordinates under my supervision that these records do not exist.” Regarding the emails withheld under Exemptions (M) and (P), he affirmed the exemptions’ applicability to the withheld emails and stated that “[a]fter conferring with legal counsel, I do not agree with your interpretation of these exemptions.”

The Complainant then submitted the instant Complaint to this Office. The Complainant asserts that the Department failed to properly substantiate its representation that records he requested do not exist. He argues that under R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-3(b), “[w]hen denying access based on nonexistence public bodies must demonstrate a factual basis, such as: Data retention policies[,] Documentation of system limitations[,] Written affidavits from record custodians.” He further asserts that the Department improperly withheld two records in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-7(a) because Superintendent Buck failed to state in his response to the administrative appeal: “What those two records are[,] What exemption(s) were applied[,] Why those exemptions apply to the specific contents.”

The Department submitted a substantive Response to the instant Complaint through its legal counsel Dioney Garcia, Esq. The Department asserts that it complied with R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-7(c) when it informed him that the records he requested did not exist as such statute states only that a public body shall state that it does not have or maintain the requested records. It argues that “[t]here is no legal or practical basis cited by [the Complainant] … that would require the [Department] to prove a negative when no such records exist.”

The Department further asserts that the Complainant is “being disingenuous in the lack of cited exemptions in Superintendent Buck’s response to [his] administrative appeal.” It asserts that R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-7(a) applies only to APRA request responses, not administrative appeal responses. Further, it asserts that Superintendent Buck affirmed the withholding of these records.

We acknowledge the Complainant’s rebuttal.

Relevant Law and Findings

When we examine an APRA complaint, our authority is to determine whether a violation of the APRA has occurred.  See R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-8.  In doing so, we must begin with the plain language of the APRA and relevant caselaw interpreting this statute.

·         Superintendent Buck’s response to the Complainant’s administrative appeal

The APRA provides that if a requester is not satisfied with the response they receive from a public body they may submit an administrative appeal to the chief administrative officer of that public body. R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-8(a). The chief administrative officer shall make a final determination within ten business days after the submission of the appeal. Id.

Superintendent Buck responded to the Complainant’s administrative appeal by affirming the Department’s partial denial. He stated that the Complainant was previously advised that several requested records did not exist and Buck had “confirmed with the appropriate subordinates under my supervision that these records do not exist.” He further affirmed the Department’s application of APRA exemptions to the withheld records.

The Complainant alleges that Superintendent Buck’s response to his administrative appeal violated R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-3(b) by failing to provide a “factual basis” for why no responsive records existed in response to some items in the Complainant’s request and the Superintendent’s response violated R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-7(a) because he failed to provide a “record-by-record analysis or reference to the exemption statute.”

However, the APRA does not require that public bodies provide detailed legal analysis as to why certain exemptions apply or provide a Vaughn index or other similar description of the withheld records in either their initial denial or in response to an administrative appeal. See Zurier v. Office of General Treasurer, PR 23-30 (finding a public body is not required to create a Vaughn index). R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-8(a) only requires a chief administrative officer to “make a final determination”, it does not place any obligation on chief administrative officers to include certain analysis or explanations in their responses. As to the Complainant’s allegation that Superintendent Buck did not cite to specific APRA exemptions in his response, this Office is satisfied that Superintendent Buck incorporated such citations by reference when he affirmed the Department’s application of such APRA exemptions in withholding responsive records. Accordingly, we do not find that Superintendent Buck’s response to the Complainant’s administrative appeal violated the APRA. 

·         The Department’s withholding of two emails

Under R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-7(a), a public body must provide a requester in writing with the “specific reasons for the denial.” Here, the Department informed the Complainant that it was denying his request for two responsive emails as they were exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemptions (M) and (P). The Complainant alleges that this violated the APRA because the Department “fail[ed] to state: What those two records are [,] What exemption(s) were applied [,] Why those exemptions apply to the specific contents.” More specifically, the Complainant argues in his rebuttal that the Department was required to provide “record-specific reasons―e.g., for each withheld email, a brief description (date, sender/recipient, subject/description) tied to the cited exemption―sufficient to satisfy § 38-2-7(a).”

However, the Department’s citations to specific APRA exemptions in its partial denial satisfied its obligation under R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-7(a). The APRA does not require that public bodies provide detailed legal analysis as to why certain exemptions apply or provide a Vaughn index or other similar description of the withheld records. See Zurier, PR 23-30 (finding a public body is not required to create a Vaughn index). Although we encourage public bodies to provide as much detail and explanation as possible in their denials, this Office has consistently applied a flexible and practical approach that accords with the legislative decision in drafting the APRA not to impose extensive or detailed requirements for identifying withheld records and the reasons for withholding. See Finnegan v. Town of Scituate, PR 20-41 (finding that a denial of records did not violate the APRA even though it did not cite a specific exemption because its response “generally corresponds” with an APRA exemption and “nothing in the APRA requires a denial to cite a specific APRA exemption”); Piskunov v. City of Cranston, PR 16-41 (finding a public body did not violate APRA when it denied access to the requested records by stating that the records were “private and confidential personnel and investigative materials”). Here, there is no question the Department satisfied the APRA’s requirement where it cited the specific exemptions pursuant to which it was withholding the responsive emails.

Conclusion

Although this Office has found no violation, nothing within the APRA prohibits an individual or entity from instituting an action for injunctive or declaratory relief in Superior Court as provided in the APRA.  See R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-8(b).  Please be advised that we are closing this file as of the date of this letter.

We thank you for your interest in keeping government open and accountable to the public.

Sincerely,

PETER F. NERONHA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

By: /s/ Patrick Reynolds

Patrick Reynolds

Special Assistant Attorney General