Header

VIA EMAIL ONLY

 

October 28, 2026

 

PR 26-38

 

Ms. Christina Rourke

 

Joshua A. Soares, Esq.

Senior Legal Counsel, Rhode Island Department of Corrections

 

 

Re:       Rourke v. Rhode Island Department of Corrections

 

Dear Ms. Rourke and Attorney Soares:

 

The investigation into the Access to Public Records Act (“APRA”) complaint filed by Ms. Christina Rourke (“Complainant”) against the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (“RIDOC”) is complete. For the reasons set forth herein, we find that the RIDOC violated the APRA.

 

Background

 

The Complainant contends that she submitted an APRA request to the RIDOC on July 1, 2026 seeking: “Report to Governor, CSG JRI DV #EO 22-25, draft and final.” The Complainant included with her Complaint an email communication from the RIDOC, dated July 16, 2026, extending the public body’s time to respond to the APRA request by twenty (20) business days. She does not take issue with the RIDOC’s assertion of an extension but contends that the RIDOC failed to substantively respond to the request within that extended timeframe. As described below, the record reflects that the RIDOC responded to the Complainant’s request by providing her with a responsive record the same day it received notice of this Complaint.

 

The RIDOC’s Senior Legal Counsel submitted a substantive Response to the Complaint on behalf of the RIDOC. The RIDOC concedes that it was “tardy by three (3) days in responding to the Complainant’s request.” The RIDOC cites a number of factors that it submits contributed to this tardiness and militates against a finding of a willful and knowing or reckless APRA violation. For example, the RIDOC notes that the “request was vague,” that the RIDOC was unsure as to whether the requested record (based on its interpretation of the request) was something it “would have within its custody or control,” and that RIDOC personnel needed to connect with other government agencies to confirm whether the record it possessed was the one sought by the Complainant. While this was happening, the RIDOC avers that it was managing “a full caseload of various litigation [matters] in State and federal courts without an administrative assistant.” That said, the RIDOC notes that it “provided [the Complainant] with the requested document without assessing any costs.” The RIDOC included with its Response an affidavit executed by its Senior Legal Counsel attesting to the facts set forth therein, along with accompanying exhibits, as well as records reflecting the underlying communications between the RIDOC and the Complainant.

 

The Complainant noted that she would “not be submitting an official rebuttal.”

 

Relevant Law and Findings

 

When we examine an APRA complaint, our authority is to determine whether a violation of the APRA has occurred. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-8. In doing so, we must begin with the plain language of the APRA and relevant caselaw interpreting this statute.

 

Pursuant to the APRA, a public body has ten (10) business days to respond in some capacity to a records request, whether by producing responsive documents, denying the request with reason(s), or extending the period necessary to comply. See R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 38-2-3(e), 38-2-7. A public body may extend the time to respond to an APRA request by an additional twenty (20) business days “if it can demonstrate that the voluminous nature of the request, the number of requests for records pending, or the difficulty in searching for and retrieving or copying the requested records, is such that additional time is necessary to avoid imposing an undue burden on the public body.” Id.[1]  

 

Here, it is undisputed that, after asserting a twenty (20) business-day extension, the RIDOC was “tardy by three (3) days in responding to the Complainant’s request.” Accordingly, we conclude that the RIDOC violated the APRA when it failed to respond to Complainant’s request within the statutory time period. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-7.

 

Conclusion

 

Upon a finding of an APRA violation, the Attorney General may file a complaint in Superior Court on behalf of the Complainant requesting “injunctive or declaratory relief.” See R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-8(b). A court “shall impose a civil fine not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000) against a public body. . . found to have committed a knowing and willful violation of this chapter, and a civil fine not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) against a public body found to have recklessly violated this chapter.” See R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-9(d).

 

We conclude that insufficient evidence exists to find a willful and knowing, or alternatively reckless, violation. We are unaware of any recent, similar violations by the RIDOC, nor does the Complainant bring any such prior violations to our attention. See Solas v. North Providence School Department, PR 26-11 (declining to find a willful and knowing or reckless APRA violation due to the absence of any recent, similar violations by the Department); Solas v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, PR 26-13.

 

Additionally, the record establishes that the RIDOC’s tardy response was attributable to a confluence of issues that each played a part in the delay. As noted, the RIDOC was unsure as to what precisely the Complainant was seeking and, in order to facilitate access to the subject record, it sought to liaise with the Governor’s Office as to the same.[2] The RIDOC submits that in doing so, its fulfilment of the request was waylaid in that it was only able to connect with the Governor’s Office the day before the instant Complaint was filed. While an entity’s timely fulfillment of an APRA request should not be inhibited due to its pending requests for information from external entities, the RIDOC’s efforts nevertheless demonstrate a good faith attempt to fulfill the Complainant’s request, which undermines any contention that the RIDOC’s actions were willful and knowing or reckless. See Hoff  Stephen vs. Town of Charlestown, PR 22-07 (declining to assess civil fines where the record indicated that the public body “spent a great deal of time … responding to the Complainant’s various, often-changing APRA requests and made a good faith effort to be responsive.”); see also Rourke v. Rhode Island Judiciary, PR 25-10 (declining to find a willful and knowing or reckless violation partly because the Judiciary “had been attentive to [the] Complainant’s requests for assistance”).

 

We also do not find injunctive relief to be appropriate, since the undisputed record indicates that the Complainant is now in possession of the requested record. In an affidavit, the RIDOC’s Senior Legal Counsel attests to the fact that “[t]he same day [that the RIDOC received the instant Complaint], [the RIDOC] emailed [the] Complainant a response letter, and provided [the] Complainant with the [requested record].” As noted, the RIDOC also submits that “[t]he Legal Office reached out to the Governor’s Office to confirm whether [what was provided] would be a responsive document,” and later confirmed that the Governor’s Office “received a similar request from [the] Complainant and provided the same document to [the] Complainant.” Again, the Complainant expressly stated that she would “not be submitting an official rebuttal.” Therefore, on this record, there is every indication that the Complainant is in possession of the record she sought. See Kelly v. Kingston Hill Academy, PR 25-57 (finding injunctive relief to be inappropriate because it was undisputed that the Complainant received the records responsive to the request); see also Neilly v. Nuestro Mundo Public Charter School, PR 23-01 (declining to pursue injunctive relief where it was “undisputed … that the Complainant [was] in possession of the requested documents”).[3]

 

This finding serves as notice that the conduct discussed herein violates the APRA and may serve as evidence of a willful and knowing, or reckless, violation in any similar future situation. Although the Attorney General will not file suit in this matter, nothing within the APRA prohibits the Complainant from instituting an action for injunctive or declaratory relief in Superior Court. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-8(b). Please be advised that we are closing this file as of the date of this letter.

 

We thank you for your interest in keeping government open and accountable to the public.

 

Sincerely,

 

PETER F. NERONHA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

 

/s/ Adam D. Roach

Adam D. Roach

Special Assistant Attorney General

 



[1] As noted, the Complainant did not object to the RIDOC’s assertion of an extension.

[2] Based on the record before us, it does not appear that the RIDOC attempted to clarify the nature of the Complainant’s request with the Complainant herself, even though the RIDOC nevertheless properly asserted an extension. We acknowledge that the burden is ultimately on the requester to properly frame the nature of their request. See ARCHaiTECH LLC v. City of Newport, PR 25-59. That said, we stress that communication between the parties is key, as communication between a requester and a public body can often promote understanding, clarify ambiguities, and resolve disputes. See Rourke v. Rhode Island Judiciary, PR 25-01.

APRA

[3] Importantly, when the RIDOC furnished the Complainant with the requested document, the Complainant forwarded that communication to this Office and restated this Office’s instruction that “all parties [be] copied on any correspondence regarding th[e] complaint.” She did not, however, challenge the sufficiency of the provided record or in any way indicate that the record was incomplete or non-responsive to the initial request.

Published by ClerkBase
©2026 by Clerkbase. No Claim to Original Government Works.